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Donald MacKinnon (1913-1994) is arguably one of the most influential Anglican theologians 
in the British context in the second half of the 20
th
 century. His writings reveal a restive and 
unsystematic thinker, yet there is a good case to be made that a series of reoccurring 
questions – ‘obsessions’ might better suit MacKinnon’s temperament –appear throughout. 
These relate to the demands of moral realism, the tensions between the philosophical 
positions of realism and idealism generally, and the perennially disruptive presence of Christ, 
whose redemptive significance cannot be fully appreciated apart from a tragic ascription.  
The first chapter proposes a new lens through which MacKinnon’s project may be viewed. It 
will characterise his work as a form of ‘therapeutic’ philosophy that combines a call for 
intense interiority and moral realism in a way that sees these notions as mutually involved 
and reinforcing. As the chapter progresses the extent to which Kant lies behind much of 
MacKinnon’s therapeutic language of ‘purgation’ and ‘illumination’ will become clear. So 
too the fact that moral realism becomes, for MacKinnon, both the end of a certain therapeutic 
discipline and a commitment that shapes his engagement with philosophy and theology at 
every level. It characterises a ‘form of life’. MacKinnon never sets out a systematic defence 
of moral realism nor for his insistence that the tension between idealism and realism is at 
once a) something crucial for theologians to confront explicitly, b) a tension that necessarily 
exists and remains perennially unsolved, and c) results in the continued need for a language 
of metaphysics. Yet, these ideas occur again and again throughout his corpus. They emerge 
as philosophical inevitabilities from within the task of continued description and re-
description of human experience in all its historical particularity. An examination of the key 
influences on MacKinnon follows in Chapter 2, and it is here we can detect one of the 
sources of MacKinnon’s restiveness as he seeks to imbibe insights from a confident moral 
apologic theology of the previous generation, while at the same time respecting the ways in 
which the analytical turn had highlighted the impossibility of such projects. The rest of the 
thesis is spent looking at various domains in which MacKinnon’s therapeutic moral realism 
comes to the fore. These include his understanding of Christ (Chapter 3), his convictions as to 
the indispensability of good literature for moral philosophy (Chapter 4) and his response to 
Wittgenstein as he sought to articulate his own distinctive moral and theological convictions 
(Chapter 5). The thesis concludes with words of affirmation and critique, having shown 
MacKinnon to represent a compelling voice in support of catholic humanism that remains 
provocative into the 21
st
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An Introduction to Donald MacKinnon and the Thesis 
 
Continued engagement with MacKinnon’s thought and legacy is almost exclusively limited 
to scholars within the Anglo-American domain, which is hardly surprising given 
MacKinnon’s localised focus and influence within the British Isles. Most of the interest in his 
legacy arose, at least initially, from his students and colleagues at Cambridge University in 
the decade after his retirement. This is chiefly represented by two books of essays published 
in the 1980s. The first was edited by Brian Hebblethwaite and Stewart Sutherland: The 
Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays Presented to D.M. MacKinnon, and 
the second was edited by Kenneth Surin and entitled Christ, Ethics and Tragedy; Essays in 
Honour of Donald MacKinnon.
1
 The tenor of both books (particularly the first) is not so 
much comprehensive exegesis of MacKinnon’s theological and philosophical project, but 
rather critical appreciations and creative extrapolations of a selection of key themes.
2
 Having 
said this, I rate essays by Williams, Kerr and Milbank in the latter volume as particularly 
incisive explications of MacKinnon’s core commitments that also pose criticisms which cut 
to the heart of his project.  
Subsequently other notable examples have emerged in which MacKinnon has been taken up 
as either a key conversation partner or cited prominently within various scholarly projects. A 
number come to mind. First are the PhD projects that engage MacKinnon as a conversation 
partner. I am aware of three, authored by John McDowell, Paul Murray and Helen Atkins 
respectively. In each, MacKinnon is brought in to play a certain ‘role’. McDowell draws on 
MacKinnon to supplement aspects of Karl Barth’s eschatology which he judged to be lacking 
sensibility to the tragic, particularly when it came to questions of theodicy.
3
 Adkins places 
MacKinnon in the midst of Vanstone, Coakley and Williams for a creative project on 
                                                          
1
 Brian Hebblethwaite and Stewart R. Sutherland, eds., The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian 
Theology: Essays Presented to D.M. Mackinnon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); 
Kenneth Surin, ed. Christ, Ethics and Tragedy: Essays in Honour of Donald MacKinnon (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
2
 André Muller, "Donald M. MacKinnon The True Service of the Particular, 1913-1959" (Unpblished 
PhD Theiss, University of Otago, 2010), 1-2. 
3
 The key features of his argument with respect to MacKinnon is reproduced in John C McDowell, 
"Rend Your Speech a Little: Reading Karl Barth's das Nichtige Through Donald MacKinnon's Tragic 
Vision," in Conversing with Barth, ed. John C. McDowell and Mike Higton (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2004), 142-72. One of MacDowell’s students has continued to expand this line of enquiry: Scott 
Kirkland, "Particularity Regained: Kenotically Recovering a Theological Pedagogy in Karl Barth and 
Donald MacKinnon," Irish Theological Quarterly 80, no. 1 (2015): 56-82.   
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kenoticism, and more specifically a consideration of the way metaphors of space and sound 
can help explicate or critique the work of these figures on the theme.
4
  Then there is Paul 
Murray whose interests are probably the closest to my own in that his project focused on 
post-foundationalist notions of rationality and its impact on theology, drawing on Rorty, 
Rescher and MacKinnon.
5
   
MacKinnon also features prominently in at least six recent theological monographs. First, he 
is given strong representation in Paul Janz’s work of philosophical theology, God the Mind’s 
Desire, which offers a defence of MacKinnon’s reading of Kant and provides what is 
possibly the longest exposition and appreciation of MacKinnon’s engagement with the 
realist-idealist distinction currently in print.
6
 Secondly, Ben Quash references MacKinnon as 
one of his principal conversation partners in his Theology and the Drama of History. For 
Quash, MacKinnon is ‘[o]ne of the great twentieth-century theological minds to reflect upon 
the way theology and history must understand each other… [and he] anticipated the 
importance of Balthasar’s Theodramatik in precisely this area’.
7
 Thirdly, and in a similar vein 
to Quash, Vanhoozer has used MacKinnon as an inspiration for his project in exploring the 
way a focus on links between drama and theology may open for the latter new 
epistemological and hermeneutical pathways.
8
 Fourthly, MacKinnon’s name appears several 
times throughout a recent edited work by Waller and Taylor on the theme of ‘theology and 
tragedy’, as well as being the sole focus of one chapter.
9
 Additionally, Anthony Cane 
references MacKinnon critically and extensively in his work on the figure of Judas Iscariot
10
 
                                                          
4
 Imogen Helen Adkins, Sound, space and Christological self-giving (with special reference to 
William Vanstone, Sarah Coakley, Rowan Williams, and Donald MacKinnon) (Unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Cambridge, 2013).  
5
 My own project could be seen as an elaboration of Murray’s observations under the section heading 
‘MacKinnon on the Good’. Paul D. Murray, "Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatist Perspective: 
A Study in the Theological Relevance of Postfoundationalist Approaches to Human Rationality with 
Particular Reference to the Work of Richard Rorty, Nicholas Rescher and Donald MacKinnon" 
(University of Cambridge, 2003), 158-69.   
6
 Paul D. Janz, God, the Mind's Desire: Reference, Reason, and Christian Thinking (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
7
 Ben Quash, Theology and the Drama of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
10. 
8
 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "Once More Into the Borderlands: The Way of Wisdom in Philosopy and 
Theology after the 'Turn to Drama'," in Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology: 
Reason, Meaning and Experience, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer and Martin Warner (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007), 31-35. 
9
 Giles Waller, "Freedom, Fate and Sin in Donald MacKinnion's Use of Tragedy," in Christian 
Theology and Tragedy : Theologians, Tragic Literature, and Tragic Theory, ed. T. Kevin Taylor and 
Giles Waller (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 101-18. 
10
 Anthony Cane, The Place of Judas Iscariot in Christology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 
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and MacKinnon is also positively mentioned by DeHart in a book dealing with contemporary 
reception and interpretation of Aquinas.
11
 Indeed, under the heading 'Is there an intuition of 
being? MacKinnon and Lash on analogy in Aquinas’, DeHart says this: 
In many ways this story, like much that is most interesting in recent theology in 
England, begins with Donald MacKinnon. The towering, eccentric Scotsman (no 
Presbyterian but rather member of the Episcopal Church of Scotland (sic), and a 
catholic in ecclesial and theological outlook) held the Norris-Hulse chair in Cambridge 
for almost twenty years (1960-78). As he threaded his life's path of agonizingly self-
aware dissent over the course of the blood-soaked twentieth century, he launched one 
attempt after another toward a contemporary retrieval of the implicit ontology of 
Nicaea and Chalcedon, always faithful to a creatively Kantian ethics of the limits of 
cognition, and deeply colored by his bruisingly intimate feel for the irredeemability of 
historical suffering. This (for its time) highly atypical theological stance challenged 
and intrigued any number of independent thinkers, especially at Cambridge, as did his 
tireless recommendations of Barth and Balthasar in a period of Anglican theology when 
the first was far from popular and the second hardly known'.
12
   
 
The most important shift in academic interest in MacKinnon coincided with the onset of the 
21
st
 century, particularly with the emergence of PhD research projects that have focused on 
MacKinnon in his own right. The most significant contribution has been the excellent work 
of André Muller, whose doctoral thesis has provided a detailed intellectual biography of 
MacKinnon up until 1959, with a second volume now being prepared.
13
 Muller’s work is an 
indispensable foundation for all future work on MacKinnon. The other significant publication 
is that by Timothy Connor, whose research was published in 2011 under the title The Kenotic 
Trajectory of the Church in Donald MacKinnon’s Theology; From Galilee to Jerusalem to 
Galilee.
14
 This project was developed almost contemporaneously with that of Muller’s and 
did not benefit from the latter’s deep engagement with MacKinnon’s formative influences. 
Even so, it does provide an incisive analysis of the interactions between ecclesiological and 
christological themes of MacKinnon’s various writings and places them in the wider context 
of the ruptures and tensions of Anglican ecclesiastical polity. In addition, both projects have 
been instrumental in achieving what George Steiner called for in his 1994 tribute to 
MacKinnon: a concerted effort to begin collating MacKinnon’s disparate published and 
unpublished material in order to bring it to a wider audience.
15
 In this vein, Muller has 
collated and is currently editing a comprehensive collection of essays spanning MacKinnon’s 
                                                          
11
 Paul DeHart, Aquinas and Radical Orthodoxy; A Critical Enquiry (Oxford: Routledge, 2012).   
12
 Ibid., 38. 
13
 Muller, "True Service". 
14
 Timothy G. Connor, The Kenotic Trajectory of the Church in Donald Mackinnon's Theology: From 
Galilee to Jerusalem to Galilee (London: T & T Clark, 2011). 
15
 George Steiner, "Tribute to Donald MacKinnon," Theology 98, no. 781 (1995): 5. 
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whole professional life, and both he and Connor have compiled exhaustive bibliographies. In 
addition to these, McDowell has recently edited a ‘Donald MacKinnon Reader’,
16
 a new 
edition of Borderlands has recently been reissued
17
 and a collection of MacKinnon’s essays 
on the theme of ecclesiology are being prepared for publication.
18
       
My thesis will continue within this linage of research on the premise that there remains much 
to be explored and uncovered in fully accounting for MacKinnon’s legacy. In 2012 I had the 
opportunity to ask Stanley Hauerwas about this and received his verdict: ‘MacKinnon saved 
British theology!’, which given the content of our discussion to that point, I took as an 
endorsement of MacKinnon’s attempt to reframe theology in light of a rejection of 
‘constantinianism’ and the ‘Christendom project’, his suspicion of popular theological 
modernisers and liberals of the 1960s and 70s and his willingness to sit at the feet of Barth on 
christology. Hauerwas’s exclamation was characteristic hyperbole, but it was this encounter, 
as well as subsequent conversations with MacKinnon’s students such as Rowan Williams, 
Nicholas Lash, Brian Hebblethwaite, Fergus Kerr and David Fergusson, as well as his long-
time friend George Steiner, that convinced me that MacKinnon’s contribution warranted 
further exploration.   
What follows is a thesis that is largely sympathetic to MacKinnon, perhaps too much so. Yet 
I think an effort to focus on enduring positive insights is warranted because they have often 
been obscured by MacKinnon’s own style, by the fact that it was impossible to establish any 
discrete and enduring school of thought in his name, and by the fact that he was so immersed 
in the particular theological and political controversies of his day that some may be tempted 
to see his work as speaking exclusively to a past epoch.
19
 As I began to read MacKinnon 
more deeply I became convinced of two things. First, that there was insufficient attention in 
the current literature pertaining to the way a commitment to moral realism appears over his 
disparate writings, providing a point of connection between his theological and philosophical 
interests. Secondly, I began to ponder if there was more that could be said about 
                                                          
16
 D. M. MacKinnon, Philosophy and the Burden of Theological Honesty: A Donald MacKinnon 
Reader, ed. John C. McDowell (London: T & T Clark, 2011). 
17
 Borderlands of Theology, and Other Essays by Donald M. MacKinnon, ed. George W. Roberts and 
Donovan E. Smucker (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2011). 
18
 Scott A. Kirkland, Moyse, Ashley J., McDowell, John C., ed. The Church in Dispossession: The 
Ecclesiological Writings of Donald M. MacKinnon (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016 Forthcoming). 
19
 Janz speaks about MacKinnon as one ‘…whose illuminating and highly relevant contributions to 
[the philosophical problem of anti-realism and realism] have been all but lost in contemporary 
treatments and whose insight opens the debate to theological problems in enormously productive 
ways.’ Janz, God, the Mind's Desire, 52. 
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MacKinnon’s methodology beyond such labels as ‘deliberately unsystematic’. I address this 
latter concern with the proposal that MacKinnon’s method has a distinctly ‘therapeutic’ 
character. The issue of MacKinnon’s moral realism and call for metaphysical renewal are 
interlocking themes across the whole thesis. It is a realism that seeks to contemplate suffering 
borne of evil unflinchingly, together with the presence of Christ, who (for MacKinnon) is 
always the crucified messiah of history and the mystical body of the church catholic at every 
time.
20
 MacKinnon’s moral intensity and concern for a post-positivist metaphysics comes to 
bear on his appreciation of Kant and Wittgenstein, and plays a decisive role in his 
engagements with literature, Marxism and the person of Jesus.  
What becomes clear over the course of the thesis is that MacKinnon was engaged with 
philosophy at depth. Classics was a core focus of the curriculum at Winchester and an interest 
in Plato and Aristotle never left him, no doubt encouraged by his study of the ‘Greats’ at 
Oxford and his early close proximity to figures such as A.E. Taylor. Yet it was Kant who had 
the greatest impact and Janz has argued that MacKinnon’s nuanced interpretation of Kant has 
received something of a vindication since the collapse of the influence of Strawson’s 
commentary; a reading that led many British theologians to view Kant as the enemy. 
MacKinnon was and remains a minority voice for viewing Kant as an indispensable ally for 
theology. This is certainly a point on which he and Hauerwas would certainly disagree and 
which, as I will examine in Chapter 5 becomes the greatest source of Milbank’s complaint 
against him. For MacKinnon, the purgation Kant effected in the realms of metaphysics and 
theology is seen as a ‘point of no return’, and the way Kant set up a perennial tension 
between idealism and realism, freedom and necessity, as an unavoidable dimension of human 
reason stayed with him. This point, I think, was crucial for MacKinnon’s reluctance to join 
others in a full embrace of Wittgensteinian trajectory, although, as my final chapter shows 
(possibly for the first time) MacKinnon’s reluctance emerged from a perceptive reading of 
Wittgenstein rather than any indictable avoidance or neglect.  
Taking a broad view, I see MacKinnon as offering an invitation to engage in a restless and 
purgative form of therapy that fashions the theologian, and through them the wider church, as 
animators of a renewed catholic humanism with an uncompromising commitment to moral 
realism. For MacKinnon, Kant was an ally for this project, while for the likes of Milbank he 
is what the catholic humanist needs to be saved from. Some of the criticisms certainly hit 
                                                          
20
 For an early affirmation of this sentiment read D. M. MacKinnon, The Church of God, Signposts 
(London: Dacre, 1940). 
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their mark, as the final chapter will show, but there is also room for riposte. In any case, in 
what follows I seek to shine a light on an original thinker, whose mark on Anglican theology 
continues to be felt and whose attentiveness to the problem of metaphysics and call for moral 
seriousness, which are really the same thing, remains as relevant as ever.      
7 
 
Chapter 1: MacKinnon’s ‘Therapeutic’ Method  
1. Introduction   
 
In an introduction to a book entitled ‘Wittgensteinian Fideism?’, Szabados speaks about ‘a 
family of writers’ ‘reading in the borderlands’ whose  
…line of thinking was fideistic in the sense that they believed in order to understand, 
that they endorsed the attitude ‘Credo ut intelligam.’ This is an attitude to the activity 
of philosophizing that sees acceptance of rooted practices and ways of life as a given. 
Such an acceptance is not some peculiar and wilful act of belief, but an expression of 
reverence and a sense of wonder. This attitude takes what is given seriously. In contrast 
to traditional philosophy, which employs the method of sceptical doubt as a road to 
knowledge, fideist thinkers take an attitude of trust as fundamental to action, 
understanding and appreciation. They aim to do justice to what there is by overcoming 
forms of thought that distort and by providing perspicuous descriptions.
21
  
While claiming that it would be wrong to attribute to this ‘family’ a ‘common essence’ 
Szabados thinks that they do share a ‘…central concern to leave room for faith by exposing 
the abuses and pretensions of reason involved in bad philosophy and the scientism of the 
age’.
22
 Perhaps the ‘fidest’ label obscures more than illumines, yet all that follows will 
indicate that MacKinnon was a sympathetic fringe dweller of the ‘family’ about which 
Szabados speaks; a fringe dweller because he continued to see immense purgative potential in 
the ‘sceptical doubt of traditional philosophy’.  
Attempts to bring the philosophical and theological output of MacKinnon under the discipline 
of a single organising principle is a dubious enterprise, not least because MacKinnon himself 
admitted that there was nothing particularly organised about the way he thought and wrote. 
He never claimed to have reconciled the different strands of his thought.
23
 The open-ended, 
interrogative, continually shifting and suggestive nature of his work indicates as much. 
Regarding theology, MacKinnon discounts the possibility of synthesis as a factor that arises 
from within the discipline itself:   
                                                          
21
 Béla Szabados, "Introduction," in Wittgensteinian Fideism?, ed. K. Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips 




‘I don’t pretend that my philosophy and theology hang together. I wish they did. They impinge on 
each other; but there are many very dark places.’ MacKinnon, in L Macintyre "Thinking Legend Still 
in Search of Answers," Glasgow Herald, 7 November 1989. 
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If ‘synthesis’ is not to be the lot of Christians in the twentieth century that will be 
because it is less a theological act than an act of God, a putting together of fragmentary 
lives and efforts in the resurrection of the dead.
24
   
In regard to his philosophical commitments, MacKinnon was too influenced by the early 
twentieth century positivist turn in philosophy to go along with the idealism that was fading 
in its wake, or any analogous approach that lent itself to great philosophical or theological 
exercises in system building.
25
 It is not only the idealist tradition, however, that Mackinnon 
sought to move beyond. He also articulated dissatisfaction with positivist reductionism as it 
manifested in various forms, concerned that when one submits to its premises and methods, 
one is then restricted to an approach that inevitably leads to violations against the manifold 
complexity of the human subject and the refusal of some modes of imaginative discourse that 
are valuable in any effort to apprehend what is.
26
 This is despite his life-long admiration for 
positivism (and the whole empiricist pedigree) because of its commitment to ‘realism’ and 
what he perceives as its purgative intellectual rigor. Perhaps it is the case that –loosely 
analogous to figures of the early German romantic movement in their own time and context –
MacKinnon feared that the atomistic drive of empiricism and its positivist offshoots of the 
interwar period ended up placing costly limits on the very realism empiricists nonetheless 
held as an absolute commitment. At the heart of this line of critique is the identification of an 
irony. It is the very rigour of the empiricist’s drive to capture objective knowledge of the 
world as it stands independent of specific subjective constructs that is at once the greatest 
contribution of the empiricist school and the source of its most crippling ‘blind spots’.   
In this vein, it is no surprise that at one point MacKinnon looked upon the progression of J.S. 
Mill’s thinking with sympathy, in as far as the latter affirmed the necessity and usefulness of 
empirical realism, but alongside a growing conviction that Benthamite epistemological rigour 
could undermine the realist’s receptivity to reality in ways that demanded redress, 
supplementation, or the expansion of terms.
27
 The most telling test case in any manifestation 
of this dispute, and certainly between the likes of Bentham and Mill, is whether poetic forms 
of speech can constitute knowledge of some sort, or whether they must be rejected or exposed 
                                                          
24
 D. M. MacKinnon, "Some Reflections on the Summer School," Christendom 14 (1945): 111. 
25
 "Revelation and Social Justice," in Burden, ed. John McDowell (London: T & T Clark, 2011), 144-
45. 
26
 The Problem of Metaphysics, Gifford Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 
46-52. 
27
 Ibid., 46-47. 
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to reductive analysis in order to uncover underlying ‘facts’.
28
 In MacKinnon’s case and, 
unlike Mill, the resources drawn upon for this critical engagement with empiricism lies less 
with any specific forms of romanticism and more with Kant, existentialism, Collingwood’s 
historicism and phenomenological approaches to moral action, although he refuses to be 
definitively aligned to any of these. Closer to MacKinnon’s era was Isaiah Berlin; 
MacKinnon’s one time tutor at Oxford and a man whose relationship with positivist 
philosophy seems to reflect vague Millian biographical overtones.
29
 Berlin was deeply 
committed to the positivist turn in British philosophy in the early 20
th
 century, yet without 
renouncing a commitment to ‘empirical seriousness’ spent much of his latter life examining 




MacKinnon resisted projects of idealist metaphysics and positivist realism in as far as they 
were judged to distort or limit apprehension of the subject’s particular place in history and 
compromise moral self-apprehension. As intimated above, he saw much more promise in the 
second although he did think a qualified re-engagement with Kant may be an effective way to 
repair some of its deficiencies.
31
 Kant is the great philosophical figure of modernity for 
MacKinnon, separating yet holding together the realms of the ‘nature’ and that of the 
freedom of the autonomous rational subject, while seeking to posit renewed possibilities for 
speaking about morality, aesthetics and religion.
32
  
One important aspect of MacKinnon’s project was that of bringing what he saw to be the 
clarifying rigour of the early 20
th
 century positivists into conversation with Kant. To this 
conversation he added an abiding commitment to a realist orthodox Christian theology. Given 
the disparity of these interests and the way that they oppose each other fundamentally it is not 
surprising that his efforts were deliberately and self-consciously unsystematic. MacKinnon 
preferred to express himself in essays, lectures and short books; mediums that are generally 
better at raising questions and probing possibilities than attempting anything by way of 
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 This is a question that MacKinnon often references in relation to Plato. On the philosophical status 
of the poetic form see for instance: D.M. MacKinnon, On the Notion of a Philosophy of History: 
Lecture Delivered on 5 May 1953 at King's College, London, Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture, 23 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954). 
29
  Muller, "True Service", 251-52. 
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definitive solution or ‘knock-down’ argument.
33
 While allowing for creativity and subtlety 
the openness of texture can also be frustratingly obtuse.   
Burdening MacKinnon with either ‘systematic’ or ‘unsystematic’ ascriptions may not be 
particularly helpful due to the inevitable lack of specificity in defining and applying such 
terms. To call MacKinnon ‘unsystematic’ is to evoke a famously restless and eccentric 
personality, as well as to point to deeply held convictions about the nature of rationality itself. 
Yet this is not to say that MacKinnon was blind to the benefits of attempts to systematise, 
whether they emerged from the pen of Barth and Balthasar, or from Russell or Moore. Nor is 
it to say there are no common threads or carefully developed arguments to be found. Indeed, 
the conviction that propels this thesis is that MacKinnon’s project does have a theme into 
which all the tributaries of his various thoughts flow; that of moral realism and the perennial 
dialectic of idealism and realism which is seen to warrant the retention of reference to 
‘metaphysics’. By his own admission the place MacKinnon found himself was the 
‘borderlands’, where one is caught in an open-ended conversation between philosophy and 
theology. Such liminal spaces proved to be a crucible because in the early to mid-20
th
 century 
the trend in Britain was toward a revelatory positivism that sought sanctuary from the fires of 
hostile philosophical trends or the abandonment of realist claims for theology in order to 
make a bid for greater philosophical credibility. MacKinnon refused both options.   
The point of this chapter is to propose a new way of understanding MacKinnon’s method as 
he sought to occupy this tense and uncomfortable space. Saying that MacKinnon was an 
unsystematic thinker is perhaps to describe him pejoratively. It might suggest a scattered 
mind that could never quite pull the threads together; never attaining final coherence, 
resolution, or a convincing response to detractors. There is a degree to which all of this is 
true, yet my purpose in what follows will be to say something positive about his approach. 
MacKinnon knew that he could be obscure, fragmented and rather tortured in his writing; he 
often displays a heightened level of self-consciousness as he apologises for various failures 
and limitations as he writes. In what follows, I will put forward a case that MacKinnon was 
developing something of the therapeutic method and that looking at his project through this 
lens may help us to better appreciate both his struggle and the unique level of perceptiveness 
achieved. I realise that the term ‘therapeutic’ is potentially just as dubious as ‘(un)systematic’ 
in trying to describe a methodology, yet I plan to demonstrate that it has the potential to 
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capture characteristic features of MacKinnon’s project. There are good reasons to believe that 
he may have balked at the term, however in what follows I attempt to show that the way he 
describes his own project makes the introduction of such an ascription possible, if not 
inevitable. In any case, I am prepared to risk invoking the ‘therapeutic’ label for the deepened 
level of insight about the scope and intention of his work that results and the way in which it 
helps to separate truly insightful criticisms from those that stem from a fundamental 
misunderstanding about what he set out to do.  
Before I begin to defend this approach, it may be helpful to explain the initial impetus for 
beginning to understand MacKinnon’s method in this way. The route is circuitous, for it 
comes from re-reading MacKinnon after having read Wittgenstein together with Stanley 
Cavell. With his seminal essay The Availability of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, Cavell 
helped to establish a reading of Wittgenstein as having been engaged in a project imperfectly 
described in therapeutic terms. Cavell then embarked on a philosophical project inspired by 
this same style, culminating in his most recent category-defying book Little Did I Know, 
which combines intellectual autobiography, personal confession and philosophical treatise.
34
 
What Cavell sought to argue is that it is unhelpful to take the later Wittgenstein simply as an 
unsystematic thinker full of radical provocations and half-formed propositions for a non-
foundationalist linguistic philosophy that can be profitably appraised from an ‘objective 
distance’. Of course, one can remain at a distance but what Wittgenstein sought was to invite 
us to observe and participate in something which can only be described with an analogy to 
spiritual disciplines of contemplation and purgation. In this way, the quote from St. 
Augustine’s Confessions which opens the Philosophical Investigations signals a deeper 
affinity than the refusal of the former’s account of infant language formation would suggest.
35
  
It was an effort to explore Kerr’s contention that MacKinnon had neglected insights of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy that lead me to take some tentative steps into this world of 
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 Greater focus on Kerr’s argument will be found in the final 
chapter, but at this point all I want to note is the fact that these explorations led me to Cavell 
and Cavell led me back to MacKinnon with fresh eyes. For example, whereas previously 
MacKinnon’s A Study in Ethical Theory (SET) seemed frustratingly opaque and poorly 
executed, now it seems to me that MacKinnon may well have been ahead of his time, 
engaging in a style that has only begun to be more widely appreciated with the advent of 
philosophers such as Cavell.  
Peter Dula is the author of the first monograph examining the theological dimensions of 
Cavell’s thought, and has made the observation that the only sustained interest in Cavell that 
has been expressed by British theologians has come from students of MacKinnon.
37
 Indeed, 
Dula invests a chapter of his book examining the way in which MacKinnon’s one time 
student Rowan Williams exudes a style and a set of interests that render him the most 
‘Cavellian of modern theologians’.
38
 The connection is no coincidence for both Cavell and 
MacKinnon occupy the same borderland, even if they do so in very different ways. One as a 
philosopher who is open to theology in a way that marginalises him; the other a restive 
theologian engaged deeply with philosophy in a way that marginalised him, with both finding 
that the only way to occupy this space as teachers and writers is by means of a therapeutic 
method.   
2. Therapy 
  
When it came to the task of moral theory, MacKinnon learnt from, yet ultimately rejected, 
positions variously labelled as non-realist, non-cognitivist, emotivist or subjectivist. 
MacIntyre shared a similar judgement and in After Virtue sought to represent what he 
considered to be one of the more impoverished ways of envisioning the moral agent to have 
emerged with emotivism. MacIntyre notes that  
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…one way of re-envisaging the emotivist self is as having suffered a depravation, a 
stripping away of qualities that were once believed to belong to the self. The self is not 
thought of as lacking any necessary social identity, because the kind of social identity 
that it once enjoyed is no longer available; the self is now thought of as criterion-less 
because the kind of telos in terms of which it once judged and acted is no longer 
thought to be credible.
39
  
Into this situation comes the therapist; one of MacIntyre’s ‘characters’ that flourish in a 
context where pluralism reigns and rational moral truth claims are thought to be impossible. 
They embody an ‘elitist monopoly of expertise’ and represent an ‘obliteration of the 
distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative modes of being in personal life’.
40
 
Further, they apply various techniques to certain diagnosed ills, assisting people as they 
navigate a complex and potentially hostile world without recourse to the sort of rational 
grounds for moral evaluation that certain influential streams of philosophy since the 
Enlightenment had disallowed. According to MacIntyre therapists understand themselves, 
and are viewed by others in this context, as essentially disengaged from moral debate; 
limiting themselves to the implementation of a technique that transforms ‘…neurotic 
symptoms into directed energy, maladjusted individuals into well-adjusted ones’.
41
 In this 
vein, MacIntyre notes that  
…in our culture the concept of the therapeutic has been given application far beyond 
the sphere of psychological medicine in which it obviously had its legitimate place. In 
The Triumph of the Therapeutic (1966) and also in To My Fellow Teachers (1975) 
Philip Rieff has documented with devastating insight a number of the ways in which 
truth has been displaced as a value and replaced by psychological effectiveness. The 
idioms of therapy have invaded all too successfully such spheres as those of education 
and religion. The types of theory involved in and invoked to justify such therapeutic 
mode do of course very widely; but the mode itself is of far greater social significance 
than the theories which matter so much to its protagonists.
42
 
I will not seek to exegete MacIntyre’s polemic any further, only to make the observation that 
where he sees the notion of therapy as intrinsically connected to moral non-realism, both 
MacKinnon and Cavell deploy the notion in tandem with formulations of realism (of a 
markedly different character in each case). Both would probably agree that such language 
becomes inevitable in a climate of intense scepticism regarding the possibility of moral facts, 
yet neither would see the connection MacIntyre makes with moral pluralism and emotivism 
as being one of necessity. Perhaps this highlights the danger implicit in taking up vague terms 
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such as ‘therapeutic’ and employing them beyond their original domain. Even so, it is this 
very flexibility that leads me to suggest that Cavell and MacKinnon are able to use the notion 
free of the negative connotations MacIntyre gives to it. It is a flexibility that Peterman 
acknowledges as he seeks to provide clarification as to what he is trying to achieve by 
invoking this notion within Wittgensteinian hermeneutics:  
The phrase ‘philosophy as therapy’ suggests different claims about the relation between 
philosophy and therapy. Some may argue that philosophy is nothing but therapy of 
some sort. Others may claim that philosophy, of whatever sort, may have some 
therapeutic consequence. But I wish to defend neither of these claims. I do believe, 
however, that it is possible for some philosophical work to be therapeutic, to be 
committed to realizing some therapeutic goal as central to its project as a form of 
philosophy. Moreover, I think that such a project could be a good thing for some 
philosophers to do but not necessarily good for all philosophers. So ‘philosophy as 
therapy’ signifies a kind of philosophy to be distinguished from other sorts, such as 




Roger Shiner argues that with the exception of Cavell no interpreter of Wittgenstein since 
Wisdom has understood the ‘ambivalence of the image of philosophy as therapy’.
44
  This is a 
tantalising claim given MacKinnon read and admired Wisdom’s philosophy and it is one that 
I will return to.
45
 Wisdom and Cavell are not alone. Caleb Thompson, Cora Diamond, James 
Conant, Thomas Ricketts, Kelvin Hector and James Peterman have been important in 
advocating ‘therapeutic’ interpretations of the later Wittgenstein also.
46
 Each in their own 
way attests to Wittgenstein’s restless, vividly self-conscious explorations of various problems 
in philosophy which are not, in fact, simply ‘problems’ but ‘illusions’ and ‘temptations’. 
Peterman suggests four features of a properly therapeutic philosophy:   
i. The interlocutors must acknowledge what they actually believe and not just enter in 
the conversation in a merely academic way. I will call this the requirement of 
confession to emphasize that such acknowledgments made in a therapeutic context 
often will require recognition that the acknowledged beliefs are mistaken and must 
be overcome.  
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ii. …the acknowledged belief be challenged and refuted if mistaken. 
iii. …the interlocutor be led to a new way of looking at things that is better than the old 
way. 
iv. …there must be some agreement on the goals of the therapy…[which] might exist 
prior to the therapeutic discussion or may emerge in the course of it.
47
 
Key conversation partners for this style of philosophy are typically religion and psychology; 
domains that refuse any strict methodological demarcation between the epistemological and 
the moral. They plunge interlockers into various processes of self-examination and 
renunciation where sifting illusions and self-deceptions become the focus for a life that 
integrates intellectual and moral striving. In this vein, perhaps Peterman’s criteria as listed 
above remain too vague and wooden, needing to be furnished with more fulsome 
characterisations of the distinctive purgative, personal and moral dimension of the therapeutic 
process. Additionally, in light of my earlier engagement with MacIntyre’s criticisms, there 
needs to be a distinction between those philosophical therapies that arise as a function of non-
realist convictions and those which tend toward realist sensibilities. In MacKinnon’s broad 
terms, it is a distinction between those that could be described as efforts weighted toward 
‘construction’ compared to those of ‘reception’. It is on this point that opposing therapeutic 
approaches will understand themselves as taking on vastly different goals to their rivals, 
which pertains to the deliberations which point iv. of Peterman’s list would provoke.   
Works such as Augustine’s Confessions, Wittgenstein’ Philosophical Investigations, 
MacKinnon’s SET and PM, and Cavell’s Little Did I Know could all be said to display each 
of the characteristics Peterman mentions in one form or another. More than this, each engages 
in a version of therapeutic method in order to achieve a greater level of realism. That is, in 
each case therapy necessitates a move from various illusions and unhelpful abstractions to 
greater immersion in the concrete, the historical and the ‘ordinary’. Variously, it may ground 
the human being before a God who becomes incarnate in history or before a realisation of our 
‘situatedness’ within particular communities of language users. Realising the limitations of 
human apprehension becomes a core epistemic discipline and humility a core moral virtue for 
the reader joining the confessing author in therapeutic purgation.  
On exploring the relationship between analytical philosophy and existentialism (a 
relationship that could also be said to have characterised aspects of MacKinnon’s borderland 
wanderings too), Cavell argues that  
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In both [Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard], the cure is for us to return to our everyday 
existence. It will be obvious that this emphasis on diagnosis and cure continues the 
early image of the philosopher as the physician of the soul, and it also aligns these 
writers with the characteristic effort of modern thought to un-mask its audience, its 
world, an effort as true of Marx and Nietzsche and Freud as it is of Kierkegaard and 
Wittgenstein. And the effort to un-mask requires a few masks of tricks of its own. 
Traditional forms of criticism, of logical refutation pre-eminently, are unavailing. Our 
new problems do not arise through inconsistency or falsehood; they are worse than 
false, and they are all too consistent. What one must do is to alter the terms and the 
ground upon which the whole argument rests.
48
  
I realise that applying the term ‘realism’ to Wittgenstein’s work, as I did above, is dubious 
(Kerr is not alone in arguing that the distinction between realism and non-realism emerges 
out of the illusions that Wittgenstein saw fit to purge),
49
 but I do so in a very qualified sense. 
All I mean to distinguish at this point is a philosophical therapy which is essentially about an 
agent being assisted by philosophy in an effort to (re)construct identity, meaning and moral 
sense on the assumption of non-realism, compared to therapy which assists the person to 
receive ‘what is’. It provides methods which assist the ‘patient’ to apprehend the world with 
greater clarity and honesty and to apprehend options for constructive moral response on that 
basis. What this really amounts to is the difference between a philosophy coloured by the 
assumptions of certain forms of secular existentialism, radical scepticism, and emotivism, 
compared to one shaped by empiricism, moderate scepticism or agnosticism and a trend 
toward strong or weak moral realism. It is essentially the difference I was seeking to identify 
between MacIntyre’s conception of the therapeutic and the alternative conception which I am 
attempting to locate in Wittgenstein, MacKinnon and Cavell.
50
 Admittedly, such a claim 
needs further justification, but it is not a novel line of thought. Thompson, for instance, 
makes the following observation in relation to what he sees as the analogous concerns of 
Augustine and Wittgenstein:  
Wittgenstein like Augustine feels his problem as real disturbances, as ‘deep 
disquietudes’ [tiefe Beunruhigungen] (§111). But more than that, each is deeply 
concerned with his separation from and connection with reality. Each is deeply 
interested in language as a medium in which one is brought to or led away from what is 
real. Consequently, each is exhibiting for us a linguistic activity which can perhaps 
secure for one presence in the reality and limitations of human existence. For each that 
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activity involves an attention to the details of human life and language, details in which 
meaning is in the end found to reside.
51
   
Cavell and MacKinnon join Augustine and Wittgenstein in this therapeutic drive toward a 
form of confessional realism; an ascription which becomes particularly resonant in their 
respective writings on the nature of moral knowledge.
52
 As will become clear, MacKinnon is 
a moral theologian with an almost obsessive zeal to critique the tendency that theologians 
have to be captivated by abstracting forms of idealism, while never entirely submitting to 
versions of realism preferred by key figures of his British empiricist and positivist milieu.
53
 It 
may be fair to say that some exposure to Wittgenstein together with the influence of Wisdom 
helped MacKinnon toward an embrace of this particular type of dissatisfaction. Discussing 
Wittgenstein in SET, MacKinnon states that ‘[i]f the conception of a reconstruction of human 
knowledge upon a sure and certain foundation is an illusion, yet like other illusions it may tell 
us much of the men who attempted it; it can even be regarded sometimes as a specially 
revealing chapter in their autobiography’.
54
 While MacKinnon does not imbibe 
Wittgenstein’s approach to the degree of Cavell, this excerpt would suggest that he does 
share Wittgenstein’s sense of the illusory nature of modernist foundationalism and the 
conviction that the task of curing ourselves may require a much deeper purgation, involving a 
confrontation with unsettling forms of self-knowledge, demanding more than a standard 
logical refutation.  It also suggests an approach to moral realism that, in an idiom inspired by 
Wisdom, is less like adding new information to the world, but rather training ourselves to see 
what is already there with ever greater perceptiveness.   
Like Cavell, MacKinnon was deeply influenced by the philosophical revolution represented 
by the Oxford Positivists and the subsequent linguistic turn. They both think that positivist 
philosophy produced much needed purgation, yet arguably left very limited possibilities to 
account for the moral complexity of human experience; a concern they share with 
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 Further, they like Steiner, Murdoch and Nussbaum thought that the category of 
tragedy and a close reading of literature could be important curative resources that the 
philosopher would do well to embrace. MacKinnon was less sure than Cavell that 
Wittgenstein provided a definitive way forward at least in as far as MacKinnon was 
committed to a version of metaphysics, a qualified notion of ‘correspondence’ and a related 
commitment to moral realism that he sees as integral to the Christian ‘system of projection’. 
Indeed, MacKinnon will pose a question to other forms confessional therapy as they move in 
a decidedly secular trajectory as to how this shift might affect the character and defensibility 
of realist moral discourse. 
3. A Study in Ethical Theory and the Problem of Metaphysics 
In this section I will focus on MacKinnon’s SET and The Problem of Metaphysics (PM) –
although my observations will be supplemented by reference to pertinent essays. The two 
books demonstrate the possibility of appreciating him as one who framed other’s projects in 
therapeutic terms and often adopted the same language to convey his own agenda.
56
 I will 
also seek to test the claim made regarding the possibility that a therapeutic method and a 
commitment to moral realism may be conjoined and mutually reinforcing. Attention will fall 
on the way MacKinnon’s therapeutic program can be explored by reference to his aversion to 
anthropomorphism, his embrace of agnosticism (of a kind) and the way both dimensions 
relate to his perennial interest in the distinction between realism and idealism.  
Examining a selection of reviews of SET indicates that the work received a mixed, if not 
decidedly tepid reception. The perplexity expressed toward MacKinnon’s work is captured 
well by the opening lines of John Wren-Lewis’ review. Wren-Lewis is clearly exasperated:  
This is a curious book, which at least one reader has gone through carefully twice 
without being able to grasp quite what the author is trying to say or indeed to achieve. 
The one thing that can be said with certainty is that it is a study in the different ways 
that ethical language can be used, written somewhat in the style of a ‘novel of 
atmosphere’, bringing out various subtle differences of nuance and highlighting the 
tensions that occur in different situations. Professor MacKinnon studies a number of 
writers on ethics more or less at random: H.A. Pritchard, Mill and the Utilitarians, 
Kant, Isaiah Berlin, Bishop Butler, Hegel and St. Paul each serve to illustrate one 
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aspect of his subject, one mood, as it were, in which ethical language may be used. If he 
makes no reference whatever to the ethical teaching of Jesus, Buddha or Plato, or even 
of Aristotle or Confucius, it is hard to know whether he can be criticised for omitting 
them or not: it is scarcely possible to criticise a playwright’s use of character when you 
are not clear just what plot he has in mind.
57
 
Wren-Lewis was right to detect a theatrical impulse and the influence of a literary sensibility 
in MacKinnon’s style. In chapter 4, I will show that MacKinnon was acutely aware of the 
way plays and novels of realist intensity can invite engagement which is different in kind to 
that demanded by modernist philosophical work seeking to prevent flights of fancy by 
mimicking the natural sciences or mathematics in key aspects of method. Where Wren-Lewis 
is wrong is in his claim that MacKinnon chooses his subjects ‘at random’ and this is a 
representative case in which the invocation of the therapeutic is helpful. Wren-Lewis suspects 
something more is at play in SET but he can only explain it in terms of the inaccessibility of 
the creative temperament. If one is looking for a systematic or comprehensive treatise of 
moral philosophy, then MacKinnon’s choice of subjects does indeed seem eccentric, even 
‘random’. MacKinnon begins the book with a focus on the controversy that dominated 
modernist moral philosophy; the debate between utilitarians and deontologists, and then 
proceeds to invoke a number of figures whose work provides a series of distinctive purgative 
and reparative resources orientated toward two inter-related goals. The first involves enabling 
the reader to look beyond the terms of the debate as they had been set (and in this vein there 
is a similarity with Wittgenstein’s project), and the second: to convince the reader that part of 
their ‘healing’ comes with the acceptance of a form of historical realism which encompasses 
the moral domain. If this is MacKinnon’s intention then an unhelpful criticism would point to 
a lack of breath, comprehensiveness and systematic resolution, while a helpful critic would 
point to the ways in which he has misdiagnosed the problem, sought therapeutic remedies 
from the wrong sources, or missed potential resources altogether.
58
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Regarding the writings of St. Paul, MacKinnon observed that 
If Paul writes sometimes as a man in pain, the very depth of his perplexity gives a 
certain purity to his words; for he writes not as if he would provide a solution, but 
rather as if he would lay the texture of a problem bare.
59
 
While this comment sets out to describe another, implicit is an insight into MacKinnon’s own 
style as well: there is an acknowledgement of unresolved perplexity, a drive toward ‘purer’ 
expression, and an emphasis on an open-ended need for diagnosis and treatment. The quote 
about St. Paul also brings forth a tendency evident in both SET and PM, which is for 
MacKinnon to speak about key interlockers as having been engaged in therapeutic projects. 
This is particularly clear with MacKinnon’s descriptions of Kant’s agnosticism. I am not for a 
moment arguing that MacKinnon tried to read the whole of Kant’s project via a hermeneutic 
straightjacket of the ‘therapeutic’. He is attuned to the ambition and breadth of Kant’s aims, 
noting that:   
In the first half of the Critique of Pure Reason, [Kant] was both trying to give as 
satisfactory account as he could of our ultimate conceptual scheme, and…as part of the 
same enquiry, to give an inventory of the fundamental structural features of the world 
in which we find ourselves.
60
  
The articulation of this inventory involves encountering limits: ‘the pervasive features of an 
experienceable world’ and an admission that ‘[o]ur point of view as experients is the human 
point of view, our world a world marked by the conditions under which alone experience is 
possible for us.’
61
 Practically speaking this means a critique of traditional metaphysical 
projects and the adoption of an agnostic stance that can, for MacKinnon, be best described in 
therapeutic terms, as can the necessary transition to an emphasis on practical reason in the 
second Critique.
62
 According to MacKinnon there ‘…is much both in Kant’s criticism of 
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metaphysics and, indeed, in his treatment of the nature of ethical discourse which is 
congruous with modern logical procedure’, yet he goes on to highlight discontinuities, 
including that ‘…Kant will not concede that logical disentanglement is something carried on 
apart from the subject’s immediate presence to, and involvement with, what is being 
disentangled’.
63
 Here we see an intimation of that level of personal engagement; a subject 
acutely aware of the limitations under which they labour, which characterises any therapeutic 
project. Furthermore, it emerges that Kant’s is a therapy that has a kind of realism as its goal. 
MacKinnon argues that for all of ‘Kant’s painstaking work in the philosophy of 
perception…[he] never abandons his underlying loyalty to the common-sense conviction that 
in coming to know we do not construct a world of our own fashioning, but compel that which 
is given to us to yield its secrets in ways admitting of our assimilation.’
64
 This is a form of 
empirical realism, as Strawson noted: 
 All concepts, and with them all principles, even such as are possible a priori, relate to 
empirical intuitions, that is, to the data for a possible experience. Apart from this 
relation they have no objective reality  (B298). Of the most general of concepts, the 
categories, Kant says that they “allow only of empirical employment and have no 
meaning whatsoever when not applied to objects of possible experience, that is, to the 
world of sense” (B724).
65
  
This limit stands at the heart of Kant’s agnosticism, which pertains not only to knowledge of 
God ‘in himself’ but of all external objects independent of our perception. It is where the 
therapeutic ascription comes most clearly to the fore in MacKinnon’s reading of Kant. What 
will become clear is that MacKinnon uses the term agnosticism to describe a characteristic 
feature of a person who has undergone therapy and also the stance from which further 
therapy should take place. Additionally, he uses the term ‘anthropomorphism’ to denote that 
which obfuscates the realist task and from which we need deliverance.
66
 Presumably with the 
Critique of Pure Reason A640/B668 in mind, MacKinnon notes that Kant’s agnosticism is 
something which  
…has a certain kinship with the via negativa of the classical theology, a purification of 
our concepts from every taint of anthropomorphism, to the intent that we may at least 
see what it is that, in our attempted use of these concepts to scrutinise the 
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unconditioned, we are attempting. [MacKinnon goes on to argue that if] …a man sets 
down Kant’s first Critique and calls himself in its sense an agnostic, the position he 
adopts is something at once similar to and different from the agnosticism of those who 
have not undergone the same discipline; it is something to be understood in the end in 
terms of a new self-consciousness concerning the nature of conceptual thinking as such, 
and it is something which provides supremely the context within which the evident and 
transcendent authority of the moral law, and the realm of ends, can be grasped.
67
 
This concern about anthropocentrism is also evident in MacKinnon’s engagement with Plato, 
he notes: 
We must be on guard [Plato] implies, against the pervasive temptation of 
anthropomorphism. We must see that that way lies inadmissible contradiction; we must 
learn and relearn the purgative effect of such recognition, making our own the lesson 
that in speculation the last enemy is anthropomorphism rather than agnosticism, yet 
sustained always by a sense that the underlying insights of which the theory of forms is 
an exploration are significant and important, and that the proper mode for the 
expression of this theory is always or nearly always dialogue rather than treatise.
68
 
Such extracts, I believe, capture many of the threads which I am seeking to draw together, 
and which, as I aim to show over the course of the thesis, are folded into MacKinnon’s own 
‘therapeutic’ method. Many of the characteristics of philosophical therapy noted above are 
present here, including language of purgation, confession, conversion (i.e. reference to ‘a new 
self-consciousness’) and a move toward realism which is thought to derive from a 
deliverance from anthropocentrism.  
What will become clear is that ‘anthropomorphism’ stands as a representative term for what 
MacKinnon understands as the key feature and the key problem of ‘idealism’. This is not to 
be confused with the notion of ‘anthropocentrism’, however, which is a far more neutral term 
for MacKinnon that is related to his commitment to a form of humanism. Indeed, as noted 
above, he speaks of Kant’s anthropocentrism in relation to a proper acknowledgement of 
limitation; something which MacKinnon saw in the comparison between God’s knowledge 
(or any ‘ideal’ knowledge) and human knowledge in the third Critique.
69
 An acute awareness 
of this limitation drives MacKinnon to see links with the tradition of negative theology, to 
embrace the restlessness of a dialectical style and to see something essential for philosophy 
and theology in the notion of tragedy.
70
 Yet it does not drive him to relativism, non-realism or 
radical scepticism in epistemology, ethics or theology; quite the opposite, in fact. Indeed, one 
of the key concerns of my exploration is the way in which this agnosticism, anthropocentrism 
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and realism are seen by MacKinnon to be mutually reinforcing. This is a point that weaves 
his theological and philosophical concerns together: the revelation of Christ within history as 
the ‘objective’ presence of God engenders illumination but also evokes a realisation of 
human limitation, as does the apprehension of metaphysical notions such as substance and 
causality, as well as the realisation of absolute moral imperatives. ‘Thrusting against the 
limits of language’ is the phrase MacKinnon calls upon from Wittgenstein to capture the 
essence of his restless dialectic.
71
 In reflecting on the confluence of the philosophical, the 
theological and the ethical in his thought, MacKinnon states that his  
…chief concern has been with the question of the limits of experience, of intelligible, 
descriptive discourse, with the kind of questions discussed by Kant as that philosopher 
is presented in Mr P.F. Strawson’s recent book The Bounds of Sense and by Professor 
Wisdom in some of the papers contained in Paradox and Discovery…[MacKinnon 
goes on to admit:] I know that this preoccupation has deeply affected and been affected 
by my besetting theological concern with issues of christology.
72
   
Just as SET focuses on Kantian therapy, so PM opens with an emphasis on ‘an aspect of 
Plato’s Republic’ and attention rests on the fact that our linguistic and conceptual resources 
are regularly stretched to breaking point as we try to apprehend the world in which we find 
ourselves. It is in the domain of rich, textured, and often perplexing moral dilemma, 
specifically that of Glaucon and Adeimantus, where such limits are particularly clear 
according to MacKinnon.
73
 Evoking St. Augustine, MacKinnon notes that they ‘…express 
their aspirations, revealing the restlessness of their hearts till they find rest in the Good.’ But, 
Mackinnon goes on to add in parenthesis that the ‘…restlessness of heart is not by itself 
evidence that there is a Good in which the restless heart may find rest; a very different 
therapy may be required.’
74
 Indeed, one can inhabit such a dialogue about morality 
‘…without raising the absolutely crucial question whether or not in this sort of discourse we 
draw nearer to what is the case, whether or not something is being represented in this sort of 
discourse that is there to be represented’.
75
 In this way, as soon as MacKinnon raises the 
possibility of ‘resting in the Good’ restlessness immediately returns and the sceptical question 
is articulated by one drawn to express themselves in realist terms. This particular restlessness 
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is more MacKinnon’s  concern than Plato’s, yet an empirical bias in his account of realism 
leads MacKinnon to insist that its absence in the former points to a source of bondage. He 
argues that in 
…Plato’s highly significant quarrel with the tragedians we find the birth of a kind of 
ethical reflection which deliberately eschews the method of description and re-
description and substitutes the quest for an authoritative transcendent norm which at 
once supplies a standard of judgment and a resting place for the interrogative spirit. 




In the moral domain, ‘thrusting against the limits of language’ amounts to immersion in the 
concrete situation and a continuing dialectic where questions are posed but not resolutely 
answered. This need not cause us to give up on the quest, in the same way that the difficulty 
in applying language to God should not cause the end of theology. With Butler, our struggle 
to articulate what we mean by the word ‘God’ as the source of the world or a being with 
whom we have familiarity, is a ‘…deficiency [which] need not disturb us; indeed it has a 
genuinely therapeutic value, provided we can lay to heart its lessons’.
77
 In philosophy, it 
means that the approaches of positivist realism and classical idealism must be found wanting 
though neither abandoned entirely.
78
  
The emphasis so far has largely focused on the way MacKinnon identified the therapeutic 
dimensions of those he read. The task of understanding the character of the particular therapy 
to which MacKinnon invites us to undergo has only been referenced obliquely. It is the task 
for the rest of the thesis to tease out peculiarities, risks and goals of MacKinnon’s therapeutic 
programme; to observe what emerges as he folds these different perspectives into his work, 
weaving them into a spirited and often tense conversation. Two interrelated themes will 
become important and both have already featured. They pertain to the importance of 
philosophy for the theologian and the centrality of morality to this particular therapeutic 
methodology. In the first instance, MacKinnon holds that theology can only remain true to its 
vocation if it engages with philosophy, not in an apologetic mode but in a mode of testing and 
refinement. In his inaugural lecture as the Norris Hulse Professor at The University of 
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Cambridge, MacKinnon noted that ‘…apologetic concern, as Karl Barth (the one living 
theologian of unquestionable genius) has rightly insisted, is the death of serious theologizing, 
and I would add, equally of serious work in the philosophy of religion.’
79
 Yet it might be 
argued that in contrast to Barth, MacKinnon is more explicitly engaged with the way theology 
might avoid illusion and resist temptation in as far as it exposes itself to the sceptical gaze of 
the modern philosopher. In his particular context, it is clear that the advent of analytical 
philosophy in Britain, with its positivist and empiricist dimensions and its tendency to 
underwrite forms of utilitarianism, is seen to provide an excellent provocation or purgation 
for Christian temptations toward anthropomorphism, as well as voluntarism and abstraction 
in moral theology. The same could be said for the various trends in Marxist theory with 
which MacKinnon engaged.  
One will search MacKinnon’s writing in vain for an equally strong sense that philosophers 
need to open themselves up to the purgative insights of theology. There is nothing of the 
vehement tone later developed by the Radical Orthodox movement, which in many ways 
became the heir of the strong reactive currents within the Anglo-Catholicism to which 
MacKinnon aligned himself in qualified ways.
80
 Beyond an ever deepening apprehension of 
revealed knowledge, theology’s task animate what can only be described as the moral 
dimension of personhood and locate the unique spiritual dignity of humanity. It can note the 
way in which moral experience continually raises questions that expose limits and reinforce 
the poverty of anthropomorphism. Additionally it can issue an invitation and challenge to 
those philosophical (and religious) projects that are reductionist in their image of personhood 
and in their account of the moral struggle. It is to the centrality of morality within 
MacKinnon’s therapeutic task that I now turn and this is impossible without referring again to 
his reading of Kant.  
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4. MacKinnon as a Kantian Moral Theologian 
  
MacKinnon’s moral deliberations are a locus where his attraction to agnosticism and a form 
of realism become particularly evident. In addition, a moral focus lies at the centre of his 
attempts to articulate the content of christology and metaphysics. Just as MacKinnon 
understood christology to stand at the centre of theology, so he sees at the heart of christology 
an act of freedom on the part of Jesus understood primarily in terms of (a rather stoic-
sounding) moral agency: 
…the claims which Christians make for that which he endured demand that he shall 
have approached his sufferings in a particular way, not simply as a luckless victim of 
uncontrolled circumstance, but as someone, who even if he found that circumstance 
uncontrollable, yet freely accepted the fact.
81
 
This attempt to highlight Jesus’ moral agency as a central component of any account of his 
life, is mirrored in the positioning of moral concerns near the centre of MacKinnon’s forays 
into philosophy.  
Following his onetime mentor A.E. Taylor, MacKinnon stated a preference for Kant over 
Hegel, chiefly because he thought that the former more than latter better managed to 
encapsulate the ‘seriousness’ of the moral struggle.
82
 Broadly speaking, Hegel reacted 
negatively to Kant in as far as he thought that Kant accepted a dualistic view of the will and 
had settled for an alienating picture of our relationship to rational moral duty, necessitating 
constant struggle and permanent irresolution.
83
 MacKinnon was of the view that rather than 
counting against Kant, this focus on the divided self and the perpetual moral struggle of the 
free agent is a promising sign of authenticity and an indication that Kant is the more faithful 
ally of the ‘realist’. Having said this, and taking in a broader sweep of MacKinnon’s work, it 
must be noted that Hegel looms in the background of MacKinnon’s convictions as he 
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develops his moral theory with reference to the ‘philosophy of history’ and the tragic.
84
 Yet it 
is Hegel’s influence on (what became) the moral vision of British Idealists that most worried 
MacKinnon as did any approach that bracketed out the agony and complexity of particular 
moral decisions, lacking (so he thought) the tension born of immersion in concrete historical 
situations. Also driving MacKinnon’s concern was his need to defend the possibility of an 
individual contemplative distance by which deeper apprehension of the contours of particular 




To appreciate Kant’s influence on MacKinnon’s writings on the relation between religion, 
metaphysics and morality, there is no better place to start than the final chapter of SET.
86
 




In the first instance, MacKinnon acknowledges that Kant has much to offer Christian ethics, 
arguing that  
…the sharpest influence of Kant’s thought on British theologians of the Reformed 
tradition lay in the demand it made on them to rethink the crudities of their theology of 
grace, to find room for human responsibility in their scheme of man’s redemption, to 
seek a place for an authentic autonomy that would yet not altogether forget Luther’s 
words: Non Deus revivificat, nisi per occidendum.
88
  
It is also clear that along with figures such as Maritain, it was Kant who most inspired 
MacKinnon’s commitment to a form of humanism:  
…it was through Kant’s influence that the spirit of the Aufklärung was effectively 
baptized into Christ. And this was a conversion that the theological tradition that was to 
receive it urgently needed. It was not only that the crudities of solifidianism and the 
debasement of Catholic sacramentalism into the idea of a grace-energy impersonally 
transmitted through appointed channels demands required correction; it was also 
necessary that the claim of the Churches to override the rich, fragile stuff of our 
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humanity in the wake of a dogmatic orthodoxy, guarded and enforced by an alleged 
Heilsanstalt, should be effectively resisted.
89
  
While Kant can help Christians revive aspects of their own account of moral agency, 
MacKinnon was of the view that there were still more resources available to one committed 
to philosophical realism that took one beyond Kant’s overly-restrictive formalism. The fact 
that Christians insist on doing ethics in conversation with particular lives, whether they be 
Jesus or the saints, and in conversation with robust literary traditions (the focus of Chapter 4) 
are examples of moves that MacKinnon endorses.
90
 Nonetheless he maintained that the 
Christian moralist must learn from Kant’s refusal to look to God or metaphysics as absolute 
ontological foundations to ‘secure’ moral deliberation.
91
  
It is no secret that theologians in Britain have been (and remain) perennially divided as to 
whether Kant should be counted a friend or foe.
92
 As noted above MacKinnon saw Kant’s 
legacy as unavoidable, or ignored at the theologian’s peril. Kant’s attempt to banish 
traditional arguments for God’s existence and then to revive the notion of God as a ‘postulate 
of practical reason’ was a move that fascinated MacKinnon.
93
 So too the way Kant’s critique 
goes deeper than just dispatching particular arguments for theism; undermining the 
possibility of ‘God’ as knowable while promoting scepticism regarding the traditional 
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sources of rescue, such as revelation, religious experience and doctrines of analogy. 
Wolterstorff has argued that  
Kant is a watershed in the history of theology. Ever since Kant, the anxious questions, 
“Can we? How can we?” have haunted theologians, insisting on being addressed before 
any others. This is the agony, the Kantian  agony, of the modern theologian. Since 
Kant, a good many of our theologians have spoken far more confidently of The Great 




The language of ‘boundary’ here is taken from the conclusion to Kant’s Prolegomena to Any 
Future Metaphysics, which Wolterstorff judges as having been far more influential on 
modern theology than Kant’s Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone.  Earlier in the 
chapter I referred to Kant’s agnosticism, and at the heart of Kant’s insight here is that God 
cannot ‘…make up an item of intuition, of awareness or Anschauung, as do other objects that 
become part of the intuitional content of our mental lives’.
95
 Knowledge is limited to those 
objects that we experience, or that which we could in principle experience. ‘Thoughts without 
content are empty’ (A51/B75) and Kant maintains that there cannot be an intuition of God 
(A638/B666). The structure of our conceptual apparatus determines what intuitions are 
received and how they are understood, and space and time are considered –in qualified terms 
that have attracted no end of controversy –in some ways inseparable from that cognitive 
apparatus.
96
 It follows that God, being posited as transcending the confines of space and time, 
cannot be experienced on principle and cannot be known by means of the operation of Kant’ 
notions of understanding and reason on principle.
97
  
Yet, as Strawson noted: 
Kant was not content merely to draw this general negative conclusion about the 
impossibility of transcendent metaphysics. He thought that the propensity to think in 
terms of ideas for which no empirical conditions of application could be specified was 
not merely a philosophers’ aberration, but a natural and inevitable propensity of human 
reason. It was even, in some ways, a beneficial propensity. Certain ideas which had in 
themselves no empirical application or significance nevertheless inevitably arose in the 
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course of scientific inquiry, and might even serve a useful function in stimulating the 
indefinite extension of empirical knowledge.’
98
  
The postulation of an ens realissimum and its conceptual relationship to the idea of a 
necessary being lies at the heart of Kant’s discussion of the proofs and his eventual 
conclusion that existence cannot be a predicate.
99
 God may well exist, but there would be no 
way that such a determination could be made outside the realm of practical reason. This is the 
insight which stands at the heart of Kant’s agnosticism: while we may conceive the boundary 
of possible knowledge in theistic terms, this is a convention to which we cannot give any 
realistic content. Furthermore, reference to direct religious experience is ruled out as having 
any epistemological warrant for the philosopher.
100
  
There was, however, an important caveat. While God may not be known in the same way as 
other objects that we intuit within the bounds of space and time, God may nonetheless be 
posited by faith, or rather, a particular form of rational faith which avoids the worst excesses 
of fideism and religious ‘enthusiasm’, but rather comes to a notion of God by means of 
reflection on the moral order.
101
 We may not be able to prove that God exists, but we may 
nonetheless have good reasons for forming the concept; reasons that correspond to the world 
as it presents itself to us. Even so, Wolterstorff emphasises just how much of a challenge 
Kant poses to traditional theology:  
Kantian theology, so it would seem, must be exclusively negative theology. But even 
negative theology presupposes the ability to get God in mind; only if I have God in 
mind can I deny something of God. And this brings us back to the question as to how, 
on Kantian premises, could one ever get God in mind well enough to deny things of 
God? Theology, on Kantian premises, looks impossible.
102
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 Hare and MacKinnon both appreciate the point that for Kant the 
‘ultimate…can never be the subject of referential or descriptive statement’.
104
 Yet both 
emphasise the place Kant allows for continuing language of special revelation, even though it 
is never strictly necessary for ‘pure religion’.
105
 Insole sees Kant as a modern representative 
of a long running tradition of ‘intellectualist theology’. Byrne joins MacKinnon in finding 
some similarities between Kant’s agnosticism and question 13, 8 of the prima pars of the 
Summa, where there is a minimal notion of God as the ground of a moral teleology about 
whom it can also be said: ‘the source of all things, above all things and distinct from all 
things.’
106
 Yet the fact that we can know that God is does not mean we can know what God is 
in any more substantive way, only what God is not.
107
 Kant is seen to take this approach in an 
even more agnostic direction and on this score MacKinnon sides with Thomas.
108
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This is the tension from which it has been cogently argued that Kant is for all intents and 
purposes on a trajectory toward outright atheism and from which Hegel’s frustrations emerge 
in his insistence that to posit the notion of God as limit and to set God beyond the realms of 
reason is to say a lot more about God than Kant would admit.
109
 For Kant, God ‘…must 
remain always an unknown X, a mere limiting idea with no content. It stands for the fact that 
God transcends our knowledge in modes and ways of which we can never be aware and of 
which we have no inkling’.
110
 It is not possible to speak about God as a result of reason 
applying itself to nature or with reference to the logical features of the concept of God 
analytically (A635/663ff.). Kant does maintain, however, the possibility of intelligible talk 
about God and it has a certain inevitability and utility in providing coherence in the moral 
sphere that alternative non-theistic options lack (A634/B662).
111
  
This is often labelled as the ‘moral argument for the existence of God’, but any such label 
could be misleading if not taken together with the observations already made regarding 
Kant’s rigorous agnosticism.
112
 While the God that is postulated from reflection on the moral 
order is ‘the traditional notion of God as the supreme personal agent possessing the ‘omni’ 
properties’, it is not known as an independent reality external to human subjectivity and the 
needs of practical reason’ (5:125-6).
113
 This is an affirmation which has given rise to constant 
debate as to whether Kant is a realist or a non-realist when it comes to the object of his 
religious language.
114 
On the one hand it would seem that without the existence of free, self-
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conscious human agents engaging in reflection on the moral order, God would not be. On the 
other hand Kant does engage in reference to a transcendent ground and maintains that the 
God arising from moral speculation can be considered on analogy to this, even if it is in no 
way dependent on it.
115
 The proposed content for the notion of God-as-lawgiver in practical 
reason seems non-realist, yet the demand for language of this kind is derived from a 
reasonable apprehension of the world as it presents itself to us. Further, the claims of religion 
amount to far more than construction, consensus or outright fancy, but in their purest form 
they give expression and motivate adherence to the moral order which could not be 
otherwise.
116
   
With all this in mind, Byrne argues that what Kant does provide is ‘the most famous variation 
of the argument [for God] from moral order’.
117
 What Kant does not do is enlist God as the 
agent of a divine command theory of ethics or as a transcendent ‘foundational’ support for 
moral realism.
118
 It is the free self-legislating human agent that is the source of the absolute 
moral ‘ought’ of which Kant speaks and it is the demand of reason alone that compels one to 
act dutifully. The most important postulate undergirding the possibility of morality is 
freedom, by which a person finds it possible to engage in a mode of reflection and decision-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
absolutely determinative in producing the content of moral imperatives. Rawls is a particularly 
influential figure upholding such a view. At the heart of the discussion is Kant’s identification of a 
paradox pertaining to the fact that while there may be a concept of good and evil prior to the moral 
law, it does not serve as a foundation for the moral law, but emerged and is defined ‘after and by 
means of the law’. Stern, Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard. 36. The divide 
that Kant is wanting to preserve is between the ‘is’ and ‘ought’, by which moral principles are 
determined in the realm of the latter, that is: independently from any empirical observation, 
preference, interest, or reference to pleasure or pain. The debate about realism and constructivism 
centres on whether this moral law is conjured up by the free agent in a way that suggests that it could 
have been otherwise, or whether it is in some senses ‘received’ within reason as a non-negotiable 
principle. The constructionist tends to mount an argument based on Kant’s commitment to the 
subject’s autonomy; the realist tends to highlight the way in which Kant desires basic moral principles 
that are the result of an ‘unsullied’ exercise of reason. I suspect that the reason MacKinnon is attracted 
to Kant is that he perceives a refusal to take either option, but to forge some unresolved mediating 
position. 
115
 Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion, 62. See also Roger M. White, Talking About God: 
The Concept of Analogy and the Problem of Religious Language (Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 105-34.  
116
 Godlove, Kant and the Meaning of Religion, 52. The tension here is related to a much wider issue 
that Insole discusses in relation to ‘one and two realm interpretations’ of Kant’s transcendental ideal 
and Janz’s insistence that it is only bad readings of Kant that will try to force him into realist or 
idealist moulds. I will return to this issue in Chapter 5. Insole, Realist Hope, 110-15. See also Janz, 
God, the Mind's Desire, 136-38. 
117
 Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion, 61. 
118
 This becomes abundantly clear in Kant’s distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘revealed’ religion. 
Godlove, Kant and the Meaning of Religion, 46.  
34 
 
making that is not locked into a fixed chain of causation.
119
 Apprehension of the self-
conscious rational individual in possession of a will is the locus whereby a language beyond 
naturalistic determinism becomes necessary.
120
  
Where then does God emerge in Kant’s argument? Sorley put the matter thus: 
…for Kant, nature is a closed and self-consistent system; so is morality. Neither 
therefore proves God; but he is needed to weld them together; and the moral reason 




God is adopted into the argument as a means to ensure that humans can retain some 
confidence in the ultimate coordination of virtue and happiness; a coordination which Kant 
takes as self-evidently constitutive of the good (5:123-32).
122
 This is an approach which 
works from the conviction that our moral lives are rational in as far as they generate certain 
ends and that these ends can be achieved.
123
 Such ends include the fulfilment of duty and the 
attainment of happiness on the part of moral agents. Indeed, for Kant it would be irrational to 
posit a moral order where partial or intermediate goods are acknowledged without the 
possibility of a perfect good (5.111ff).
124
 Furthermore, it is held that the attainment of such 
moral ends is only possible if ‘…natural order and causality are part of an overarching moral 
order and causality’.
125
 It must be possible that the moral ends can be achieved despite the 
natural limitations, frustrations and divisions of human life. In the end, Kant believed that 
such moral striving and such a resolution is only possible if both the soul’s immortality and 
God are posited within the moral system to ensure its ultimate fairness, coherence and 
fulfilment.
126
 MacKinnon notes that:  
Where Kant speaks of the immortality of the soul as a ‘postulate of pure practical 
reason’, by doing so he makes of immortality a matter primarily of rational religious 
hope. It is, moreover, a hope that he supposes justified by the fact that only if we 
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entertain the idea of a state in which frustrations to the completion of the individual’s 
moral commitment are made good, are we confirmed in the commitment in question.
127
  
This is the openness of the moral agent to a qualified teleology which constitutes ‘Kant’s 
eschatology’ according to MacKinnon, by which Kant takes ‘…his treatment of personal 
immortality into areas sometimes nearer to Paul’s vision of the redemption of the created 
universe than to the metaphysical traditions associated with Plato on the one hand and 
Aristotle on the other’.
128
       
MacKinnon’s exposure to the positivist tradition and to the best features of utilitarianism led 
him, I think, to the conclusion that Kant is insufficiently ‘realist’. It is to explicate this 
problem from a Christian vantage point that leads MacKinnon to place Bishop Butler; a 
largely forgotten figure in moral philosophy today, even if something of a luminary of the 
18
th
 century British Anglican sphere, alongside Kant.
129
 For Butler, the empirical turn did not 
lead with any inevitability to utilitarianism nor did it necessarily close off the potential moral 
insights of concrete religious existence. Butler’s approach was to adopt a style of moral 
reasoning in a way in which there was not such a stark distinction between the realm of ends 
and the realm of nature as one finds in Kant.
130
 As well as adopting something of a 
conscience-based natural law approach with some broad resonances with Kant, according to 
Mackinnon, he also includes in his moral deliberations a very un-Kantian concern for 
‘…[t]he passional side of human nature’, evident by the way Butler ‘…will suddenly interject 
an explicit reference to the authority of the religious imagination’ when discussing moral 
propositions.
131
 MacKinnon is also captivated by St. Paul in as far as his apostolic ministry 
embodied a certain type of moral dispensation. Paul is a case of the mixing of an 
introspective intensity that is common to the modern deontological tradition, with the specific 
moral fall-out of a divine encounter interpreted in terms of theophany.
132
 Indeed, Kant, Butler 
and St Paul are all grouped within a broadly conceived deontological frame, or what 
MacKinnon likes to call the Gesinnungsethik.
133
 
In this vein, while offering an appreciative reading of the alternative utilitarian tradition 
emerging in the wake of eighteenth to twentieth century empiricism and positivism, 
                                                          
127
 MacKinnon, TT, 26. 
128
 "Kant's Influence on British Theology," 354. 
129
 SET, 194-202. 
130




 Ibid., 257-62. 
133
 Ibid., 58. 
36 
 
MacKinnon never places it at the front and centre of his forays into moral philosophy. Kant is 
judged to have ‘achieved a level of intellectual sophistication and subtlety as well as of 
introspective concentration, which [the ultilitarians] lacked’.
134
 This is not to say that the two 
positions are without important overlaps. Both tended to reject the notion that morality 
requires a metaphysical foundation, God or a universal natural law in order to secure its 
content.
135
 At the same time, both were clear that reason can discern moral obligations that 
we have an imperative to follow. Both are also routinely analysed in terms of whether they 
adopt forms of constructionism or realism. 
In the instance of Butler and St. Paul, MacKinnon shows the way in which Christian 
approaches to morality can draw together the historical and existential, together with an 
aptitude to apprehend an absolute moral imperative albeit in the context of a robust claim 
about human autonomy. In other words, it has the potential to reflect elements of utilitarian 
and Kantian approaches without the reductionism or the formalism that sometimes plagues 
the work of the more ardent defenders of these traditions. This is not to make the claim that 
Christianity can somehow provide an easy synthesis of the great modern divide between 
utilitarianism and deontology. As pointed out above, MacKinnon is simply not interested in 
attempting such reconciliation or trying to vindicate ‘Christian morality’ over and against its 
rivals in any absolute sense. For him, Christian moral discourse is as much subject to the 
purgative critiques of positivists as it is to the Kantian’s even as it retains a focus on 
explicating the moral implications of the incarnation. The process of engagement and 
conversation can highlight temptations for the Christian moralist while also motivating 
continued attempts of re-articulation and implementation. 
MacKinnon accepts Kant’s argument that contemplation of the problem of metaphysics will 
re-emerge in the realm of practical reason and morality after it had been subject to the 
purgative dissolution and re-definition in the first Critique. In this vein, he observes that 
…for Kant the moral universe is the universe with which the transcendent 
metaphysician, if he understands his job aright, is really concerned; and it is his view 
that men [sic] require rescue from the bondage of false conception alike religious and 
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In a much later essay, MacKinnon reiterated the point that the metaphysical expression, 
together with related moral and religious discourses, properly belong outside the realm of 
‘pure reason’, but yet are necessary: 
Because Kant believed he had established the frontiers of the objectively conceivable, 
while allowing a highly significant role, for instance, to the idea of a total 
comprehension of the world in which we found ourselves (the so-called regulative use 
of the Ideas of Reason), he had set himself free to appreciate the suggestive power of 
the mythological. It could, as in the example taken from Religion Within the Limits of 
Reason Alone, sustain and deepen our purchase hold on that unconditioned with which 
we were all the time in commerce, and whose authority we could only gainsay at the 
cost of denying our own rational nature.
137
   
For Kant, practical reason or the realm of moral freedom, choice and obligation arising within 
concrete experience is the locus of the possibility of a qualified renewal of mythical 
expression and metaphysical ideas, which in turn are found to be essential to the ‘health’ of 
rationality itself in as far as they put us in touch with the ‘unconditioned’.
138
 MacKinnon goes 
along with all this, yet as noted above, did not feel entirely bound to the constraints Kant 
placed on theological language.  
Building on this insight, one of the reasons to see MacKinnon as a theologian with a 
genuinely creative and independent spirit, is that despite his deep admiration of Kant, he 
rejected the path of liberal modernist theology; arguably the tradition that was most self-
conscious in its sympathy with Kantian theology in MacKinnon’s context.
139
 Broadly 
speaking, this was a diverse collection of approaches which were distinctive for adopting a 
reductionist approach that viewed Jesus, the church and the believer primarily in terms of a 
particular kind of moral possibility.
140
 It often arose in antagonism to other modes of 
knowledge such as the ontological, metaphysical and historical that had been central to past 
expressions of Christian orthodoxy.  
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5. MacKinnon Contra Liberalism  
 
According to Bryne,  liberal modernist theological trajectories of the post war period placed 
‘…the ethics of religion before its doctrines and historical myths’.
141
 One manifestation is a 
form of Deism that ‘…more or less identif[ies] the concept of God with the concept of an 
eternal moral law in nature’ which in turn allows the theologian to posit a form of theism 
shorn of any super-naturalistic claim to revelation or any crude dependency on the historical 
contingency of one or more particular religious traditions.
142
 In this approach, morality 
becomes a way to justify references to God, once history and metaphysics have been deemed 
unreliable supports for theism.
143
 The result was more often than not forms of non-
cognitivism: ‘…[e]ither religious claims are not propositional at all, having some kind of 
non-cognitive (non-fact-stating) function in human discourse, or these claims are cognitive 
only in being descriptive of entities or states in the empirical world’.
144
 Where a realist theism 
persisted it tended to be ‘revised’ and reference to the ‘freedom of God’ as explored, for 
instance, by Neo-Orthodoxy was depreciated, as well as a notion of God explicated with the 
aid of traditional Greek metaphysical notions of ultimate reality.
145
 At a bare minimum a 
generic notion of transcendence was extolled, associated with ‘…the goal of human striving, 
[and] the source and supreme embodiment of value. Morality may lead to something outside 
itself which…occupies religious space, and likewise, reference to transcendence will only be 
possible in relation to the moral space.’
146
 
Theologians who adopted these premises were too often willing victims of what MacKinnon 
regarded as ‘facile Kantianism’.
147
 Here, religion subordinated itself to an otherwise 
independent morality as a kind of survival strategy. Realist theistic ontology was no longer 
the integrating ground for theology and the uniqueness of Christian ethics as it was related to 
the history and person of Christ and the early church was now to be remodelled to reflect the 
content of enlightened ethical self-awareness of individuals within liberal, secular 
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 The new-found commensurability of theology and philosophy could be 
symbolised in a dubious analogy or actual confluence between Kant’s categorical imperative 
and a divine command ethics.
149
 Christianity could be deemed reasonable and the continuing 
role of the quasi-established or established state churches could be reinforced to the extent 
that the doctrines believed and the behaviour encouraged accorded with ‘rational ethics’. 
O’Donnovan observes that:  
…the ethical conception of the truth was the essence of the modern; and this program 
[i.e. liberal theology] was ex professo “modernist,” taking for granted that the highest 
and noblest ideals were being grasped and realized in contemporary history.
150
  
While MacKinnon saw great promise in Kant’s ‘moral turn’ and the possibility of a 
theological re-articulation via practical reason, he was critical of the sort of emaciated 
theology he detected in this sort of liberalism. He resisted the naïve expulsion of the problem 
of metaphysics and feared that concrete suffering and tragedy may be muted by liberal 
notions of moral consensus and progress.      
For all this, it must be remembered that modernist or liberal theology was a highly varied 
movement in Britain, which manifested in very different forms throughout MacKinnon’s life. 
Indeed, there were distinctive inter-war and post-war expressions, as well as a significant 
flowering in the 1960s and 70s marked most famously (or notoriously) by sensationalist non-
realist ‘death of God’ theologies.
151
 MacKinnon appears to have remained implacably 
critical, which in some ways explains (and in others is explained by) his participation in the 
Catholic wing of Anglicanism from his student days in Oxford and then consistently to the 
end of his life. Like British liberal theology, British Anglo-Catholicism was (and remains) a 
complex phenomenon and they are not mutually exclusive. Yet its general character was 
shaped by its beginnings as a movement of protest and retrieval. It sported an inbuilt grain of 
suspicion toward modernising trends in theology, even though its more reactionary edge was 
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moderated by Lux Mundi and the second generation of reformers. While MacKinnon 
subscribed to this movement he was also known to chide fellow Anglo-Catholics with just as 
much, if not greater vehemence, whenever he perceived this conservatism fostering a wilful 
ignorance of the serious gains of modern philosophy and political science, or on the other 
hand, betraying this conservative impulse with an uncritical subscription to modernist 
intellectual fads.
152
 In this way, MacKinnon was something of a serial ‘outsider’, often 
showing inordinate sympathy to forces that were undeniably hostile to theology (such as 
Logical Positivism and Marxism) whist retaining some of his harshest criticism for the 
theologians and church leaders who were in all respects closer to him in terms of 
philosophical and religious commitments.  
The motivation for MacKinnon’s antipathy toward certain types of 20
th
 century theological 
liberalism not only arose from concerns about its adequacy for a sufficiently orthodox and 
philosophically rigorous account of the faith, but also in the way it failed the demands of the 
historical moment. He saw it as an attempted therapy that failed in its diagnosis and its 
attempted cure. In observing trends in the early to mid-20
th
 century English ecclesiology, 
Lawson observed that  
…[t]he post-First World War Church of England remained inherently hopeful about the 
future and theological liberalism dominated across the church’s political spectrum, not 
withstanding the continued importance of Anglo-Catholicism within the broad Church 
of England. Yet even the triumph of hopeful liberalism was challenged by domestic and 
international crises between the wars. By the time the generation of Christian social 
radicals came to dominate the church hierarchy in the 1940…their particular brand of 
incarnation theology and their effort to construct the Kingdom of God…appeared 
increasingly anachronistic…The hopefulness of Christian sociology appeared 
meaningless when faced with both the religiosity of political dictatorship on the 
continent and the prospect of national annihilation in war. Lower levels of the Church, 
clergy and laity for example, seemed to take refuge in a quite different, pessimistic 
theology of redemption which emphasised the otherness of God and the sin of man 
[sic].
153
   
To a large extent MacKinnon was a theologian who showed solidarity with these so-called 
‘lower levels of the Church’. In this vein, I suspect that his conviction of the failure of this 
optimistic inter-war period theology stayed with him in such a way that made him suspicious 
of later forms of liberalism as they emerged. Indeed, to the extent to which he saw any 
theology rejecting a confrontation with ‘the otherness of God and the sin of man [sic]’, 
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MacKinnon was suspicious. This may explain why he was more critical of Cosmo Lang as 
Archbishop of Canterbury than he was of his successor, William Temple.
154
 The former 
seemed too uncritical in his support of Government policy in the lead up to the Second World 
War and scandalously naïve in the way in which he spoke about the coronation of King 
George VI as a possible source of renewal for British Christianity and the established church. 
Temple shared the hopes of ‘a generation of social radicals’, initially embracing 19
th
 century 
notions of progress in the midst of the post-World War One recovery. Yet as Europe lurched 
toward fascism and war again, it was the recovery of the doctrine of original sin that became 
the dominant note sounding in his public theology.
155
 European society was set in the midst 
of violent, degenerative forces and Britain was facing dire existential threat. As such, Temple 
realised that liberal theologies and sociologies geared toward engineering continuous 
betterment were ‘clanging symbols’. MacKinnon appreciated this sort of realism and it would 
seem that he did not want to lose hold of these lessons in a period of optimism and 
reconstruction following Temple’s death and the Allies’ victory. Where post-war liberal 
theology produced a reductionist God that was tied up with the achievements of human 
culture or reason, or when it anchored itself in the presumption of the moral superiority of the 
present, MacKinnon voiced dissent.      
Returning now to O’Donovan’s observation that Kant was a huge influence on modernist or 
liberal theology, I hope to show that MacKinnon’s divergence from these traditions is 
nonetheless explicitly related to his own specific way of engaging with Kant. As noted above, 
according to Kant, religion purged of its most ambitious metaphysical claims could be 
justified in as far as it encouraged individuals to discover and embrace their duty in respect of 
the moral law; a law that became apparent through introspective reason rather than historical 
revelation.
156
 MacKinnon observed that 
…Kant is concerned primarily with religion as a separable aspect of human life. He 
treats it as, in fact, the name of a family of practices including here a number of beliefs, 
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The religion that Kant proposed was self-consciously unlike that of ‘orthodox’ Christianity, 
with notions familiar to Kant from his pietistic upbringing such as grace, justification, final 
judgement and the sanctifying work of the Spirit, modified in a thoroughly anthropocentric 
direction. In this regard MacKinnon noted that ‘[i]t is…by Kant that the contradiction 
between the ethical and the religious standpoint seems sometimes to have been most sharply 
brought out’.
158
 To the extent that this observation is true, it may be that with the enthusiastic 
take-up of Kantian style of moral religion by certain liberal streams of theology, aspects of 
Kantian moral rigour were left behind.
159
 Whether this is exactly what MacKinnon meant 
when he criticised ‘facile Kantianism’ is an open question, but it is a phenomenon also 
flagged by O’Donovan, who notes that ‘…[i]f the program of the ‘primacy of the ethical’ is 
Kantian , it is not the Kant of the second critique… into which [theological] liberalism never 
really ventured’.
160
 Not only was much liberal theology too quick to baptise whatever moral 
trends were in vogue, showing forth a lack of intellectual seriousness compared to Kant, they 
presumed that Kant was collapsing religion into morality, yet the reality may have been far 
more nuanced.
161
     
The point to note here is that while MacKinnon followed Kant in seeing practical reason as 
the locus in which claims to transcendence and metaphysics were likely to remerge in a 
compelling way, he parted company with Kant when it came to the latter’s exposition of 
‘rational religion’. This raises the question: can he have one without the other? That is, can 
MacKinnon take as much inspiration as he does from Kant in terms of his views on the 
possibility of metaphysics and the epistemological limitations that beset us without also 
taking on something like the form of Kant’s religion? Perhaps a negative answer would be 
justified if MacKinnon had been an uncritical disciple of Kant; for if Kant’s purgation of 
metaphysics and theology had been accepted wholesale then MacKinnon would have 
certainly been compelled to follow Kant into an articulation of ‘rational religion’ with the 
modernists. As it happens, and as I will continue to demonstrate throughout the following 
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chapters, MacKinnon was not an uncritical devotee of Kant and this allowed him some 
flexibility. The onto-theology of old needed to yield to the purgation of a realist empiricism. 
Yet, likewise MacKinnon insisted that the anthropocentrism of rational religion needed to 
yield to the purgative claim of revelation-in-history. At this point one must keep in mind 
MacKinnon’s conviction that only a loose and problematic connection exists between his 
suggestions toward metaphysical recovery and the actual content of his theology. The moral 
concerns that provided at least some of the impetus for the continuation of metaphysical 
language and the possibility for a transcendent referent in philosophy did not serve as a 
unambiguous prolegomena to theology for MacKinnon, nor did a focus on morality take 
away the difficult ontological considerations that a theologian must face in order to sustain 
and defend the possibility of a realist notion of God and the possibility of revelation.  
For MacKinnon, a focus on moral philosophy helped to identify some points on which 
philosophy and theology may become more intelligible to each other, but there was no sense 
in which such a focus provided a ready solution to theology’s marginalisation or a rationale 
that somehow lessened the scandal of revelatory particularity. In this respect, we can see the 
influence of a Barthian trajectory in as far as the Kantian decoupling of theology from 
classical metaphysics provided the impetus for a very non-Kantian re-articulation of 
revelatory uniqueness.
162
 Kant’s argument regarding the inability to know God beyond the 
mere notion of God practically conceived, coupled with a respect for empirical realism, 
opened the door to a theology that proposed a revelatory act as the radical point of departure 
for modern theology. Yet if Barth was the foremost exponent of such a move, it is apparent 
that MacKinnon went along with him only so far. MacKinnon did recognise and respect the 
metaphysical dimension of Barth’s project;
163
 something which accords with his conviction 
that ‘…the denial of the possibility of metaphysics…leads inevitably to the repudiation of 
any sort of religious language whether of immanence or of transcendence’.
164
 He notes that 
Barth’s project, ‘…unlike much that calls itself radical theology’, refused to side-step ‘…the 
problem of metaphysics upon christology’.
165
 Yet MacKinnon remained too much in Kant’s 
orbit to become a fully-fledged Barthian. He saw the moral domain ‘threading-through’ and 
uniting secular and ‘revealed’ history, relativizing the distinction in a way that required the 
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re-positing of the ‘problem of metaphysics’ in conversation with the classical tradition and in 
this way countenancing experiments in analogical discourse in theology that Barth could not 
countenance. 
6. Moral Realism 
  
Moral realism was a commitment that was reinforced for MacKinnon via his interactions 
with Kant and Barth, and in the final section of this chapter I would like to contextualise this 
doctrine further, making suggestions as to the ‘sense’ in which it applies.  
In the mid-twentieth century, Bernard Williams noted that one of the problems with moral 
discourse was the ‘…remarkable assurance with which people think they already know what 
moral questions are about and consequently what can and what cannot be called ‘moral’.
166
 
This was a fault of moralists on all sides, yet it is a temptation to which moral realists have 
been particularly prone, for they have a tendency to take for granted the fact that they have 
common-sense and intuition on their side.
167
 Critics will point out, however, that one only has 
to interrogate taken-for-granted notions of ‘moral fact’, ‘intuition’ and ‘common sense’ to 
discover a nest of conceptual vulnerabilities which the sceptic is only too ready to exploit. In 
a paper published in 1958, Anscombe famously argued that all moral ‘ought’ claims were 
dependent, whether knowingly or unknowingly, on the presumption of a divine law-giver 
(and therefore impossible) while urging that ethical discourse could continue intelligibly only 
as a discipline of philosophical psychology emerged to clarity notions of pleasure, action, 
virtue and human flourishing.
168
        
For MacKinnon, and many of his generation, the conviction inherited through the linage of 
Descartes and Kant was that one of the central problems of philosophy and, by implication, 
moral philosophy, was the relationship between a subject and the external world. In this 
regard Platts (discussing the Anscobe’s work) makes a telling distinction between two 
different directions of ‘fit’ when attempting to give a philosophical account of the connection 
between mental states and the world:  
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Beliefs aim at the true, and their being true is their fitting the world; falsity is a decisive 
failing in a belief, and false beliefs should be discarded; beliefs should be changed to fit 
the world, not vice versa. Desires aim at realization, and their realization is the world 
fitting with them; the fact that the indicative content of a desire is not realised in the 
world is not yet a failing in the desire, and not yet any reason to discard the desire; the 
world, crudely, should be changed to fit the desires, not vice versa.
169
  
In their effort to articulate a position on the status of moral claims, the realist tends to give 
greater weight to the first type of ‘fit’ and the non-realist the second, although any strict 
distinction tends to collapse when the actual moral convictions of liberalism, Marxism and 
Christianity are examined (for instance), as it becomes impossible to entirely separate ‘belief’ 
and ‘desire’, ‘is’ and ‘ought’.  
The possibility of moral realism is a vast topic riven with complexity and intense conjecture 
and it is essential to gain sufficient purchase on the notion so that MacKinnon’s claims can be 
contextualised and responsibly critiqued.
170
 Indeed, one of the frustrating (but not in the least 
surprising) aspects of MacKinnon’s moral philosophy in this regard is that he never sets out 
to systematically defend the realist motifs he frequently uses in discussing the nature and 
possibility of moral knowledge. It is almost as if the possibility of such a way of speaking 
reveals itself in the midst of attending to the exercise of moral agency in specific contexts; a 
form of attentiveness that MacKinnon’s therapy helps us to practice. 
Sayre-McCord argues that moral realists are those who think that evaluative judgements 
‘should be taken at face value –moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get 
the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true.’ For Sayre-
McCord: ‘…that much is common (and more or less defining) ground of moral realism.’
171
 
This view does not necessarily come with any fixed idea regarding the content of these truth 
claims, nor does it presume any standardised metaphysical commitment. DeLapp offers the 
following, more sophisticated definition:  
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Moral realism [is] the view that moral values exist in a way that is causally and 
evidentially (though not conceptually) independent from the beliefs of anyone and 
everyone (including idealized agents) such that evidence and beliefs do not determine 




If God is one such ‘idealised agent’, and such a claim is debatable, then many Christians 
would not count as moral realists. This, presumably, is the conclusion implied by DeLapp, 
and one shared by anyone who emerges from consideration of the Euthyphro Dilemma with 
the conviction that one cannot speak of the goodness of God and the moral excellence of 
God’s commands without independently establishing the meaning of notions such as 
‘goodness’ or ‘excellence’.
173
 It is a logic that many modern theologians, whether those in the 
orbit of Augustine and Barth or Aristotle and Aquinas, would reject with references to God’s 
transcendence, human disobedience and human limitation resulting in the impossibility of 
realising fulsome notions of goodness without some prior participation in the non-arbitrary 
goodness of the Divine.
174
 A grossly inadequate generalisation, but not one without some 
truth, is that moral theologians in the orbit of the former tend to be tempted toward a version 
of divine command voluntarism while the latter are more likely to seek refuge in a natural 
law of abstract universals. Lovibond has noted that the ‘…theme of partisanship, or 
voluntarism, might be regarded as the crux of the non-cognitivist theory of ethics: its ‘moral’, 
so to speak.’
175
 In this vein, while theological voluntarists of an extreme variety may think 
they are securing a version of moral realism, the deep structure of their proposals may often 
have more in common with their non-realist rivals. The presence of the natural law tradition 
as self-consciously moderating or accompanying divine command theories is sign enough 
that significant constituents of the theological tradition are willing to develop a more nuanced 
account of God’s command.
176
 It is such a possibility that led MacKinnon to tentatively 
identify himself at key moments with the language of ‘natural law’, while still seeking to 
imbibe insights from Barth’s command ethics.
177
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The great challenge to moral realism came with the rejection of all traces of theological and 
metaphysical grounding for moral claims typically associated with various forms of 
naturalism, the collapse of ‘traditional metaphysics’ orchestrated by Kant, Nietzsche’s protest 
against bourgeois Christian morality and analytical philosophy’s linguistic and conceptual 
dismantling of claims relating to objective moral ‘facts’.
178
 For those committed to 
‘naturalism’ of one kind or another, ‘…the only facts we should believe in are those 
countenanced by or at least compatible with, the results of science’.
179
 The result is that moral 
claims are reduced to being mere expressions of individual or collective preference. Those 
that attract widespread assent are no more than expressions of strong cultural settlement that 
may have been otherwise. A.J. Ayer’s Emotivism, R.M. Hare’s Prescriptivism, J.L. Mackie’s 
Error Theory and Allan Gibbard’s Norm Expressivism are examples of significant 
contributors to the non-realist school.
180
  
Sayre-McCord goes on to categorise two positions that stand in opposition to moral realism, 
the first being that of the non-cognitivists and the second, the error theorists. Non-cognitivists 
hold that ‘…moral claims are not actually in the business of reporting facts, but are rather our 
way of expressing emotions or of controlling others’ behaviour, or, at least, of taking a stand 
for and against certain things’.
 181
 Lovibond notes that  
…the theory denies that there are any truths about intrinsic values. The concept which 
is jettisoned by non-cognitive theorists is that of a value which is both objective and 
intrinsic. Such theorists are quite ready to allow that there can be propositions, in the 
strict logical sense of the word, about instrumental value: it can perfectly well be a 
‘fact’, on their view, that such and such means are conducive to such and such an end, 
and hence the means are good, given the end as determined’. [Yet, she 
continues], …judgements of intrinsic value are held to be warranted not by the actual 
obtaining of a certain state of affairs which they declare to obtain, but by some 
phenomenon which, pending a better use for the word, can be called ‘subjective’: 




Alternatively, error theorists hold ‘that moral claims are in the business of reporting facts, but 
the required facts are not to be found.’
183
 J.L. Mackie is a high-profile proponent, whose 
Inventing Right and Wrong was published a year before MacKinnon’s retirement but 
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nevertheless reflects elements of the debate in preceding years.
184
 He accepted that ordinary 
‘common-sense’ moral judgements involve a claim to objectivity yet insisted that this must 
be met with scepticism even while the language continues to dominate everyday moral 
judgements. It would seem that there is not much that is substantively different between this 
approach and non-cognitivism, except that the former thinks it is necessary to keep the 
language of moral factuality alive while sceptically redefining its character from the ‘inside 
out’, whereas the latter views it as meaningless from the outset. 
In any case, differences over the language of moral factuality are really only symptoms of a 
deeper divide; one that is connected to the distinction Anscombe captured relating to the ‘fit’ 
between mental states and the world. A crude, but not entirely misleading assertion is that the 
distinction between ‘fact’ / ‘value’ or ‘is’ / ‘ought’ forms the nucleus of controversies 
between and among realist and non-realist moralists. In this vein, Black seeks to capture 
‘…what is widely understood as Hume’s contention that it is not logically possible to derive 
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’’ and he takes this to mean that  
…the starting-point for moral reasoning must be practical reason (the sort that people 
use to plan action) and not theoretical reason (the type of reason that tests the truth of a 
proposition by seeking to establish its conformity to some prior reality, for example 
scientific reason. [Black further asserts, that]…to respect this claim is not to say that the 
nature of reality is unrelated to an ethic of practical reason but rather that reflection 
upon this relationship cannot be the logical foundation for ethical reasoning.
185
  
The implication here is that notions of value and obligation need not be disconnected from a 
set of theoretical premises or naturalistic observations, yet they cannot be entirely determined 
by these either. The general question implicit here pertains to the relationship between claims 
to knowledge in the domain of the empirical sciences and those that emerge from moral 
discourse. The specific question for the moral realist is how to respond to those who see any 
affirmation of the fact-value distinction as requiring a form of moral non-realism. In relation 
to the first general question, Brink assists the search for clarity by offering three options: 
1. Realism about science and antirealism about ethics. Placed within this category are:  
‘…traditional nihilists, non-cognitivists (e.g. emotivists and prescriptivists), moral 
skeptics, and relativists.’ 
2. Realism about science and ethics: ‘Although many traditional cognitivists found 
important dis-analogies and discontinuities between ethics and the sciences, most of 
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them, including the intuitionists (e.g. Richard Price, Thomas Reid, Sidgwick, Moore, 
Ross, Broad, and H.A. Prichard), believed that ethics does or can possess these marks 
of objectivity.’  
3. A third alternative proves difficult to capture because it involves proponents claiming 
a ‘global subjectivism or antirealism’, yet regarding their position as realist or 
objectivist in re-defined terms. According to Brink, ‘…the idea is that, although ethics 
cannot fit the common sense view of scientific objectivity, this establishes nothing 
interesting about the objectivity of ethics, since science itself does not satisfy the 
common sense view of scientific objectivity’. I take this position to involve a version 
of scepticism which undermines the objectivity of the sciences, thus purporting to 
bring discourses that were formally seen as incapable of producing objective 
knowledge, such as ethics, onto a ‘more even epistemological playing field.’
186
    
The option that I will focus on is the second: realism about science and ethics. MacKinnon is 
well described by it, even if he finds himself in disagreement with the moral philosophers 
whom Brink associates with it. It is a position that shares substantial points of commonality 
with theological approaches that refuse any sort of strict demarcation between fact and value, 
such as those put forward by Hauerwas, O’Donovan, J.E. Hare and anyone who rejects the 
logic of the Euthyphro Dilemma in the way mentioned earlier in this section.
187
 It was D.Z. 
Phillips who observed that a common misappropriation of the distinction in the realm of the 
philosophy of religion was that ‘…one cannot argue from a descriptive statement about God 
to the assertion of an obligation to God’.
188
 Phillips offers the example of common ways of 
speaking about a son’s obligation to a decrepit father as a means to illustrate the point that the 
‘…distinction between descriptive and evaluative statements in this context is confused and 
misleading’ and he sees this as having analogous import for the way ethics is done in 
religious communities.
189
 In a similar vein, Hauerwas, who like Phillips is indebted to the 
later Wittgenstein, has insisted that accepting the distinction would be the death of Christian 
ethics, for ‘…this alleged separation of “facts” from “values” drives an artificial wedge 
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between our beliefs and our actions, for there is an intimate connection between what a man 
[sic] believes and what he finds intelligible to approve or disapprove morally.’
190
  
Hauerwas readily imbibes the non-foundationalist, communal and linguistic sensibilities of 
the Wittgensteinian trajectory. He would agree with MacKinnon when he extolled Barth for 
avoiding a substandard theology that continues on ‘…as if we were enabled to avoid the 
sharp needle of enquiry concerning how best to represent the one with whom we have to do 
[i.e. Christ] by suggesting that in the end even as the proper study of mankind is man, so 
Christian man finds his appropriate study in himself’.
191
 Yet avoiding this manifestation of 
idealistic anthropomorphism in the development of a distinctively Christian moral position 
has dangers, namely that ‘…to conceive of human nature or theological beliefs in terms of 
facts implies a universalism in the first case and, in the second, an epistemological 
foundationalism’.
192
 In this vein, Barth, MacKinnon and Hauerwas all went about avoiding 
any facile articulation of universalism or foundationalism in their ethical writings.  
In the face of a consolidation of non-realist ethics, British moral philosophy in the 20
th
 
century hosted various attempts to defend the meaningfulness and factuality of moral claims. 
Perhaps the most notable given MacKinnon’s context is that of G.E. Moore, and in different 
ways, Iris Murdoch and John McDowell. MacKinnon sought to avoid the mysteriousness of 
Moore’s moral intuition of the good, which the latter took to be a simple, indefinable, non-
natural property that delivers us into the realm of objective moral factuality.
193
 On this point, 
Hare observes that ‘…[t]o say that it is non-natural is to distinguish it [i.e. the moral intuition 
of goodness] both from natural properties (like producing pleasure) and supernatural ones 
(like being commanded by God).’
194
 MacKinnon desired a course that honoured the same 
distinction, yet found Moore wanting.
195
 MacKinnon also avoided a qualified reversion to a 
platonic form of the good such as that advocated by Murdoch; he was too much the Kantian 
to adopt any realist or quasi-realist Platonism even if the influence of A.E. Taylor could have 
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pushed him in this direction.
196
 Instead, he developed the distinction between naturalistic and 
moral knowledge claims with reference to a unique form of historical and existential practical 
reason, which gives rise to ‘facts’ necessarily different from the those verified by the natural 
sciences, yet not ultimately unrelated to these in terms of a shared commitment to some form 
of correspondence theory of truth. 
The result is a conviction that while it may be impossible to derive the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’ in 
ways that reflect the legacies of Hume and Kant, the strength of this assertion depends on the 
how narrowly one defines the ‘is’ or the realm in which we are permitted to speak of ‘facts’. 
If in the spirit of someone like Levinas, for instance, one admits to this realm the question of 
the possibility and character of moral personhood from the beginning, as well as the 
historical, existential and imaginative dimensions of moral existence, then a narrowly 
conceived fact-value distinction comes under intense strain.
197
 There is no way of embracing 
a quest to apprehend the world without also apprehending ourselves as moral agents whose 
ascriptions of value and apprehensions of the claim of the ‘good’ can ever be finally cut loose 
from particular people with a history and a future.
198
 MacKinnon liked to quote Butler’s 
dictum that ‘everything is what it is and not another thing’, with the implication that the 
uniqueness of moral facts must be respected and one cannot seek to justify them by 
jettisoning their particularity through over-determined analogies.
199
 It is as if MacKinnon 
would prefer richer and wider notions of ‘empiricism’, ‘is’ and ‘fact’ than what many 
positivists would typically allow; he embraced the empiricism of the poet, rather than to take 
the alternative routes of securing moral knowledge claims in esoteric, self-authenticating and 
a-historical sources or, with the emotivists and error theorists, giving up on the possibility of 
moral factuality altogether.
200
 In this respect he reflected the influence of moralists in the 
generation before him, such as Sorley and Taylor, both of whom feature in the next chapter. 
MacKinnon decries any absolute distinction between fact and value, descriptive and 
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evaluative claims, yet at the same time seems very aware that not making this distinction at 
all, or making a confused distinction, is no way forward either.
201
   
Reference to this point can be found in MacKinnon’s later forays into the ethics of nuclear 
proliferation, where he avows 
…the facile invocation of the alleged distinction between fact and value. If in what 
follows we seem to advance into metaphysical territory, it may be that only by such 
floundering will we avoid the damaging consequences of saying that such and such a 
question is question of fact, and such and such a question of value. The need to 
understand what we are about in this respect is all the greater because in the debates 
which concern us, there are concepts which slither, and are indeed encouraged to slither 
by those who use the distinction of fact and value, from the factual to the ethical and 
back again’. MacKinnon adds: ‘if I am concerned with abuse of the murky distinction 
between fact and value, it is because through abuse of that alleged distinction we are 
prevented among other things from seeing the possible relevance to our whole situation 
of the concept of temptation.
202
   
MacKinnon mentions a form of metaphysical discourse (here undefined) as usefully 
transcending the distinction, relativizing it and helping observers to prevent the ‘slithering’ he 
found so offensive. He resented the way in which proliferation and the doctrine of deterrence 
had become a ‘fact’; something which subsumed and pre-empted substantive judgements of 
value.
203
 The very structure of debate prevented serious consideration of the question as to 
whether the state was an entity that could justifiably require the use of such weapons to 
protect its interests and ensure its own perpetuation.
204
 Indeed, there is a way of speaking 
about factuality that undermines the presence of human agency and, as MacKinnon points 
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out, a way of establishing the distinction so that distortions of perspective and motivation 
remain unexamined. A metaphysic is needed which might provide the tools to give 
expression to the complex dialectic between ‘moral facts’ and ‘facts of nature’, and also a 
moral discipline by which human agency is preserved, contemplative critical distance is 
achieved and self-delusion held in check.
205
   
7. Conclusion   
 
To recapitulate, it can be noted that MacKinnon seemed uneasy with aspects of 
Wittgenstein’s legacy when it came to ethics, as well as the sort of ‘command ethics’ that 
emerged from the Barthian and Augustinian traditions. Likewise he found fault with the 
formalism of Kant, the positivism of the utilitarians and the moribund inflexibility of some 
natural law approaches which he observed in the history of moral discourse and at work in his 
own context. For all this, he sought to make the moral realism (which lay at the heart of many 
versions of these approaches) workable, because he found alternatives unconvincing.
206
 What 
MacKinnon did like about non-realist and relativist approaches was their therapeutic 
potential. They tended to emphasise the sort of emersion in the ‘concrete particular’ that he 
came to see as vital for any attempt at serious moral discourse. For non-realists and 
relativists, a disciplined focus on the particular tended to be an integral step on the road to 
scepticism regarding moral truth claims paired with language of ‘factuality’ and the 
‘absolute’. With Isaiah Berlin, MacKinnon refused to see non-realism as inevitably paired 
with such sceptical reserve.
207
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MacKinnon mounted an exploratory argument that sought to counter the non-realist. He did 
not mount a frontal attack, but sought to demonstrate that an empirical temper which led one 
to an immersion in particular historical case studies will inevitably lead to the recognition of 
moral imperatives, and do so in a way that gives succour to the realist who persists in 
invoking ascriptions of ‘factuality’ and also the moralist who continues to experiment with 
metaphysical styles of language against all odds.
208
 In the midst of apprehensions of 
‘irreducible particularity’ there are also intimations of consistency, even if it be in a minimal 
sense of the persistence of common questions arising from the description and re-description 
of particular moral dilemmas.
209
 It is in a focus on these persisting elements, including the re-
occurring experiences of ‘absolute’ moral obligation and an existential dimension that can 
only be described in terms of the language of ‘freedom’ and ‘tragedy’, which keeps a robust 
moral realism and a related language of metaphysics alive for MacKinnon.
210
  
This has been a wide-raging chapter that has sought to ‘place’ MacKinnon’s work by 
approaching it from a number of discrete vantage points. The primary aim has been to justify 
the application of the ‘therapeutic’ ascription to MacKinnon’s work. Secondarily, I sought to 
explore the Kantian nature of this therapy while moving on to document the ways in which 
MacKinnon’s moral realism sought to move beyond Kant’s formalism and his ‘rational 
religion’. In the next chapter I will seek to delve deeper into the intellectual influences on 
MacKinnon in a way that will help to explain the restiveness and irresolution of his thought.   
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Chapter 2: Beyond Kant and Back Again: Further Influences on 
MacKinnon  
 
This chapter continues to advance an appreciation of those influences that shaped 
MacKinnon’s moral theology and will be divided into two sections. The first will consider 
A.E. Sorley and W.R. Taylor as figures in the preceding generation to MacKinnon’s, who 
took Kant seriously and influenced MacKinnon’s formation, particularly as they sought to 
advance ‘moral arguments for God’s existence’. The second section will reflect on the 
analytical turn in British philosophy and its deep impact on MacKinnon’s therapeutic 
endeavour. 
The focus in the first section is a version of natural theology in which some element of 
human experience or observation of the world is held to necessitate a transition to language 
of transcendence and/or metaphysics and eventually theism. As noted above, Kant took the 
irreducible fact of human freedom and the objectivity of moral duty as posing a question that 
a purely naturalistic world-view could not adequately answer. Sorley and Taylor are both 
cited by Byrne as standing with him on this point.
211
 They do not begin by postulating God as 
the source of morality (at least not consciously), but rather seek to examine elements of moral 
experience and then posit God as an option to help explain these. Like Kant, they distinguish 
a rational moral system from an irrational one on the basis that the latter uphold some 
standard of ethical perfection that can be conceived, that such a standard is integral to the 
coherence of moral philosophy generally, and also that it could conceivably be met. For all of 
them, moral ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.
212
 Resolution of the tensions created by the coexistence of 
these elements is then addressed in each case by integrating theism into the argument. Theism 
becomes a guarantee that there will be some correspondence between virtue and happiness; 
between the life we experience and the moral order apprehended by practical reason. 
Regarding this sort of argument, Byrne makes the following observation: 
The notion that to be complete a morally good life must be part of a satisfied life lies at 
the heart of the traditions of thinking about morality inherited from Greek 
philosophy…The moral life has to be seen as the constitutive means to attaining the 
human good. The idea of the good includes: the moral perfection of the individual, the 
advancement of good over evil in the world’s history and the fulfilment of human 
wellbeing. The natural order taken as it stands runs counter to, or is at best indifferent 
to this deep teleology…So: morality is pointless unless the given, experienced order is 
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part of a larger order of justice which will fulfil the deep teleology of morality. The 
notion of God provides the best (that is, most intelligible, most reasonable) anchor for 
belief in this all-encompassing, hidden moral order.
213
 
Both A.E. Taylor and W.R. Sorley have the distinction of seeing moral discourse as giving 
rise to the need for minimalist transcendental concepts, but more still: a notion of a personal 
God in something approaching a conventionally realist sense. While they might be placed on 
various points along a post-Kantian theological trajectory, they differed from Kant in finding 
far greater potential for conventional apologetics arising from within this tradition.  
1. A.E. Taylor  
 
In Faith of Moralist Taylor writes in a way that resonates with what would become 
MacKinnon’s own interrogative, sometimes tortured style: 
It may be, as von Hügel held it is, that the costingness of a faith which will sacrifice 
neither history nor metaphysics, the torment of mind, if you like to call it so, by which 
faith is won, or held fast, is itself evidence of its worth.
214
 
We may take this as advance notice that Taylor did not see his project as having made life 
easy for the theist, yet he certainly thought that his arguments have added weight to its 
intellectual credibility. Charles Virtue describes the way Taylor’s early allegiance to non-
realist and constructivist forms of morality gave way to a comprehensive embrace of a 
thorough-going form of moral objectivism.
215
 He further notes that:  
Taylor’s philosophic pilgrimage led from his early rationalistic agnosticism, through 
the gradual analysis of rationality, to the acceptance of an a priori element in 
experience, and through a steadily deepening insight into the nature and implications of 
purposiveness to his final Christian-Platonic philosophy in which human purposiveness 
is held to be a phase of the value-reality of a temporal order having its roots in an 
eternal order which is determined by an eternal being.
216
  
In his intellectual biography of MacKinnon, Muller makes the case that Taylor had a 
significant impact on MacKinnon’s life at a critical juncture of intellectual and professional 
formation. MacKinnon spent a year as assistant to Taylor at the University of Edinburgh 
working in the field of moral philosophy; a subject that focused on the ethics of Mill, 
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Bentham, Hume, Kant, Butler, Plato and Aristotle.
217
 Taylor was the foremost interpreter of 
Plato in Britain at the time, having published a well-received commentary on the Timaeus. He 
was also ‘…at home dealing with the moral philosophy of Kant or Butler, and the 
metaphysics of Aquinas or Bradley’.
218
 Add to this his impressive grasp of modern literature 
and trends in the natural sciences, together with his continuing commitment to Christianity, 
and it is easy to understand why MacKinnon would have looked to him as someone to 
emulate.   
It is possible to identify at least three related points on which MacKinnon followed his early 
mentor. First, the suspicion noted in Chapter 1, that Absolute Idealism whether articulated by 
Hegel or the later British idealists, no longer provided a convincing metaphysical proposal, 
nor did it take account of evil and the moral life of the individual with sufficient 
seriousness.
219
 Secondly, MacKinnon joined Taylor in continuing to find the language of 
metaphysics helpful. This mode of speech was not to represent a pre-critical project with the 
lofty aim of unifying the sciences under a single concept, but a means by which the moral 
imperative, the limits of language in the face of the ‘ultimate’ and the perennial tussle of 
realism and idealism, may play a role in a way that supplemented the insights of the natural 
sciences, not competing with or ‘completing’ them. Thirdly, like Taylor in the broad Kantian 
trajectory, MacKinnon perceived the moral domain as one from which questions continued to 
arise; the sort of questions that may be open to the application of theological resources. In 
sum, Muller notes that  
…in Taylor MacKinnon found a philosopher who shared his own dual concern to make 
sense of his faith and defend its intellectual cogency in a post-idealist context without 




MacKinnon began his year as Taylor’s assistant following his immersion in the world of the 
Oxford positivists. To the extent that he was unconvinced by the adequacy of the 
philosophical atomism and metaphysical minimalism (or outright purgation) being proposed, 
Taylor would have been a welcome source of inspiration. To the extent that MacKinnon 
heeded the seriousness of the attack on the very possibility of intelligible theological speech 
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acts, Taylor’s apologetic efforts would have struck MacKinnon as over-confident. What we 
have in Taylor’s later work is something of a meeting between philosophy of religion and 
natural theology. The claim is that any significant degree of ‘moral seriousness’ will include 
a strong sense of objective imperative grounded in moral realism, as well as associated 
metaphysical speculation, notions of self-transcendence, reference to the tragic, and a realist 
notion of God as the capstone.           
a. A Snapshot of Taylor’s Intellectual Legacy 
  
In this section, I will survey some of Taylor’s later publications, focusing on those that 
contain themes which overlap with MacKinnon’s work.  
First is Taylor’s encyclopaedia entry ‘Theism’, which attracted effusive praise from 
MacKinnon.
221
 With impressive erudition he charted major philosophical justifications for 
theism from selected figures in the Western canon from the classical to modern periods.
222
 
Then there was Vindication of Religion in Essays Catholic and Critical, which placed Taylor 
as a key contributor to a work that informed a generation of Anglo-Catholics in the Church of 
England in the lead up to World War Two.
223
 In this way Taylor played a formative role in 
the ecclesiastical milieu in which MacKinnon moved, although this essay showcases 
MacKinnon’s divergences from his mentor just as it does their shared convictions. 
MacKinnon also read and appreciated Taylor’s Gifford Lectures published in 1930s under the 
title The Faith of a Moralist.
224
 At the heart of the first volume of the lectures is the claim that 
moral life creates the conditions where notions of God become necessary for coherence and 
consistency.
225
 Finally there is Taylor’s brief monograph Does God Exist? published in 
1945.
226
   
Commenting on Taylor, MacKinnon notes his early affinity with the Hegelian F.H. Bradley 
at Oxford, yet a break with this tradition was clear as early as his first publication The 
Problem of Conduct (1901). Here, Taylor ‘…maintains that ethics is independent of 
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metaphysics and its study can only take an empirical form’.
227
 The influences which drew 
Taylor away from his earlier idealist commitments include his contact with Samuel 
Alexander’s realist epistemology and the latter encouraging Taylor to read the work of 
Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach. Taylor’s reading of Galileo, Leibniz and 
Descartes were also important in solidifying this move according to Mackinnon.
228
 
Additionally, one might imagine that there is no easy way to speak of ‘Spirit’ bringing 
coherence and progressive integration of a historical dialectic while hearing accounts of the 
Battle of the Somme. Taylor argues that   
…among all the creatures, many of whom are comic enough, man is alone in being 
tragic. His life at the very best is a tragi-comedy; at the worst it is stark tragedy. And 
naturally enough this is so; for, if man has only the “environment” which is common to 
him with the beasts of the field, his whole life is no more than a perpetual attempt to 
find a rational solution of an equation all whose roots are surds…
229
 
For both Taylor and MacKinnon, the idealist drive toward the sublation of particulars within 
a program of monist metaphysics comes under the intense scrutiny of empirical history and is 
found wanting. An empirical-realist therapy is proposed and adopting this alternative is also 
thought to keep the question of God alive in a more convincing manner.   
b. Theism, Vindication of Religion and Faith of a Moralist  
 
Vindication sets out a three pronged defence against scepticism, with Taylor noting 
irreducible questions arising from nature, moral reflection and religious experience that, at 
least to his mind, cannot be sufficiently answered within these domains alone. He offers a 
perfunctory re-statement of arguments for God’s existence from the Aristotelian-Thomist 
tradition drawing on notions of causation and infinite regress in order to furnish a 
cosmological argument for theism. Theism is more ambitious as Taylor expanded his line of 
attack, attempting a rebuttal of criticisms that Kant and Russell made against arguments for 
God’s existence. Provocatively, Taylor challenged any claim that Kant had definitively 
refuted the ontological argument and, because he accepted Kant’s judgment that the 
ontological argument was the root of other attempted proofs, he sought to revive arguments 
from design or teleology as well. As part of the latter case, he considered the impact of 
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evolutionary biology on moral philosophy, as well as a defence of the unique epistemological 
status of religious experience in conversation with insights from Rudolph Otto.
230
 
However, it is the moral argument where his main focus lies. It ‘…suggests God more 
directly and much less obscurely’ than the other arguments.
231
 This is a position that Taylor 
develops briefly in Vindication, in Theism, in Does God Exist? and then most expansively in 
his Gifford Lectures (1926-28) The Faith of a Moralist. Unlike Taylor, MacKinnon was 
never interested in reviving arguments from ontology, design, teleology or religious 
experience. Further, while MacKinnon was impressed with Taylor’s Theism he was 
unconvinced by his critiques of Kant and Russell in the realm of epistemology and together 
with them, was committed to disciplining logical and metaphysical philosophy through a 
rigorous agnosticism born of a focus on empirical limits. Yet together with Taylor, there is a 
strong sense for MacKinnon that empirical history and moral experience demand a bolder 
metaphysical articulation beyond that allowed by Kant and first generation analytical 
philosophers.   
All this should not mask the fact that there is much in Taylor’s approach to morality that 
mirrored Kant. He argued, for example, that there is an irreducible feature of moral life which 
is captured by the term ‘duty’.
232
 Duties cannot be turned aside or rejected without the 
rejection of the whole moral order, which is Taylor’s way of arguing that forms of relativism, 
non-realism and nihilism are tantamount to the dissolution of moral discourse in any 
meaningful sense. These are duties ‘…to which I must need sacrifice everything else, must be 
something which cannot even be appraised in the terms of a secular arithmetic, something 
incommensurable with the “welfare” of Church or State or even of the whole human race.’
233
 
Taylor goes on to claim that  
[w]hoever says “ought,” meaning “ought,” is in the act bearing witness to the 
supernatural and supra-temporal as the destined home of man. There are some acts that 
should or should not be done regardless of the goods or lack of goods… for the reason 
of the greater good.
234
 
Here, perhaps, is a vindication of Anscombe’s observation noted in Chapter 1 regarding the 
mutuality between certain ideas pertaining to moral compulsion and supernaturalism. It 
seems that the objectivity of the ‘ought’ is held to be self-evident and as such Taylor may be 
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guilty of a Cartesian slight-of-hand, placing too much weight on his own sense of the natural 
light of reason operative within him and his cultural milieu.
235
 Any sound moral thinker will 
apparently come to a point where an absolute principle is discerned in any given situation, 
meaning one not explicable in terms of advantage, or in purely naturalistic terms. This entails 
a strong appropriation of Kant’s distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of ends 
and also a strong teleology whereby the ‘ought’ serves progress toward the good. For Taylor, 
the tensions involved here are the mark of the philosopher who takes the moral task 
‘seriously’. Speaking of Plato and Kant in this respect, he notes that they ‘…insisted most 
vigorously on what the secularly-minded call, by way of depreciation, the “dualism” of “this 
world” and the “other world,” or in Kantian  language, of “man as (natural) phenomenon” 
and “man as (supernatural) reality”’.
236
 To deny the reality of this antithesis is to eviscerate 
morality. Indeed, in regard to positing a dualism at the heart of moral anthropology, Taylor 
affirms that:       
…Kant seems to be unquestionably right as far as this. Even were there is nothing else 
to suggest to us that we are denizens at once of a natural and temporal and of a 
supernatural and eternal world, the revelation of our own inner division against 
ourselves afforded by conscience, duly mediated, is enough to bear the strain.
237
  
The next step from here is to posit the need for an eternal dimension to moral discourse; an 
update of Kant’s discussion of the ‘immortality of the soul’. The invocation of an ideal which 
ought to inspire and regulate all our conduct includes the possibility of its real attainability by 
us, yet its unattainability inexorably leads to a conclusion that our final destiny must lie in the 
non-temporal.
238
 Taylor claims that ‘…if the fruition of all secular good fails to attain this 
ideal we may reasonably infer that the ultimate good of man is non-secular and eternal and 
that the facts of our moral being point to the Christian conception of the transformation and 
completion of nature by “grace”’.
239
 The nature of the ‘reason’ justifying this point remains 
opaque and its implicit universality is highly contentious. 
C.F. Virtue contends that 
…[t]he Gifford Lectures, 1926-27 and 1927-28, gave Professor Taylor the stimulus and 
the opportunity to work out a “natural theology” for the Christian faith he so devoutly 
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held. He spoke as a moralist, “who took morality seriously” and generalized his moral 
theory into an objective axiology with metaphysical implications…. [the argument put 
forward] is similar to A.N. Whitehead’s objectivistic relativism, but more explicit in its 
distinction between being and value and in its characterization of value. It is in sharp 
contrast to R.B. Perry’s interest-centred neo-realism, which is naturalistic and 




Taylor used the final lectures to explore the implications of his notions of value and eternity. 
Both are held to be beyond naturalistic explanation and both are seen to be indispensable to 
the coherence of human claims to knowledge in the historical and moral spheres. The result is 
what Virtue calls an ‘axiological argument for theism’. At the conclusion of the argument we 
find the Cartesian-sounding claim that the  
…nature of temporal value experience is such as to be explicable only upon the 
assumption that it is grounded in a non-temporal perfect Being, the most real of beings, 
the absolute and primary source of actuality, and the most perfect of beings, so good 
that none better can be conceived.
241
  
Whereas Kant’s God provided a means whereby the two incommensurable domains of nature 
and ends might find eventual integration, Taylor explores the themes of time and value to 
show that the dualism can never be conceived as incommensurable in the first place. Indeed, 
Taylor saw Kant as a progenitor of a particularly extreme manifestation of the fact / value 
distinction and criticised him for it: 
We may trace [the distinction] back, in the first instance, historically, to Kant’s first 
Critique, where the purpose of the smashing assault on speculative theology, and, 
indeed, of the whole Dialectic of Pure Reason, is to divorce value completely from fact 




What Taylor attempted was a Kantian approach to morality while opting for (what he saw as) 
a weaker dualism between the realm of nature-fact and that of end-value. With Kant he 
claims that theological implications of morality would not arise if ‘…ethics is concerned 
exclusively with values, and fact and value are ultimately disconnected’.
243
 Yet against Kant 
he claims that the integration of the two is always and everywhere part of ‘nature’s factuality’ 
rather than awaiting integration by a regulative supernatural agent at some far away point. 
This is the basis on which Taylor can see rather un-Kantian synergies between the argument 
for God’s existence from morality and those from nature and experience; all are part of a 
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realist apprehension of an integrated fact-value reality which cannot fully explain or justify 
itself without an external referent. A more definitely realist God becomes necessary for 
Taylor relative to Kant’s proposal.   
In commenting on the moral approaches of Taylor and Kant respectively, Virtue notes that:  
Both theories rest upon faith in the veridicality of moral insight; but for Taylor, moral 
judgements are not merely objective, in the sense of humanly universal, but are 
realistic. Moreover, Taylor’s profound sense of the deepening of the genuine moral 
consciousness, and its increasingly tragic cost is nowhere matched in the high-minded, 
but somehow pedantic, moralism of Kant.
244
 
Describing a movement beyond Kant in this respect touches on the heart of what MacKinnon 
learnt from Taylor. Indeed, mention of the tragic immediately makes one mindful of 
MacKinnon, for whom (as we will see) the category was an important component of the 
therapy he offers. Yet it is also on the question of tragedy, and more specifically on the 
related question of evil, where MacKinnon moved beyond Taylor. For instance when Taylor 
says that: ‘It is possible to do better than to abstain from complaints or to cultivate pride; it is 
possible…to make acceptance of the worst fortune has to bestow a means to the development 
of a sweetness, patience, and serene joyousness which are to be learned nowhere but in the 
school of sharp suffering’,
245
 MacKinnon would in all likelihood sound a note of caution, if 
not dissent. MacKinnon’s attentiveness to accounts of the crucifixion and also to the Marxist 
critique of religion made him sceptical of any claim pertaining to the positive benefits of 
suffering as a ‘veil of soul making’. Indeed, he was suspicious of any easy integration of 
suffering into an account of developing personhood, or as a necessary step on the way to the 
full realisation of the greatest good.
246
 His comments on the person of Judas make this more 
than clear.
247
   
The broad similarities between Taylor and MacKinnon are captured well by Muller when he 
argues that the former etched out a ‘third way’ in between the idealists and the logical 
positivists. This was  
a kind of modern reworking of the Augustinian-Thomist tradition –tentative, 
unsystematic, open to dialogue with its detractors, but based upon a firm conviction 
that a serious investigation of human action would not only vindicate the intelligibility 
of faith, but also reveal that it was only by acknowledging the given that lay behind our 
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Despite sharing a similar post-Kantian trajectory, MacKinnon refused Taylor’s move from 
morality to any firm theistic apologetic. This is true even in light of Taylor’s qualifications 
and his admission that theism is only one possible way to ‘ground’ rationality, history, 
morality and the purposiveness of the world generally, even if it is the best answer in his 
view. MacKinnon doubted whether Taylor had seriously apprehended the challenge of ethical 
naturalism and offered a far more minimalist conclusion.
249
 There could be no ‘vindication’ 
of faith, except whatever vindication could be discerned in the crucifixion and resurrection of 
Jesus. Limiting the scope of his allegiance to Taylor in this regard was a deft move. 
MacKinnon shared Taylor’s attempt to enhance the realism and objectivity of the Kantian 
‘ought’ by proposing a more integrated field of fact and value, yet preferred to remain in the 
orbit of Kant’s agnosticism.     
2. W.R. Sorley 
 
Like MacKinnon, Sorley was tempted toward ordination as a young man, but this option was 
passed over when a life of full-time academic research and teaching beckoned.
250
 Again like 
MacKinnon, Sorley held the post of Professor of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen early in his 
career, only to move to Cambridge thereafter. The former would make a permanent shift to 
Divinity, whereas Sorley remained in a chair of moral philosophy at Cambridge until his 
retirement in 1933. Tennant notes that 
…[Sorely] was initially influenced by the idealism of T.H. Green and Bradley…but he 
became increasingly critical of philosophical idealism, which he regarded as unable to 
account for the existence of evil. For example, he criticised idealists for describing an 
individual’s moral activity as the reproduction of an eternal reality even though selfish 
interests so often prevailed over the common good. He found deeply unsatisfactory 
attempts by all non-theistic theories to explain the struggle between good and evil.
251
  
Tennant also describes Sorley’s Gifford Lectures Moral Values and the Idea of God as his 
‘chief work…[that] played an important part in the education of students of philosophical 
                                                          
248
 Muller, "True Service", 111. 
249
 MacKinnon and Schofield, "Taylor, Alfred Edward (1869-1945), Philosopher." MacKinnon: ‘It 
seems simply untrue to assert that ethical naturalism has been definitively demolished by the 
arguments of [A. E.] Taylor and [W. R.] Sorley’. D. M. MacKinnon, "Religion and Philosophy by 
W.G. de Burgh [Book Review]," Laudate 15 (1937): 225.  
250
 F.R. Tennant and S. M. den Otter, "Sorley, William Ritchie (1855-1935), Philosopher," in Oxford 







 MacKinnon clearly appreciated it as ‘a minor classic’ on the theme of ‘an 
ethically grounded and orientated theism.’
253
 Indeed, he sees it as a representative work of 
unique clarity: ‘…if the modern analytical philosopher wishes to ‘get inside’ the ethical 
theist’s outlook, he could well be referred to Sorley’s work’.
254
 At its heart is an affirmation 
of Lotze’s dictum, following Kant, that ‘…the true beginning of metaphysics lies in 
ethics’.
255
 Indeed, like several of the works authored by Taylor mentioned above, Moral 
Values made a connection between the continuing intelligibility of metaphysics, together with 
talk of God, and the persistence of moral discourse of a certain realist type. The constellation 
of ideas leading up to an overtly theistic appeal includes a phenomenology of moral 
experience and reflections on the possibility of self-conscious apprehension of personhood, as 
well as the perception of value and purposiveness in history. All contribute to a claim 
regarding the inadequacy of naturalistic reductionism in the moral domain.  
Anticipating debates that continue unabated, Sorley accepted evolutionary naturalism as the 
best explanation for the emergence of life, yet claimed that it was ‘…unable either to set up a 
comprehensive ideal for life, or to yield any principle for distinguishing between good and 
evil conduct’.
256
 The fields of history and biography are held as irreducible to the natural 
sciences because of the particular way they apprehend the contingency of their respective 
subjects. According to Long, ‘…it is the individual that is the focus of [Sorley’s] research: 
the life of a particular human being or the life of a nation’.
257
 Most importantly, it is in the 
latter domain where individuals are apprehended as persons; bearers of value who routinely 
make judgements of value in their apprehension of reality.
258
 Yet, universals and regulatory 
law-like theories will emerge from this domain just as they do in science: ‘…the [value] 
judgement...always involves both something assumed as existing and a universal by means of 
which it is approved or disapproved’.
259
 Moral knowledge arises in history and among 
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persons; it resists naturalistic reduction, yet constituent claims are (apparently) factual and 
law-like in a way analogous to those of the sciences.
260
 Indeed, value judgements constitute 
crucial data for apprehending reality and cannot be relegated to a ‘second order’ form of 
knowledge:  
The goodness of something is recognized in a concrete situation and the moral 
judgement is in the first instance a perceptive judgment in Aristotle’s sense of the term. 
Ethical science is based on these perceptive judgements just as natural science is based 
on sense perception. The data of ethics then are the particular judgements of good or 
evil passed in certain concrete situations.
261
 
Sorley also claimed that  
…[t]he validity [of ethical values] could not be verified in external phenomena; they 
cannot be established by observation of the course of nature. They hold good for 
persons only: and their peculiarity consists in the fact their validity is not in any way 
dependent upon their being manifested in the character or conduct of persons, or even 
on their being recognised in the thoughts of persons. We acknowledge the good and its 
objective claim upon us even when we are conscious that our will has not yielded to the 
claim; and we admit that its validity existed before we recognised it.
262
  
Sorley (like Taylor) continued to see a useful purpose for employing the classic distinctions 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, ‘fact’ and ‘value’, yet he also blurred the boundary with his 
particular brand of personalist idealism, which attempted to account for a notion of a 
metaphysical whole that avoided pluralism on one hand and the monism of Absolute Idealism 
on the other. The idealistic temper of Sorley’s proposal shines through as he eventually came 
to argue the sublation of ‘is’ into ‘ought’.
263
 With the evolutionary emergence of human 
beings as self-aware agents cognisant of moral value comes the conviction that the 
recognition of the good and the apprehension of duty is a realist, objective component of 
reality which is as much part of ‘nature’ as any other ‘fact’ apprehended about the world by 
the senses. Sorley claimed that ‘[t]he moral universe has a different principle from that which 
science describes for the actual universe, though it is only in the actual universe that the 
moral universe seeks and can find its realisation’.
264
 In this respect, MacKinnon noted that 
Sorley balanced an ‘idealism of freedom’ with the constraint implicit in the common sense 
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view that the ‘…world is in no sense a construct of our understanding’. He goes on to observe 
that: 
Sorley’s philosophical master is Kant; indeed his whole work may be construed as an 
elaboration of Kant’s bifurcation of the ‘realm of ends’ and the ‘realm of nature’. If the 
‘realm of ends’ is sovereign, the sovereignty is something to be won and achieved, not 
taken for granted, let alone affirmed as already actual. Sorley follows Kant in his 
resolute separation of the so-called ‘realm of ends’, the domain of moral value, from 
the natural world; but he rejects the instrument Kant used for effecting this separation 
in his doctrine of the subjectivity of space and time.
265
 
A ‘resolute’ separation is not absolute incommensurability; resolution can be hoped for and 
worked toward. Yet relative to Kant, it may be that Sorely had a far more ‘immanent’ sense 
of the overlap of the two ‘closed and self-consistent systems’, which then needed God or 
‘purposiveness’ as a point of connectivity.
266
 For this reason, he ended up proposing a God 
that was far more immanent than Kant’s. Sorley argued that moral values  
…are manifested in selves and persons; and persons live in and interact with the world 
of nature. The causal system may be considered by itself; but the abstraction is made 
for the purposes of science, and is in this respect arbitrary: it is only one aspect of the 
world. And moral values…are another aspect of reality, dominating or claiming to 
dominate the lives of persons. We must regard the two systems, therefore, not as the 




The question animating Sorley’s argument is whether the world expresses a moral meaning. 
As human beings are an aspect of the world and they express moral meaning, he takes the 
answer to be affirmative. Here Sorley’s idealistic leanings shine forth: there is a clear reaction 
against any empiricist temptation to operate with a model of the transcendent ‘self’ 
accounting for the world’s features all the while remaining blind to the irreducible moral 
personhood of the one doing the perceiving.
268
 The perceiving ‘self’ in all its historical and 
psychological complexity needs to be included in any account of reality as Hegel insisted. 
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Furthermore, for Sorley, in as far as this discussion contains reference to the partial good it 
implies the absolute good as well. He asserted the Platonic-sounding idea of the Supreme 
Good, the notion of a universal law, and the categorical imperative.
269
 This led him to see a 
certain anthropocentric teleology at work in nature: a ‘world process’ developing in such a 
way that certain values are becoming manifest and certain moral ends are revealing 
themselves as the regulating determinants of value judgements, the goal of life and the 
purpose of history. In this vein, Sorley claimed that ‘…the objective moral value is valid 




In all of this, Sorley sought to avoid what he saw as the unhelpful developments of 
‘traditional intuitionism’ and Kantian formalism. According to Sorley both held that ‘…moral 
judgement is an application of the general principle that goodness belongs only to will in so 
far as it is determined by the conception of a law which admits of use as a universal 
principle’.
271
 Whereas intuitionism posited ultimate subjects of goodness, such as happiness, 
perfection, justice etc., as resistant to explanation via naturalistic reductionism, it also tended 
to reject theistic or rational bases for such subjects and thus, in the end, could only secure 
these conceptions by reference to particular experiential phenomena, or even less adequately, 
as free-floating metaphysical ‘foundations’ irreducibly and immediately present within 
human consciousness.
272
 As already noted, Kantian formalism sought to remove subjectivity 
from the apprehension of moral obligation altogether, reducing ‘…the principle of morality to 
the formal proposition that the good will alone is good or that goodness ought to be realised 
or willed’ in a way that was disconnected from the concrete location of moral actors’.
273
 
Sorley rejected these alternatives and this is his main legacy upon MacKinnon.    
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What Sorley attempted to posit was a conception of the good which was universal and 
objective in a Kantian sense, yet also more self-consciously embedded and responsive to 
concrete experience in the vein of the intuitionists. He said that ‘…[t]he universal of morality 
is contained in particulars and at first concealed by them; and the moralist’s problem is to 
elucidate the universal by reason of which these particular cases are appropriate subjects for 
the moral judgement’.
274
 For Sorley, the starting point is concrete moral judgments with all 
their contextual limitations and fallibility, and the claim is made that in working through the 
conditions that make such a claim possible and intelligible one will be driven to language of 
universals and the language of realist, objective moral claims.  
Naturally, such claims are vulnerable to the sort of attacks that the likes of Mackie and the 
non-realists before him would make. Even so, there is no sense that Sorley was blind to the 
huge array of contradictory judgements of good and evil that can be easily documented in 
every sphere of human discourse; it just didn’t lead him to see non-realism as the inevitable 
conclusion to be drawn. What he did perceive was a common receptivity to the good as a 
fixed point around which all these judgements could be incorporated into a rational system. 
As noted, Sorley’s insistence was that the exercise of sound rationality here will demand the 
positing of an absolute Good, and also the realisation that moral judgments are made in a way 
that is analogous to more primary judgements arising from sense perception. As such, these 
judgements must be open to the law of non-contradiction and also to the test of consistency; 
that what is right for one to do in a certain circumstance must be right for anyone else if they 
were in exactly the same circumstance.
275
 Reasoning about moral judgements will produce 
pattern and convergence. it will reveal more and more the sense in which to say ‘this is good’ 
is to imbue ‘this’ with a judgement of a ‘determinate kind’ with a ‘universal element’.
276
 
Reflecting on Sorley’s proposal, MacKinnon noted, that:  
There is in his work a clear awareness that metaphysical construction, of the sort which 
he undertakes, has in it a visionary or imaginative element. The philosopher commits 
himself to his idèe maîtrise almost by an act of faith and thence, in a movement of 
thought which surely deserves to be described as an essay in ‘faith seeking 
understanding’, he interprets the totality of what is under its inspiration.
277
   
MacKinnon has identified something critical here: Sorley’s confident metaphysics of self-
evident moral value is in fact an expression of faith. For all its attractiveness in bringing a 
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degree of clarity and stability to the notion of moral order, the analogy between sense 
perception and moral judgment is question-begging. Sorley implicitly concedes this as he 
calls upon theism to further secure his commitment to moral realism. He noted that 
‘…[a]nalysis sunders a thing into its elements; synthesis puts these elements together again; 
synopsis views the thing as a whole’.
278
 What the natural and the moral sciences do in their 
respective domains is provide analysis and synthesis, yet Sorley is convinced that human 
intellect requires a synopsis; ‘something more and something less than synthesis…[the 
contemplation of] a whole of which the parts may not be distinct’.
279
 Sorley is well aware that 
‘…philosophers are divided on the question of whether this synoptic view is to be recognised 
as a valid attitude of thought’ and that it is ‘often ignored and sometimes definitely 
rejected’.
280
 Yet Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Coleridge, gave him cause to persist. In the 
end Sorley concluded his Gifford lectures by attempting a robust defence of classical theism 
as being more effective than pluralism and monism in terms of available options for synoptic 
ways of thinking that could sustain the moral order. In a summary of his own argument 
Sorley notes that it is 
…not that the order of nature and the moral order agree in their manifestations. On the 
contrary, it started from the fact that there are values which have no actual existence in 
the world, that the moral law is often broken, that the moral ideal is something 
unrealised. The argument was that the natural order might be shown to be adapted to 
the moral order, but only upon two conditions: first, if nature were interpreted as a 
purposive system, and secondly, if it were recognised that morality required for its 
realisation the free activity of individual persons.
281
 
It is in posing such ‘conditions’ that the cracks in the edifice become obvious. All this leads 
to Sorley’s claim that the only way the good can have any reality analogous to the reality of 
the world we know and experience, is if it exists in a supreme mind.
282
 To adopt theism as a 
synoptic view of the world is necessary if we are to make sense of ourselves in a purposive 
universe within which we access objective or absolute moral values and it is also necessary in 
order that people might ‘…confront evil via their own free choices, with the assurance that an 
omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent agency will bring those choices to fruition’.
283
 
The chief problem with all this has already been identified: Sorley’s misplaced confidence in 
moving from a reception of a moral imperative by means of a faculty analogous to sense 
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experience, to positing a realist moral ontology undergirded by an absolute moral agent. The 
links binding each move of the argument are far more tenuous than Sorley imagined. 
Commenting on ‘transcendental arguments from truth to God’, that is, arguments which 
claim that ‘…God is the necessary condition for our beliefs about truth and objectivity’, 
Moore observes that  
…we need God to exist in order to ground our view of truth, but…all we [are given is] 
(widely contested) arguments for God’s putative existence. Without knowing that these 
are true we cannot know that God exists, but we cannot know that God exists without 
knowing that the arguments are true. The argument from truth to God requires that we 
can know that the arguments are true, but this is beg the question and so render the 
argument viciously circular because it assumes its conclusion as a premise.
284
   
Perhaps it is for this reason that Long noted that  
…[w]ithin a few years after Pringle-Pattison and Sorley delivered their Gifford 
Lectures the movement which they helped initiate had almost entirely receded into 
history. And this, coupled with the strong blasts of dogmatic theology blowing down 




MacKinnon remained committed to many of the concerns of his predecessor’s forays 
philosophical theology, yet he shared the disillusion identified by Long, especially as his 
theology came under the influence of Barth and later, Balthasar. Additionally, there is no 
evidence that he ever presumed that arguments from morality (or any notion of ‘objective’ 
truth) could be relied upon to provide any direct path to theism. MacKinnon learnt much from 
Taylor and Sorley and he came to share their conviction that God becomes the subject of a 
question articulated in light of our perception of freedom and the experience of evil. Yet, 
under the influence of the neo-Orthodox strain, this becomes inseparable from an ontology of 
‘Christological realism’ and further still, his exposure to philosophers of the analytical turn 
encouraged MacKinnon back into the orbit of Kant’s agnosticism.  
To be sure, MacKinnon did admire the legacy of Kant’s categorical imperative in these 
thinkers. It is something that he takes with him as he eventually sought to articulate a rather 
messy moral position with reference to a dynamic understanding of the natural law tradition 
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and a form of intuitionism. It led him to cite concrete examples in history and literature where 
the moral ‘ought’ is experienced as ‘absolute’ yet for all that prone to tragic 
misapprehension.
286
 Indeed, reflection on historical and literary tragedy led MacKinnon to 
write about a ‘surd’ element which must find expression in any truly realist apprehension of 
history; a kind of interrogation of experience and a form of language that demands a move 
beyond naturalism and scientism to pose the question of transcendence.
287
 What MacKinnon 
embraced in light of all this, was not so much a moral apologetic but a moral theodicy in 
which the Christian claim becomes, in Niebuhr’s phrase, an ‘impossible possibility’. This is a 
path which can only be travelled by means of a kenotic self-abandonment and without any 
ultimate guarantee of vindication or the kind of hopeful resolution of the sort that Kant 
maintained (at least in Religion) as the key reason for embracing theism. 
3. The Analytical Awakening  
 
If Taylor and Sorley represent one pole of influence on MacKinnon, then the other must be 
the analytical turn in philosophy, dominant throughout his years as a student and tutor at 
Oxford. Swinburne provides a sweeping view of the relevant philosophical landscape: 
‘Analytic philosophy’ is the somewhat misleading name given to the kind of 
philosophy practiced today in most of the universities of the Anglo-American world. 
This stream of philosophy started off in the Oxford of the 1950s; it saw the task of 
philosophy as analysis, clarifying the meaning of important words, and showing how 
they get that meaning; and this was done by studying in what circumstances it was 
appropriate in ordinary language to use the words. The philosopher investigated when it 
was right to say that something ‘caused’ something else, or someone ‘knows’ 
something. Metaphysics was deemed a ‘meaningless’ activity.
288
 
According to Christopher Insole’s broader definition of the phenomenon, three phases can be 
identified in the emergence of Analytical Philosophy.
289
 The first is the empiricism of Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume. The second is the logical positivism of Ayer and the early Wittgenstein 
and the logical atomism of Moore and Russell. And third is the ‘post-positivist analytical 
period’, characterised by a cautious re-engagement with formally rejected modes of 
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metaphysics and in some cases, heavily qualified openness to notions of transcendence. In 
respect to this third phase, Fergus Kerr identifies the later Wittgenstein as a figure who left 
wider spaces for uses of religious language, which signalled a softening of hostility to 
religion maintained by early advocates of the analytical turn.
290
 This kind of openness 
coincided with a renewed confidence in the programmes of explicitly theistic analytical 
philosophers. In this vein, Swinburne speaks of a ‘metaphysical turn’ of the 1970s’, which 
then ‘…gave philosophy of religion the more obvious task of expounding religious claims, 
clearly and coherently certainly, but with their natural metaphysical sense, investigating 
whether they were true, and/or whether we are justified in believing in them’.
291
  
Despite the ground-shifting importance of the first phase of analytical philosophy as 
described by Insole, my focus is the second and third for the simple reason that the former 
had a huge direct impact on MacKinnon and the latter contained elements to which 
MacKinnon’s work was most closely aligned. The second phase coincided with a crucial 
period in his own intellectual formation as an undergraduate at Oxford in the 1930s.
292
 
Indeed, the fact that MacKinnon was still writing about Ayer’s 1934 attack on metaphysics in 
the 1990s suggests that the questions raised by this period remained with him right up until 
the final years of his life.
293
  
In his intellectual biography of MacKinnon, Muller reports that in his early days at Oxford, 
Isaiah Berlin took him to a lecture by John Wisdom on the philosophy of Moore and 
Wittgenstein.
294
 This lecture was one of a number of engagements with key figures of the 
analytical turn in Britain which was to prove decisive in MacKinnon’s conviction that British 
Idealism was a spent force and that positivism represented a breakthrough intellectual 
achievement that would shape the agenda of philosophy and theology from that moment 
forward. While MacKinnon was an admirer of the achievements of the positivists, his 
engagement was never uncritical.   
MacKinnon’s relationship to Insole’s so-called third post-positivist period of analytical 
philosophy is worthy of mention too. In this regard, I think it is important to make a 
distinction between two very different types of analytical philosophy which occurred in the 
wake of the second movement, perhaps justifying reference to a third and fourth movement. 
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This division was intimated above, but I would like to make it more explicit. The third 
accounts for those analytical philosophers who felt growing dissatisfaction with Vienna 
Circle-inspired logical positivism and a subsequent expansion of the possibilities as to the 
sorts of linguistic phenomenon that could be deemed meaningful. Figures that would prove 
important for MacKinnon in this regard are the later Wittgenstein, John Wisdom, Antony 
Flew and Karl Popper. More immediately in MacKinnon’s context were Basil Mitchell, 
Austin Farrer and others within the circle of scholars at Oxford who began to meet shortly 
after the end of World War Two and labelled themselves ‘the metaphysicals’.
295
 They 
focused on efforts to clarify notions of reason, revelation and morality in ways that provided 
some direct response to the positivists without accepting uncritically their ontological and 
epistemological agenda. Exchanges with figures such as John Wisdom and Antony Flew 
were extremely important for MacKinnon in as far as both stood firmly within the analytical 
tradition and yet, contra Ayer and (to some extent) Russell, found the notion of God worth 
discussing.  
The fourth movement refers to the later appropriation of analytical tools into the philosophy 
of religion in more robust, confident and explicitly apologetic ways, such as that observed in 
the Swinburne’s early work (as well as Plantinga and Wolterstorff in the U.S.A.). 
MacKinnon’s sympathies were with the third and, it is safe to presume, not so much with the 
fourth. The lasting impact of his immersion in the philosophy of the second period as well as 
his explicit aversion of self-styled ‘apologetic’ projects became too dominant in this regard. 
One might suspect that MacKinnon found (or would find…) such efforts limited in their 
persuasive power, to the extent that their methodologies tended to imbibe a misplaced 
confidence regarding the possibility of systemizing theological statements and attempts to 
render scriptural texts philosophically plausible in a way that artificially reduced their 
scandal, irreducible uniqueness, literary imaginativeness and moral challenge.
296
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MacKinnon was interested in the way the language of metaphysics had the habit of re-
emerging chastened yet reinvigorated in the wake of those philosophical periods from which 
it had been forcibly purged.
297
 The same was the case for notions of transcendence. Even if 
MacKinnon did intimate that Kant either misunderstood or underestimated what some of 
metaphysical projects he had rejected were trying to achieve in their own contexts, there was 
no going back: Kant’s purgation had changed everything.
298
 In the same way notions of 
transcendence, at least for Christian theologians, would have to be more apophatic and more 
deeply cruciform than they had been under the influence of idealism. The sheer stubbornness 
and longevity of the metaphysical impulse and notions of transcendence is a sign for 
MacKinnon that an immersion in empirical history itself demands recourse to such language 
even if it must be subject to continued purgation and re-articulation.  
a. The Rejection of Idealism in Britain 
                    
The analytical turn in British philosophy occurred in the wake of late 19
th
 century British 
Idealism and gained further momentum after the First World War, providing the sort of bold 
intellectual purgation and renewal called for by that historical moment. It was a movement 
that valued clarity and rigour, viewing philosophy as the handmaid of the empirical sciences 
and theology as an obfuscating enemy.
299
 It variously absorbed positions often associated 
with the linguistic turn and logical positivism / atomism. Together they proved to be a potent 
intellectual force. The former focused on the way philosophical problems could be identified 
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and potentially solved if the uses of language and its limitations were brought into focus and 
the latter advanced an epistemology focused on restrictive standards of verification and 
received impetus from the members of the Vienna Circle. Speaking of verificationism, 
MacKinnon observed:  
In the 1930s, the term fact became, in philosophical discussion, a synonym for that 
which verifies, confirms, or falsifies a hypothesis; the word, indeed became a label for 
the deliverance of observation in so far as such deliverance established or invalidated 
claims concerning what was the case. If, in the previous phases of this discussion, the 




For MacKinnon, a telling expression of this latter movement came in the form of Moritz 
Schlick’s hope ‘that one day there would be no more books on philosophy but all books 
would be written philosophically’.
301
 MacKinnon adds that for the philosophers of the 
linguistic turn, it was desired that  
the day of the speculative treatise would yield to that of the scientific exposition in 
which the expositor knew how to give precise case-value to the terms he was using, and 
not allow the unfamiliarity of the territory he was mapping to beguile him into 
supposing that he was opening the doors on to a mysterious ultimate.
302
 
For the remainder of this section, I will provide an impressionistic overview of the projects of 
Russell, Moore, Ayer and the early Wittgenstein; key figures of MacKinnon’s Sitz im Leben . 
The first two found the language of metaphysics helpful when explicating the role of analytic 
statements pertaining to logic and mathematics (when they wished, they could ‘play the part 
of a metaphysician’ as Copleston noted), whereas the latter two were closer to the Vienna 
Circle philosophers in their conviction that all such language was counter-productive. All 
except Moore contributed to a climate of non-realism in moral discourse.     
Bertrand Russell was a convinced realist when it came to the philosophy of science, meaning 
that like Moore he held to the doctrine that the ‘facts’ about some external object are 
completely independent of our perception of it.
303
 This commitment then pervaded all other 
aspects of his philosophy. His commitment to realism developed over a series of stages (3 
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according to Bostock) and was famously thrown off course by Wittgenstein’s criticisms.
304
 
The key, however, was a deepening allegiance to atomism: a doctrine that attempted to steer 
a course between the idealism of philosophers such as F.H. Bradley and what Kerr describes 
as the evolutionism of individuals such as Nietzsche, Bergson and the American 
pragmatists.
305
 In this vein, Russell identifies a core element of his project as follows: 
The logic which I shall advocate is atomistic, as opposed to the monistic logic of the 
people who more or less follow Hegel. When I say that my logic is atomistic, I mean 
that I share the common-sense belief that there are many separate things; I do not 
regard the apparent multiplicity of the world as consisting merely in phases and unreal 
divisions of a single indivisible reality.
306
  
Mander’s magisterial account of British Idealism shows forth the complexity and diversity of 
that movement and gives insight into what Russell was reacting against. He claims that 
idealists tended to hold a view that language expressed greater truthfulness as it moved from 
descriptions of single particulars to more and more general concepts that subsumed many 
related particulars.
307
 In this vein, Warnock notes that Bradley 
…regarded the unitary nature of reality as both the most important and the least 
dubitable part of his whole metaphysical account of the universe; and he meant his 
statement that reality was one to carry the implication, among others, that anything less 
than unity, such as a distinction between a person and the object of his thought, is 
necessarily unreal or illusory. To aim, therefore, at identifying oneself, whether with 
the object of one’s thought or with the world in which one is living and acting, is to do 
no more than to aim to remove illusion, and to exist in reality. In this context self-
realisation [the goal of moral striving] means…not only satisfying oneself, but actually 
making oneself exist. It means making oneself real instead of illusory.
308
  
Russell was convinced that the fallacy ingrained in the emergence of idealist metaphysics 
could be discovered by considering approaches to common sentences. For instance, he argued 
that monists like Hegel, Spinoza and Bradley held as a matter of dogma that every 
proposition pertaining to an external object could potentially involve a fact with a 
corresponding description of a quality that belongs to it.
309
 That is, ‘…any proposition can be 
put into a form in which it has a subject and a predicate united by a copula’, that is, a joining 
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 For Russell, Idealists held that this structure pointed to the fact that the two parts of 
the sentence are related, and in being so related must share a common attribute which stands 
‘behind them’. Typically, they start using metaphysical terms to describe the common ‘third 
thing’; the singularity that unites the two. As they follow this logic to its inexorable limits, 
they give into a temptation to articulate a singular substance or an all-embracing ‘Absolute’. 
Yet, if these sentences were analysed according to his system of mathematically inspired 
atomistic logic, the impulse toward monist metaphysical projects would be circumvented 
altogether.
311
 Reliable knowledge comes from seeing things in their simplest terms, with the 
wider web of relationships blanked out as far as possible for the task of definition and 
analysis. In this way, the axiom of internal relations beloved of the Idealists was rejected and 
MacKinnon found this move a compelling one.
312
 Cell argues that for Russell   
[t]he world…was pictured as having a form corresponding to the “truth function” or 
“extensional” form of mathematical logic, since this logic provided the model in terms 
of which the atomists conceived the nature of our everyday and scientific 
propositions… The kind of world pictured is, consequently, one in which no simple 
entity stands in any necessary relation to any other….Against Idealism, the atomist 
believed [in a] picture of the world as an aggregate of separable things, quality and 
relations...
313
   
For Russell, as was the case for Moore, a type of metaphysics is needed but it was of a 
radically different sort to that proposed by the Idealists.
314
 Russell uses metaphysical 
language not to refer to any real object within or ‘beyond’ the external world, but to name the 
content of analytic judgements pertaining to the logical conditions necessary if we are to trust 
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that our language captures the truth of the external world. Famously, Russell held that a kind 
of logic derived from demonstrable mathematical proofs provided the content for this type of 
metaphysics; a very different conclusion to that of Kant.
315
 At the heart of this logic was the 
claim that every complex mathematical statement could be broken down into a strictly 
limited number of basic mathematical statements. Further still, what was revealed in 
Russell’s mathematical logic was not only true for that particular domain, but for all other 




For the atomist metaphysician, the purpose of philosophy was not found in proposing facts 
about the world for that was the domain of the natural and social sciences. Philosophy 
provided a methodology for breaking down any proposition about the world into its most 
simple constituent parts so that it could most economically capture the truth of the object it 
sought to describe. Mander states that between Russell and the Idealists,   
…the point at issue…was not whether we were in direct contact with reality…but what 
was the correct account of its nature; whether it was something to be found by 
application of thought to sense, or something to be found by scraping away the 
distortions of thought from sense.
317
 
As a result of Russell’s purgation, three forms of statement were possible: (1) analytic 
statements which expressed logical forms derived from mathematical principles; (2) 
statements verifiable in some way by sense experience and (3) statements that were 
meaningless.
318
 Statements about God and universal moral truths were relegated to this latter 
category; observations about practical moral convictions finds a place in the second, although 
Russell joins his student Ayer in denying that there is anything like falsifiable ethical 
knowledge. Schultz notes that  
‘…[e]xcepting a relatively brief period (roughly 1894-1913) when he became a 
Hegelian under McTaggert’s influence, a Platonic realist, and then an adherent of 
Moore’s view…Russell cleaved to the Humean belief in reason as the slave of the 
passions – “outside human desire there is no moral standard,” nor any action for that 
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  According to Pigden, he ‘…combined an emotivist analysis of “good” and 
“bad” with a consequentialist/relativist reading of “ought” and “right”.
320
  
Russell maintained a long-running dialogue with G.E. Moore, accepting his critique of 
naturalism but rejecting his notion of the ‘good’. Moore is most famous for his emphasis on 
common sense language and his so-called ‘proof of the external world’.
321
 His philosophical 
notoriety began in 1903 with a paper entitled ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ and, like 
MacKinnon, Bishop Butler’s aphorism that ‘everything is what it is and not another thing’ 
was evoked as a short-hand indication of this commitment.
322
 Idealism was seen as collapsing 
analytic and synthetic; the structures of perception and the world itself, and this form of 
realism sought to preserve the independence, objectivity and integrity of the known object 
over and against the knower. MacKinnon cited the strong influence of Moore:  
Moore made it possible for me to be a realist; his laborious arguments concerning the 
status and nature of objects of perception made it clear that, whatever perceiving was, it 
was a finding rather than a fashioning. Further, truth was not to be identified with an 
internally coherent whole of judgements; it resided in the correspondence of 
proposition and fact. Thinking had a reference beyond itself; even if it was hard to 
speak of any sort of “sufficient reason” in things, yet things were somehow there to 
come to terms with. They might lack any sort of connectedness; it might even be 
possible to speak of being per se as intelligible. Yet for the logical atomist, there were 
things with which men were coming to terms; the world was not simply an expression 
of their immanent rationality, but something given.
323
  
Working from these convictions, Moore’s approach to the task of philosophy was to raise all 
the questions he could pertaining to the precise meaning and reasons for believing particular 
statements of fact, confident that clarity could be achieved through his method of analysis 
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 Like Russell and Ayer, he worked on the basis of a sharp distinction 
between analytic and synthetic statements.
325
 In as far as Moore transposed this distinction 
into the linguistic realm, his analysis of statements took place by means of the task of 
articulating definitions, in which a distinction was made between concepts that could not be 
broken down into further component parts and those that could. Cell observes that for Moore, 
‘…a definition can be given only of complex things, and is possible logically only if there are 
non-complex elements–the “parts” to be enumerated.’
326
 Thus, in the process of definition the 
philosopher will identify the different properties and qualities of concepts and their 
relationships and what will emerge is a distinction between complex and non-complex 
concepts. There are clear limits to definition here, in that non-complex words cannot be 
defined; their meaning is discerned in looking at the way they are habitually applied in 
concrete settings of language use.
327
  
It would be false to see a form of linguistic reductionism as the defining feature of Moore’s 
approach. Unlike some of the positivists who followed, Moore employed a metaphysical 
register in as far as he maintained that the meaning of a complex concept may be clarified in 
an articulation of its components parts, yet it is not entirely reducible to those component 
parts. That Moore’s epistemology demanded something rather more nuanced than a simple 
exercise in linguistic reductionism or a rejection of metaphysics tout court and this is carried 
over to his ethical thought.
328
 Turning to Principia Ethica, Moore asks:  
What, then, is to be understood by metaphysical? I use the term… in opposition to 
natural. I call those philosophers pre-eminently metaphysical who have recognised 
most clearly that not everything which is is a natural object. Metaphysicians have, 
therefore, the great merit of insisting that our knowledge is not confined to the things 
which we can touch and see and feel. They have always been much occupied, not only 
with that other class of natural objects which consists in mental facts, but also with the 
class of objects or properties of objects, which certainly do not exist in time, are not 
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therefore parts of Nature, and which, in fact, do not exist at all. To this class, as I have 
said, belongs what we mean by the adjective good. It is not goodness, but only the 
things or qualities which are good, which can exist in time—can have duration, and 
begin and cease to exist—can be objects of perception.
329
 
Moore commits to a metaphysical notion of the good yet finds both ‘naturalists’ and 
‘metaphysicians’ guilty of the naturalistic fallacy. Both seek to ‘…explain the type of ethical 
truths by supposing it identical with the type of scientific law’.
330
 ‘[T]he metaphysicians think 
that there is some absolute necessity in the laws, derivable from the nature of the universe, 
while the naturalists do not’, yet both share the error of holding that the good is something to 
be analysed or defined in terms of something non-ethical.
331
 For Moore, linguistic analysis is 
a means to an end; when applied to the term ‘good’ it purges mistakes in definition yet it also 
reveals a distinctively ethical truth.
332
 Not so with Ayer.      
Ayer saw himself following Russell in the broad sweep of the analytical tradition, but he 
wanted an even more rigorous form of reductionism, rejecting Moore’s notion of the good 
out-of-hand, calling it ‘absolutism’.
333
 MacKinnon noted that it was Russell’s ‘…more 
technical work on the foundation of mathematics that Ayer employed to give greater rigour 
and plausibility to Mill’s conception of material things as constellations of ‘permanent 
possibilities of sensation’.
334
 Rejecting Russell’s atomist metaphysic under the influence of 
the Vienna Circle, Ayer adopted the typology mentioned above, which stipulated three types 
of possible statement for capturing ‘facts’. The notion of ‘God’ as a nameable object was 
declared meaningless. He then set down a criterion for what might count as a truthful 
sentence:  
In every case where we have a series of words which seems to be a good grammatical 
sentence, and we wish to discover whether it really makes sense i.e. whether it 
expresses a genuine proposition –we must consider what are the circumstances in 
                                                          
329
 Moore, Principia Ethica, 161. 
330
 Ibid., 124.  
331
 Ibid., 124-25.Warnock doubts that Moore is being entirely fair to the ethical traditions of Kant, 
Spinoza and Hegel. Warnock, Ethics Since 1900, 32.  
332
 Warnock, Ethics Since 1900, 63. 
333
 Ibid., 58. In his paper entitled ‘Demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics’, Ayer states that 
his purpose is to ‘prove that any attempt to describe the nature or even to assert the existence of 
something lying beyond the reach of empirical observation must consist in the enunciation of pseudo-
propositions, a pseudo-proposition being a series of words that may seem to have the structure of a 
sentence but it is in fact meaningless. I call this a demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics 
because I define a metaphysical enquiry as an enquiry into the nature of the realty underlying or 
transcending the phenomena which the special sciences are content to study.’ A. J. Ayer, 
"Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics," Mind, no. 171 (1934): 336. 
334
 MacKinnon, "Ayer's Attack," 52. 
83 
 
which the proposition apparently expressed would be called true or false: what 
difference in the world its truth or falsity would entail.
335
  
For Ayer, a truthful sentence is one where the conditions for the determination of its truth or 
falsity can be clearly stated with the tools of the ‘special sciences’. All other sentences are at 
best fodder for psychological analysis or aesthetic expression. It is the case that some non-
empirically verifiable statements in the realm of morality, religion and aesthetics may be 
more or less expressive and useful than others, but nevertheless, they cannot be considered 
true or false in any meaningful sense. The poet, according to Ayer realises this, but the 
metaphysician and the theologian only succeed in ‘produc[ing] plain nonsense in the attempt 
to give straightforward information’.
336
  A person who says that God exists is merely 
describing a private experience rather than naming any object.
337
 In this way, Ayer is making 
strong truth claims about the inability of certain modes of discourse to produce truth claims, 
as Ewing notes:  
That ethical judgements are not objectively true [for Ayer] is a judgement that itself 
claims objective truth and theoretical, not practical justification. It is vindicated, if at 
all, by the standards of truth, and not by rhetoric or congruity with one’s emotional 
needs, and to its truth practical utility is irrelevant.
338
  
Ayer saw himself as having submitted to the purgation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
339
 
At the same time, he was heavily influenced by the critiques of Kant which emerged from the 
Vienna Circle such as Moritz Schlick in as far as the latter rejected Kant’s notion of the 
synthetic a priori and any residue of realist metaphysics thought to be embedded therein 
(especially in his moral philosophy).
340
 This formed the basis on which the early Wittgenstein 
and Ayer would distance themselves from the metaphysical dimensions of Moore and 
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Russell. What was manifest here was a transition by which the positivist project of 
reductionism was moving from a focus on ontology to a focus on epistemology. Referring to 
Russell, MacKinnon noted that 
[The ‘reductionist’ method]…sought to reduce the number of independent entities 
involved in the description of the world by defining through a very subtle method of 
definition, the relatively unfamiliar in favour of the familiar. ‘Reductionism’ so 
conceived was an ontological program concerned to give an inventory of the irreducible 
elements of the world; its earliest form was that of logical atomism… But with logical 
positivism ‘reductionism’ was virtually re-defined as an epistemological program, 
aimed at completing the work of Ernest Mach in formulating a descriptive, radically 
empiricist conception of science, seeking to eliminate as metaphysical non-sense from 
scientific theories, any assumption of the unobservable.
341
   
The last major figure of the positivist ‘second’ period of analytical philosophy is the early 
Wittgenstein.
342
 With the Tractatus, ‘…logical atomism reached its fullest and most rigorous 
expression’.
343
 Indeed, Wittgenstein took the linguistic turn to a new level, breaking down the 
analytic-synthetic distinction that formally separated the logical conditions that make 
language possible from actual language usage.
344
 Cell observes that for Wittgenstein, ‘…a 
proposition expressed or pictures a fact, and what is expressed by a proposition cannot be the 
subject of a proposition’ and also that ‘…[t]here are no facts about facts for a proposition to 
picture.’
345
 At this point, Wittgenstein was engaged in a project riven with paradox, whereby 
he was concerned to make all sorts of propositions about language use, but with these 
constituting a kind of scaffolding which one must mount, only to push away once one begins 
to use language correctly.
346
 In other words, the philosopher must engage in a lot of strictly 
meaningless statements –statements that do not show forth or picture empirical facts in the 
world –so that meaningful statements can be identified and put into use. 
347
 Only statements 
about particular states of affairs in the physical world can meet this criterion; a position that 
makes moral theorising redundant, yet turns the whole task of describing the way people use 
language into a type of ethical reflection. I will return to MacKinnon’s interaction with 
Wittgenstein’s legacy in Chapter 5. 
 
                                                          
341
 MacKinnon, "Ayer's Attack," 53-54. 
342
 Kerr, TAW, 61-70. 
343
 Cell, Language, Existence and God, 117. 
344
 Kerr, TAW, 62-64.  
345
 Cell, Language, Existence and God, 117.  
346
 Cora Diamond, "Throwing Away the Ladder," Philosophy 63, no. 243 (1988): 20-26. 
347
 Cell, Language, Existence and God, 117. 
85 
 
4. Options for the Theologian in Light of the Analytical Turn    
 
What were the options for theists in light of the rise of hostile forms of analytic philosophy in 
their midst? In the wake of the apparent inability to name God meaningfully, non-cognitive, 
non-realist approaches to God such as that of Don Cupitt and D.Z. Phillips followed.
348
 
Rejecting ‘traditional’ theism, they nevertheless saw religion as providing a context for moral 
formation, communal belonging and life-enhancing aesthetics. Another trajectory would 
follow Tillich in effectively ignoring the positivists, drawing on Heidegger’s notion of being 
and the wider existentialist trajectory to re-figure notions of theism and revelation. Yet 
another option was to place oneself within the Barthian trajectory, asserting the independence 
of the Christian notion of God from the metaphysics of onto-theology and thus its immunity 
from the latter’s decline.
349
 One last option was mentioned above in terms of a ‘fourth period’ 
of the analytical turn, which really amounted to a neo-Calvinist effort to revive apologetic 
philosophical theology on the edge of the analytical tradition.   
The influence of the hostile second period of analytical philosophy drove MacKinnon toward 
embracing (at least) two conclusions. The first was noted in Chapter One: while theology can 
never do without the resources and critiques of philosophy, it involves a distinctive 
philosophical position of its own and must not allow itself to be entirely absorbed into an 
alternative program, or be tempted by the illusion that such a move could provide a 
methodology or content to secure its ultimate coherence.
350
 At the same time, theologians 
should also be aware of an equally dangerous temptation to ignore the resources and 




Another significant influence wrought by the second period analytical philosophers on 
MacKinnon was a strengthening of the apophatic commitment that had already been gleaned 
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from Kant. The analytical turn further marginalised theology within the academy, yet all was 
not lost for it also provided therapeutic tools for avoiding theological excess and promoting 
the internal clarity of theological language.
352
 MacKinnon accepted the thrust of the 
positivist’s rejection of idealism and appreciated the purgative potential of atheism.
353
 He 
wrote that ‘…[s]omehow, although this atheism (i.e. of the positivists) challenged and 
unsettled me, it seemed a more honest and somehow less corrupting a thing than the monistic 
insistence on, for instance, the rational necessity of evil to the articulation of the good’.
354
 He 
added that ‘…[i]t may be that this seriousness will take the form of saying that, in the last 
resort, atheism may be less hardly reconcilable with faith than certain sorts of idealism, even 
if that atheism is a dialectical moment, for some at least, in the argument of faith’.
355
  
It seems that MacKinnon’s exposure to early analytic philosophy confirmed what had already 
been set in train with his receptivity to Kant’s agnosticism, yet it had not entirely closed the 
route to a Kantian inspired opportunity for a theological re-statement, buoyed by the 
perennial questions that the moral dimension of human experience seemed to provoke. 
MacKinnon found positivist critiques of idealism convincing, yet he also worried that their 
deployment of the criterion of verifiability and reductionist approaches to language led to 
impoverished accounts of such phenomena as paradox, metaphor and analogy, along with a 
marginalisation of aesthetic, moral and religious discourse that undermined realism.
356
 He is 
convinced that if these phenomena are taken seriously, meaning ‘on their own terms’ or, in 
trope favoured by Mackinnon, according to their peculiar ‘system of projection’ then a 
metaphysical impulse will tentatively re-emerge and await articulation.
357
   
A direct engagement with the limitations of positivism is evident in MacKinnon’s 1990 
lecture pertaining to Ayer’s attack on metaphysics, which I referred to above. It is also 
evident in his much earlier contribution to a series of presentations at the Aristotelian Society 
entitled ‘Verification’; something to which Russell, Ayer, Berlin and Wisdom also 
contributed. In the 1990 lecture, it is clear that MacKinnon can find much to praise in the 
legacy of Ayer. He states that ‘…it is in the area of logical necessity that the work which 
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Ayer presented the world in his Logic, Truth and Language in 1936 made its most important 
contribution’.
358
 Although he found his execution of the principle too narrow, MacKinnon 
was sympathetic to Ayer’s attempt to limit the sorts of sentences that can be said to refer to 
facts by ‘…specify[ing] the circumstances which would confirm or discredit the proposition 
in question’.
359
 This sensibility was appropriated by MacKinnon and is most evident in his 
insistence on maintaining historical factuality at the basis of Christological claims in 
opposition to the subjectivising trends of British modernist theology.
360
  
As noted above, Ayer was adamant that the metaphysical project, whether in its classical 
form or in its revised Kantian form was doomed, and MacKinnon showed sympathy to the 
extent that the ‘…metaphysical impulse seeks to come to rest in that which cannot be rejected 
or modified, in that which is suffused with its own self-sufficiency in that which is 
ontologically self-authenticating’.
361
 There is no doubt for MacKinnon that such ways of 
speaking can lead to intellectual stagnation and obstinacy in the face of new empirical or 
logical developments. This was not only the case when it came to the religiously committed. 
MacKinnon also notes the way in which Ayer was mindful that empiricists of the preceding 
generation, such as Cook Wilson, had become resistant to developments in non-Euclidean 
geometry because of a misplaced metaphysical commitment.
362
     
MacKinnon saw Ayer as providing a welcome therapy, yet given the way he sought 
inspiration from Kant and Aristotle, a critical reaction is not surprising. Indeed, his response 
was to ask whether Ayer really understood ‘…the impulses that tempted men of genius into 
such elaborate essays in non-sense’.
363
 Ayer suffered from empiricism’s tendency to imprison 
at the same time as it liberates; a tendency I noted in Chapter One in relation to MacKinnon’s 
reception of the intellectual biography of J.S. Mill. Yet MacKinnon also referred to figures 
such as Collingwood, Popper and Braithwaite in as far as they provide examples of 
philosophical forays that seem to undermine the adequacy of Ayer’s approach. In regard to 
Collingwood, MacKinnon mentioned his explorations as to the nature and problems of 
historical study, suggesting that had Ayer engaged with them fully, he may have realised the 
need for an expansion of the sort of linguistic phenomenon he was willing to admit as truth-
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 In the same way, Popper was invoked to the extent that he dramatically departed 
from the emphasis of the Vienna Circle with his criticism of the principle of verification. The 
dependence of the scientific method on a capacity to put forward initially unverifiable, 
creative and speculative hypotheses suggests that the approach so admired by Ayer requires 
certain latitude to better account for the meaningfulness of speculative and imaginative 
language forms if it is to operate successfully. In a similar vein Mackinnon mentions 
Braithwaite with his appreciation for the way literature captures facts and conveys truths in 
ways that sometimes surpass that managed by philosophers.  
The heart of the problem that MacKinnon identified is the adequacy of the moral thought 
emerging from the analytical ‘stable’.
365
 Cavell captures the issue in a discussion of 
Sidgwick, whose project, as he intimates here, was something of a precedent to the sort of 
moral thought that was to emerge in the wake of the analytical turn:  
Sidgwick says that “…[his] treatment of the subject is, in a sense, more practical than 
that of many moralists, since …[he is] occupied from the first to the last in considering 
how conclusions are to be rationally reached in the familiar matter of our common daily 
life and practice” (p. vi), but he goes on to caution us, in a way which is very 
sympathetic to contemporary “analytical” writers in the subject, as follows: “…my 
immediate object –to invert Aristotle’s phrase –is not Practice but Knowledge. I have 
thought that the predominance in the minds of moralists of a desire to edify has 
impeded the real progress of ethical science: and that this would be benefitted by an 




There was a commitment to immersion in concrete particularity, but in a way that excluded 
the particularity of the moralist: ‘disinterested curiosity’ looks outward to external 
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phenomena, but never ‘turns within’ as the philosophical therapist demands. Russell certainly 
escaped the full force of this charge by his personal and passionate forays into contemporary 
ethical problems, and one can only presume that MacKinnon’s lack of engagement with these 
writings came down to a ‘Kantian inoculation’ against any recourse to emotivism. In any 
case, it was Ayer’s simple utilitarianism, which seemed to be able to venture no further than 
prescribing increases to human satisfaction that captured like nothing else the limits of the 
analytical turn as a source of illumination for moral philosophy. Indeed, where Ayer ‘…failed 
most signally was in his allowing a proper place for the subject to whom that last word [i.e. of 
empirical fact] had to be spoken. He failed to see that the sort of intellectual self-criticism he 
practices himself as well as advocated belonged to the biography of a lively, suffering, human 
being’.
367
 There is an intuition here shared by Basil Mitchell and Mary Warnock, who both 
articulated dissent against the pretensions of the post-Kantian deontologist and the narrowed 
scope of utilitarianism. Both needed to be opened to ‘thicker descriptions’. Mitchell notes 
that:  
To look properly at evil and human suffering is almost insuperably difficult, but there 
is, however, something in the serious attempt to look compassionately at human things 
which automatically suggests that ‘there is more than this’. This ‘there is more than 
this’, if it is not to be corrupted by some sort of quasi-theological finality, must remain 
a very tiny spark of insight, something with, as it were, a metaphysical position, but no 
metaphysical form. But it seems to me that the spark is real, and that great art is 
evidence of its reality.
368
 
The sort of utilitarian ethics that arose in tandem with the analytical turn became linked for 
MacKinnon with a reductionism that resulted in an all too ‘thin’ account of the moral actor as 
well as an over-simplification which bracketed out elements of the complex historical and 
cultural web in which moral problems arose. In this vein, MacKinnon was fond of repeating 
Butler’s aphorism that the great virtue of the utilitarian, benevolence, ‘…is the whole of 
virtue only within the limits set by the claims of justice and veracity’.
369
 He went on to argue 
that  
…[t]he utilitarian who says that benevolence is the whole of virtue, is ironing out the 
actual complexity of human nature in the interest of a principle for which he claims an 
almost metaphysical universality and necessity; while the metaphysician is distracted 
from the familiar effort to follow conscience by his conviction that the place of 
morality in the scheme of things must first be shown him. If the utilitarian argues for 
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the sovereignty over our inherently complex nature of a principle of benevolence which 
is too narrow for that nature’s manifold diversity, the metaphysically minded moralist 
is too inclined to flee from the acknowledgement of that nature’s claims upon him as 
something which supplies its own justification.
370
  
Together with Pritchard, MacKinnon saw within positivist-inspired utilitarianism the spectre 
of a serious ‘impoverishment’ and intuitionism as supplying a needed counterpoint.
371
 I will 
return to these dimensions of MacKinnon’s moral thought in the final chapter. For now, the 
focus must shift to christology, for it is here where MacKinnon sought to apply the insights 
he had gained from Kant, Taylor and Sorley, and the purgative challenge of the analytical 
turn.   
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Chapter 3: MacKinnon’s Moral Christology  
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of the previous chapter was to document the key intellectual forces that left a lasting 
impression on MacKinnon: the theistic, morally focused, constructive and apologietic 
approaches of Taylor and Sorley were placed alongside the purgative and iconoclastic voices 
of early analytic philosophy. MacKinnon found lessons for the borderlands theologian in both 
and set them up in something of a dialectical relationship. I now want to continue the 
exploration by shifting focus to MacKinnon’s christological writings, in the knowledge that 
the questions posed and the resources offered by these key dialogue partners were decisive. 
MacKinnon once wrote that ‘Christology…is the name of something that sets in motion, and 
keeps in restless activity, the whole work of the characteristically Christian theologian.
372
 He 
goes on to admit that he shares with ‘the philosopher’ distaste at the way a preoccupation 
with the question of faith can  
…infect disinterestedness with the parti pris attitudes of apologetics. Yet [he continues] 
it is the case that while increasingly both this self-knowledge and a deepening distrust 
of the ecclesiastical Apparat lead me to be mistrustful of a very great deal I have 
enjoyed, yes enjoyed, in the world of the Christian religion and be aware that I must 
surely come equally to distrust a great deal more, the domination of the mysterium 
Christi deepens its almost obsessive sovereignty over my mind.  
In this chapter I will outline key features of MacKinnon’s understanding of the significance 
of the person of Jesus through three interwoven dimensions.  
First is the way in which he saw any account of the meaning of Jesus’ death and resurrection 
as opening the perennial dilemma pertaining to the unity of the human and divine in Jesus, as 
well as the relatively modern question of the relationship between the ‘Jesus of history’ and 
the ‘Christ of faith’. The typical locus for the discussion of these tensions is the doctrine of 
the Trinity, and this is no different in MacKinnon’s case.   
Second is the way in which MacKinnon’s christology relates to his wider philosophical 
commitments. His insistence on a form of philosophical and theological realism will be most 
pertinent here.
373
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Thirdly, I will focus on the way in which MacKinnon’s christology interacts with his 
therapeutic project generally and his forays into moral philosophy more specifically. 
Important here will be the way MacKinnon understands such themes as divine freedom, 
soteriology and theodicy as important categories for the explication of the incarnation. Divine 
freedom involves consideration of motive, action and personhood of God, specifically in 
terms of a ‘kenotic trajectory’ within the eternal Trinity and also within the historic journey 
of Christ from Galilee to Jerusalem. Soteriology involves questions pertaining to the 
relationship between the work of Christ and humanity’s righteousness or lack thereof, while 
theodicy involves the justification of God’s righteousness in the midst of the waste and 
tragedy of history. That all are implicitly or explicitly enmeshed in notions of the good and 
are thus quintessentially moral ways of speaking is not lost on MacKinnon. Christology 
becomes another way of exploring his overall commitment to moral realism, and yet he 
differentiated himself from others who took a similar line around the same time, by pairing a 
focus on the ‘moral’ content of revelation with a renewed affirmation of the notion of 
‘substance’.         
In explicating these three points, it will become obvious that MacKinnon did not offer a fully 
worked-through doctrine of the incarnation, but rather a series of critical engagements which 
may provide useful prolegomena to, or purgation of, such projects. Again, the method is 
primarily therapeutic. This is something Surin noted when he wrote that 
…MacKinnon does not have anything amounting to an elaborate and comprehensive 
‘doctrine’ of the Incarnation. Rather he provides the reader with a series of clues which 
point to those features that would have to be present in any account faithful to the 
Gospel narratives and the Christological traditions of the Church. But no attempt is 
made to press these clues into any kind of systematic framework.
374
  
It will also be apparent that he was a mediating figure, working in-between a range of 
different theological options that became prominent throughout the mid-twentieth century 
while not fully subscribing to any one of them.  
For instance, MacKinnon was comfortable enough with the continuing legacy of nineteenth 
century historical critical study of the New Testament to acknowledge the unavoidability of a 
distinction between the ‘Christ of faith’ and the ‘Jesus of history’.
375
 Simultaneously, 
MacKinnon admired early and mid-twentieth century voices such as P.T. Forsyth, E.C. 
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Hoskyns and J. Moltmann respectively, who, despite the significant differences in the context 
and content of their work, made the point that one ‘side’ cannot be fully expressed without 
the other. They opposed approaches that opted for either rationalistic-historical or subjectivist 
reductionism. Relatedly, and along with theological liberals and modernists of various types, 
he was comfortable to apply the notion of ‘myth’ to the New Testament and creeds. It was a 
way of making space for an imaginative idiom that ranged beyond minimalist notions of 
factuality as recognised in so much of the post-Enlightenment intellectual milieu.
376
 Unlike 
many within the (broadly conceived) modernist movement within 20
th
 century British 
theology, however, he was unwilling to see mythological language as automatically 
undermining a serious historical sensibility.
377
 Neither did he accept the argument associated 
with Kierkegaard and Bultmann alike that the empirical historicity of the person of Jesus 
could or should be downgraded to something less than an indispensable warrant for faith.
378
 It 
is not acceptable to replace the role of historical realism with notions of kerugma or to see the 
New Testament as a series of largely fictional theological or mythical forms which 
nonetheless ‘speak’ to the existential conditions of the modern individual in ways that, in 
themselves, warrant the continued existence of the Church.
379
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For MacKinnon, adopting a rigorously historical approach to the person of Jesus can open up 
greater avenues for appreciating his theological and existential significance, while at the 
same time allowing weight to be given to the sheer cultural distance between the eras of 
authorship and contemporary reception in addition to the sheer difficulty of recovering 
historical facts and shared meanings over such a span.
380
 Thus, against movements of liberal 
theology associated with the influence of figures such as Bultmann, or those 
contemporaneous with MacKinnon such as Macquarrie or the contributors to Hick’s ‘Myth of 
God Incarnate’ collection, MacKinnon sided with what could be broadly described as a 
Barthian trajectory, fuelled by contemporaneous trends in New Testament studies that had 
moved beyond the either/or debate between the rationalist-historical and the kerygmatic 
approaches.
381
 In the Barthian trajectory, an uncompromising revelatory idiom is adopted to 
preserve the possibility of a realist christology, characterised by an encounter with a 
particular fact-event and an absolute claim objectively conceived, that nonetheless demands 
purgation of every notion of ‘objectivity’. The content of christology is in no way derived 
from or dependent upon subjective intellectual or intuitive faculties, nor is it necessarily 
limited a priori by the philosophical presuppositions underpinning ‘mainstream’ empirical 
historiography.
382
    
While MacKinnon would go on to speak in very different tones about the problem of 
metaphysics, he did take Barth, against Bultmann, as having emerged as ‘…a most powerful 
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champion of the classical Catholic Christology, with its ontological apparatus of substance, 
essence, nature, etc.’, accepting these ‘…traditional formulations when properly 
understood’.
383
 Unlike some of his fellow Anglo-Catholics, however, he was far more 
interested in discerning the possibility of a renewed metaphysics chastened by the therapy 
offered by the positivists and Wittgenstein, rather than by reference to neo-Thomism.
384
 Even 
so, according to MacKinnon, forms of modern theology that attempt to understand the unity 
of Jesus and God in terms of ontologies of personhood, categories of action or morality alone, 
will inevitably reach an impasse that requires the reintroduction of something like a 
metaphysics of substance.
385
 In Mackinnon’s case this plays out in a greater openness to the 
ontological insights of Aristotle and G.E. Moore rather than any recantation of his early and 
well documented break with monistic idealist metaphysics.
386
 It also occurs with a great 
sensitivity to the ways in which the kenotic pattern of the incarnation may fundamentally 
change Christian ontologies in contrast to their secular counterparts.  
Much of what has been outlined so far calls for greater clarification and substantiation, yet 
the point of this introductory section has been to emphasise that christology was at the heart 
of MacKinnon’s theological enterprise, and that he went about constructing his approach with 
characteristic creativity, independence, fragmentariness, open-endedness and moral intensity.   
2.  MacKinnon on Incarnation and Revelation  
 
According to his most recent (and to date most exhaustive) biographer, MacKinnon’s 
engagement with christology began in earnest as part of his undergraduate education at 
Oxford in the 1930s.
387
 After completing three years of philosophy steeped in the work of 
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Moore, Russell and the logical positivists, MacKinnon took what was considered to be a 
counter-intuitive step by remaining at Oxford to compete a fourth year in theology.
388
 The 
influences that would prove most decisive in this period appear to be, broadly speaking, 
twofold. The first was MacKinnon’s introduction to a dialectical theology emerging in 
Germany at this time, particularly by means of his attendance at Austin Farrer’s SCM study 
group which met to discuss the work of Emil Brunner. Here, MacKinnon was exposed to the 
Barth and Brunner debate, as well as the thought of Bultmann and Gerhard Kittel.
389
 The 
second was the New Testament scholarship of Lightfoot.  
Farrer’s engagement with these trends in Germany was respectful yet critical and this temper 
probably had an impact on the young MacKinnon.
390
 While one might presume that 
MacKinnon’s robust engagement with the emerging field of logical positivism would have 
ensured that he was instinctively cautious about a form of continental theology that was 
popularly believed to be epistemologically insular and self-referential, it is clear that the 
uncompromising rigour of its realist incarnational theology struck a deep cord.
391
 
Specifically, what remained decisive for MacKinnon was the claim common to this school 
pertaining to the irreducible uniqueness of the Christ event.  
For the dialectical theologians this was a uniqueness that rendered the methodologies of 
empirical history and the natural sciences of limited use in apprehending such an extra-
ordinary one-off act conceived under the category of revelation-as-event.
392
 Simply put, this 
type of theology tended to advance the argument that the epistemological norms pertaining to 
the knowledge of God’s revelatory acts are far closer to the norms pertaining to knowledge of 
God himself, than to particular objects and events that could be the subject of historical and 
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scientific objectification. Thus, talk of ‘God as a human being’ did not render Jesus an object 
that could be probed, or whose meaning could be exhausted, on the same or straightforwardly 




MacKinnon’s relationship to Barth on the question of christology warrants a more forensic 
consideration than is possible here.
394
 I simply note the importance of figures such as 
Hoskyns and (to a lesser extent) Farrer who were prominent in the task of mediating Barth 
into the British context and who were influential on MacKinnon at a formative stage.
395
 
Additionally, P.T. Forsyth has sometimes been viewed as a pre-cursor of Barthian neo-
Orthodoxy in the British context and is a name that reoccurs throughout MacKinnon’s 
christological writings with positive ascription.
396
 A realist claim pertaining to christological 
revelation is asserted at the heart of Forsyth’s work and forms its guiding methodological 
principle. Indeed, the status of Jesus as the incarnate one is not regarded as a working 
hypothesis to be argued for apologetically or established on the basis of some other ‘first 
principle’.
397
 Furthermore, Forsyth, more so than Barth, was explicit in drawing out links 
between Kantian morality and christology; a move that would prove decisive for MacKinnon, 
particularly given the latter’s emphasis on following Kant in discovering new possibilities for 
metaphysics in tandem with a relentless commitment to the notion of the morally 
unconditioned.  
Alongside these Protestant figures, forming up on the horizon of MacKinnon’s Christological 
thought was Balthasar, who, given his magisterial (and sympathetic) engagement with 
Barth’s work, can be seen to have shared a broad post-war trend looking for a way between 
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fundamentalist reaction and modernist reductionism in theology that nonetheless retained the 
person of Jesus at the centre theological concern.
398
 Kerr notes that much of the initiative for 
the early reception of Balthasar in Britain was fuelled by Roman Catholic and Anglican 
theologian-translators in the aftermath of the War.
399
 MacKinnon played a role in this 
reception, mediating Balthasar to a British audience via several essays that appeared over his 
career.
400
 A claim regarding the uniqueness of Christ lies at the heart of each of these 
influential figures as do avid defences of the inscrutability of God’s transcendence. What they 
attempted to deliver was a certain degree of internal consistency and coherence to the 




MacKinnon remained convinced with Barth and Forsyth that there was no way in which one 
could ever hope to ‘secure’ the revelatory character of Jesus’ life by means of the various 
epistemological norms that had come to characterise modernity. Incarnation demands its 
own, unique category; for ‘everything is what it is and not another thing’. While holding to 
this insight, MacKinnon was always conscious of the risk that theologians can too easily 
revel in bold claims to positive knowledge after they have artfully justified, with reference to 
the nature of God and the uniqueness of revelation, the sidestepping of epistemological 
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canons considered indispensable for self-respecting disciplines that seek empirical rigour and 
public intellectual accountability.
402
 This sensitivity may explain why MacKinnon never 
became an outright disciple of the dialectical school and yet another reason why his theology 
took on a rather fragmented, apophatic and self-afflicted mode.
403
 Indeed, MacKinnon did not 
uncritically accept Barth’s resounding ‘no’ to Brunner;
404
 involving himself in highly 
qualified forms of natural theology at least in as far as he perceived the question of 
transcendence arising from within the contemplation of moral dilemmas in concrete history 
as relevant to the theologian’s task.
405
  
MacKinnon’s aversion to fideism (in the way defined above) is further encapsulated in the 
fact that he paired his conviction regarding the uniqueness of Christ with a conviction that it 
cannot for this reason be isolated from philosophy. This is evident when he says that: 
‘…Christology is like nothing else; it is unique; and yet it overlaps here, there and 
everywhere; and where philosophy in particular is concerned, the overlap presents 
inescapable problems.
406
 Indeed, for MacKinnon: 
The admission of the sovereignty of the christology is not, for the philosopher, any sort 
of escape from his own special problems; still less is it a device whereby he [sic] is able 
to say that theology has its own place, its statements have their own special logic, and 
that it is enough for him to point out this uniqueness and to defend it against those who 
would impinge or criticise it.
407
 
                                                          
402
 MacKinnon, "Does Faith Create its Own Objects?," 208-22. 
403
 Part and parcel of an acknowledgement of the sovereignty of Christology was the fact that it would 
make ‘…serious theological work a less delicately and closely woven unity than the theologian might 
desire’, but this was to be expected as ‘…that untidiness was itself an expression of his fidelity to the 
underlying demands of his enterprise.’ BT, 58.  On this score, it is unlikely that MacKinnon would 
share Forsyth’s rather optimistic declaration that the ‘…moral and experimental method in theology 
will give us, from its congeniality with the source of revelation in a personal Saviour, results as great 
and commanding in their sphere as did the application of the other experimental method of induction 
so appropriate to natural science.’ Forsyth, Person and Place, 231. 
404
 There are indications that MacKinnon regarded Barth as sending ‘confused’ messages on the 
possibility of natural theology. D. M. MacKinnon, "Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Book 
Review)," Epworth Review 20, no. 3 (1993): 130. 
405
 P.G.  Wignall, "D.M. MacKinnon: An Introduction to his Early Theological Writings," in New 
Studies in Theology 1, ed. S. Sykes and D. Holmes (London: Duckworth, 1980), 78. 
406
 MacKinnon, BT, 61.  
407
 Ibid., 60. Coakley writes: 18 ‘Outright rejection of secular philosophy is as dangerous an 
alternative as outright submission: there has to be a ‘more excellent way’ than the two false 
alternatives (fideism versus secularism) that currently feature large in theological culture wars. 
Ironically, Barth’s dogmatics and ordinary language (‘analytic’) philosophy –perhaps the most 
important developments in the twentieth century for theology and philosophy, respectively –have 
together combined in a pincer movement to entrench this false disjunction.’ Interestingly, MacKinnon 
tried to learn from both, obviously in search of this ‘more excellent way’. Sarah Coakley, God, 
Sexuality and the Self: An Essay 'On the Trinity' (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 18.  
100 
 
As will become clear, MacKinnon affirmed the long tradition of theologians drawing upon 
philosophical terms to explicate the identity of Jesus and the Father. Yet for him there was 
also a much more contemporary overlap between theology and philosophy in the form of the 
purgative focus on revelatory particularity among the neo-Orthodox and the purgative 
emphasis on empirical particularity found in the logical positivists.
408
 Naturally, the 
protagonists of either discipline would have protested such a connection, but drawing out 
previously unseen, contentious, yet potentially fecund resonances between philosophy and 
theology was the borderland-dwelling vocation of MacKinnon.
409
  
I explored MacKinnon’s link with the positivists in Chapter Two and so it is sufficient here to 
re-iterate the point that the influence of Russell and Moore, in undermining the doctrine of 
internal relations that was such a central part of the idealist projects of Joachim and Bradley, 
had won MacKinnon’s admiration. For MacKinnon, the positivists were reviving the 
Aristotelian tradition of correspondence notions of truth; they were introducing a healthy 
agnosticism in the wake of an over-confident yet seductive idealism; they were resuming 
‘accents of the authentic Kant’, and above all their focus on the ‘particular’ against holist 
abstractions was executed with a logical rigour that MacKinnon admired.
410
  
If one were to transfer this focus on the particular into the theological realm, one can perhaps 
see the attraction of the dialectical theologians for MacKinnon. And so, it is with some irony 
that MacKinnon’s interests in the philosophies of noted atheists led him into the arms of 
Barth, Balthasar, Hoskyns and Forsyth whose epistemological focus on realist particularity 
manifested in a bold proclamation of the sovereignty of christology.
411
 They too, suspected 
the way in which some theologians had been seduced into thinking that the monist 
metaphysics of the idealists could be a refuge by which orthodox theistic claims could escape 
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the fires of secular modernity.
412
 Indeed, if Moore was the greatest initial influence on 
MacKinnon’s growing conviction that idealism was the enemy of the philosophical 
apprehension of the historical particular, rather than its great expositor, Brunner fuelled the 
fire from the theological side. Brunner sought to show the ways in which idealism, with its 
intense focus on the philosophy of history actually distorted history:  
Brunner’s dialectical unmasking of what he called the “idealism” of the followers of 
Ritschl, Dilthey, and Troeltsch in The Mediator may have helped MacKinnon to see 
that methods that might appear to take history seriously are sometimes funded by a 




The impetus for this approach was often placed at the feet of Hegel, with his purported 
conviction that  
…religion properly so-called uses inadequate concepts and this inadequacy of its 
concepts, compared, that is to say, to the adequacy of the Begriffe of philosophy, 
normally consists in the fact that these concepts are either still too immersed in sense 
imagery though they may be dialectically inter-related (as in the story of a Father-God 
giving birth to a Son and sending him to die so that he can then return as Risen Lord or 
Spirit), or they are concepts all right (such as First Cause, necessary Being) and clear of 
such immersion, but dialectically undeveloped.
414
  
That MacKinnon did see the need to explicate the claims of the raw biblical material with 
philosophical concepts, especially when they seem to pose questions of metaphysics and call 
for a ‘philosophy of history’, not only locates him in the tradition of orthodox creedal 
theology; it also makes us pause before we attribute any crass anti-Hegelianism to him. Yet, 
while this movement between tiers of discourse may initially seem to mimic some of the 
Hegelian sentiments just noted, MacKinnon is always keen to differentiate his own recourse 
to metaphysics as anti-monist in character. Indeed, as already noted, he perceived in the 
idealist tradition a devaluation of the integrity of the particular historical moment: the 
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uniqueness, irreversibility and irreducibility of the latter was inevitably compromised as it 
was all too-quickly subsumed into the realm of the Notion.
415
 Thus, contra the theological 
champions of idealism (as he understood them), any move to further describe historical 
particulars with philosophical became a kind of contemplative attentiveness to the conditions 
of sheer historical particularity.
416
 The dialectic remains for MacKinnon: philosophical 
concepts never sublate historical theology or vice versa. In this vein, MacKinnon preferred 
Balthasar’s christology to that found in Küng’s Menschwerdung Gottes.
417
  
In addition to opening his theology to the purgative gaze of analytical philosophy, 
MacKinnon’s attitude toward Jesus and history emerged as another way in which he sought 
to avoid the charge of fideism. After all, no self-respecting fideist would make Christological 
claims vulnerable to ‘…flickering human perception and observation’ as MacKinnon 
insisted.
418
 Broadly speaking, his approach is more akin to what we see emerging in the 
theologies of Pannenberg and Moltmann rather than that of Barth. In the former, there is 
greater propensity to see the revealed and eschatological dimensions of christology as 
needing to be reconciled, or at least perpetually intertwined with Jesus’ location under the 
commonly recognised categories, limitations and norms of empirical history.
419
 This is not to 
deny the nuanced position achieved by Barth in his commitment to upholding the irreducible 
particularity of the man Jesus as the incarnate one. It is, however, to reiterate Barth’s 
insistence that the incarnation transformed notions of history from the ‘inside out’: it 
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presented to the human intellect a genuinely novel type of ‘history’ in a class of its own.
420
 
What I mean to do here is to identify MacKinnon with a later reassertion of a more 
conventional historical realism in theological epistemology.
421
 Here, the ontology of the 
incarnation still points to utter novelty, but in a way that maintains the empirical historical 
epistemology intact, at least as an ideal, rather than putting revelatory events beyond its 
searching gaze.
422
 Unlike Pannenberg, Moltmann was not as willing to expose christology to 
the epistemological norms of empirical historical research, but nor did he see the 
establishment of a separate category of revealed event qualitatively different to that of regular 
‘history’ as a viable option.  He held that  
[t]he modern dilemma lies in the fact that the two sides can no longer be reduced to a 
common denominator. The choice is made between a Jesuology, referring to the earthly 
Jesus, accessible to historical investigation and capable of human imitation, and 
christology, referring to the Christ whom faith and the church proclaim.
423
  
Moltmann questioned the premises underlying the need for any absolute choice of one to the 
exclusion of the other.    
In different ways Moltmann and Pannenberg attempted approaches that mediated between 
liberal, modernist and liberation theologies from ‘below’, where the focus began with 
historical ‘facts’ and/or concrete moral imperative, and those ‘from above’, in which the 
imperative lies with an alien, transcendent intervention which breaks apart every temporal 
epistemological and ontological norm.
424
 They attempted approaches that tried to hold both 
together albeit shorn of pre-critical naiveté.
425
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Despite my focus on Moltmann and Pannenberg, these were not the most decisive figures for 
MacKinnon early formation. Indeed, core features of his approach to the question of history 
and Christological ‘factuality’ were already set in place within the milieu of British New 
Testament studies during the inter-war period. As Muller testifies, in the context of 1930s 
Oxford, the influence of source criticism was waning, as was confidence that it would be 
possible to extract from the New Testament unalloyed historical data about Jesus. It was 
Lightfoot who formed ‘…the principal influence on MacKinnon during his theological 
studies’.
426
 Lightfoot reacted against liberal German historicism and reasserted that the 
Gospels provided much more historical justification for Christian claims than was being 
allowed by members of the Tübingen School.
427
 He took up its crucial distinction between 
myth and history, however, and his introduction of Form Criticism to Oxford provided an 
alternative to the relative naiveté of Streeter’s teaching on the four document hypothesis, 
which looked to St. Mark’s Gospel as a kind of unadulterated biography.
428
  
The fact that MacKinnon, almost certainly under the influence of the biblical theology of 
C.H. Dodd, can later say ‘…that it is John among the four, who is most deeply, if almost 
unconsciously, concerned with the factual, with the Logos sarx genomenos’ speaks volumes 
about his disposition regarding the question of the New Testament’s ‘factuality’, and how far 
he had moved away from Streeter.
429
 Indeed, the more intensive theological layering crafted 
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by the author of John’s gospel is taken to be a ‘drawing out’ of the moral struggle and 
spiritual depth of history rather than an act of concealment or obscurantism. MacKinnon says 
that 
The presentation John offers of what to him is the judgement of this world is a 
masterpiece of tragic irony. It is a narrative that invites historical evaluation by reason 
of its immanent psychological credibility. We cannot accept it as it stands, as an 
historical record; but the tragic theological and historical dimensions of these pages so 
interpenetrate that the two forms of criticism (the literary and historical) must both be 
enlisted to aid the distinctively religious perception, which finds the truth of what 
human beings ultimately are, not simply revealed but brought into being by the fact that 
Jesus leaves the place of judgement carrying his cross himself…and by his death, 
finishing the work given by his Father and establishing forgiveness and mercy as the 
telos of the whole affair.
430
 
Lightfoot’s Form Criticism highlighted the fact that in the New Testament, historical facts 
and their theological interpretation could be distinguished, but not entirely. This is a view that 
would be further developed with Redaction Criticism, in which the agency of the authors and 
compilers, together with their theological convictions, came to the front and centre of the 
examination of their writings.
431
 Where MacKinnon followed his teacher was his scepticism 
of the liberal protestant project and an acknowledgement of the potential for imaginative 
extrapolations to add rather than detract from historical realism. Where he differed and fell in 
line with the Barthian trajectory was in a rejection of the optimism that revelatory claims may 
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 Morgan’s observation vindicates MacKinnon’s move out of Lightfoot’s orbit: ‘…the result of 
adopting a basically rationalistic method for the modern historical analysis of the gospels was to 
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To get a sense as to some of the arguments MacKinnon would offer in response to a sceptical 
historian can be found in such essays as Does Faith Create its Own Objects?
433
 This is 
perhaps MacKinnon at his most restive. He refused to see faith as an escape from the 
discipline of history, yet he reminded his readers that historical certainty, even if it were 
possible, would not be analogous to faith. It is the very history of the man Jesus that gave rise 
to a theological problem that needed explication in terms of a theological imagination and 
mythological ascription.
434
 Even if greater and greater degrees of historical certainty were 
achieved, MacKinnon was convinced that faith remains a ‘…problem and a mystery. Faith is 
something which goes before historical reconstruction, and is something which even 
conditions its most radical exercise, relating it to its own intense and searching discipline.’
435
  
MacKinnon occasionally spoke about this distinction as one between the ‘perceptual’ and the 
‘historical’.
436
 When noting the ways in which Kant gives the theologian some clues as to the 
proper discipline of the imagination, he asked if there 
…are there lessons to be learnt by the Christian theologian for whom faith has a 
perceptual basis? I say: perceptual rather than historical, recalling that the author of the 
first Johannine epistle… [who] speaks in his first sentence of that which ‘we have 
heard, we have seen with our eyes, and our hands have handled of the word of life’ (1 
Jn. 1.1). If Paul found it necessary to remind the Corinthians that they no longer see 
Christ ‘after the flesh’, this reminder is warranted by the fact that once he was so seen. 
It is, of course, the fourth Evangelist who with dazzling intricacy, emphasizes and then 
seems to depreciate, the perceptual basis of the disciples’ faith.
437
 
Kant famously argued that sensory information without understanding is blind and, 
analogously, MacKinnon believed that without interpretive meaning-making on the part of 
participants and observers it is not possible to achieve true factuality in realms of the 
historical. A great influence on MacKinnon’s refusal of certain forms of reductionist 
historical empiricism was R.T. Collingwood and I also suspect the earlier influence of 
Jacques Maritain.
438
 In reflecting on St. Thomas’ doctrine of analogy in the realm of politics, 
Maritain urges a move beyond the ‘…simple empiric cataloguing of factual circumstances’ to 
an apprehension of history that can include ‘…the bearing of rational judgments of 
value…[and] the discernment of the form and significance of the intelligible constellations 
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which govern the diverse phases of human history’.
439
  On occasion MacKinnon made 
pejorative reference to a ‘scissors and paste’ approach to history, which is almost certainly an 
allusion to the same phrase used by Collingwood in The Idea of History.
440 The mistake here  
…was that it (unconsciously) interpreted the verbal evidence of the past as though it 
were the testimony of contemporaries, and was insufficiently reflective about the 
preconceptions that it brought to the study of the past.
441
  
The ‘scissors and paste’ approach seemed to draw on the empiricist’s assumption that 
immediate sensory perception is the purest form of knowledge and to the extent that 
historical events lie beyond the possibility of this epistemological security, the record must 
be subject to reductionist purgation. One must settle for the closest thing we have: the 
accounts of eye-witnesses. On this theme Graham notes that ‘….if we want to know what 
happened in the past, empiricism implies, we must scour the recorded observations of 
those who were around then, clip the testimony of these contemporaries, and paste it 
together into a continuous narrative of how the past was’.
442
 The problem with this 
approach is that it provided little by way of a self-aware methodological framework for 
how isolated atoms of eye-witness data were to be pieced together into a meaningful 
whole, and most of all, it reduced itself to a focus on ‘events’ rather than ‘actions’. That is, 
it tended to provide a truncated account of the moral dimension of history, with the side-
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3. MacKinnon on Atonement  
 
The same wariness toward Bultmann and Macquarrie also applied to Dennis Nineham’s work 
from the late 1970s in which the latter claimed that there was no longer any possibility of 
grounding atonement theology in the historical particularity of the man Jesus.
444
 MacKinnon 
warned that moves in this direction risked ‘facile depreciation’.
445
 In order to offer a response 
to Bonhoeffer’s question: ‘who is Christ for us today?’,  MacKinnon argued that the response 
to modernity’s challenge to Christianity is to delve more and more deeply into the sheer 
particularity of his life and death as recounted in the gospel accounts as well as the 
particularity of contemporary events.
446
   
MacKinnon did not spend much time in any of his Christological writings entering complex 
debates regarding the theory or theories that most faithfully capture a New Testament 
theology of atonement.
447
 This is not to discount the fact that he could turn his 
characteristically acerbic criticism on theologians that sought to absolutise one of the 
common metaphors, or who turned the whole tenor of the doctrine into the workings of a 
deus ex machina.
448
 It is simply to say that MacKinnon was not interested in coming up with 
a pure and totally satisfying theory. Indeed, his response to such alienating and abstracting 
tendencies was to drive the focus back on the messy, unsystematic particularity of Christ’s 
life.
449
 Thus, it is a return to the man Jesus that he points to, not so much to clarify atonement 
theology but to purify it of any ‘idealistic tendencies’. As usual, his approach arises from a 
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conviction that ‘…pursuing conceptual clarity comes at the cost of smoothing down reality’s 
jagged contours’.
450
 However, this is no simple move ‘back to the Bible’ or ‘back to the 
historical Jesus’ over and against the doctrinal inheritance of the church.
451
  
What MacKinnon sought was a therapeutic corrective, but in advancing this he did not see 
any reason why a solid respect for historical particularity should mean the jettisoning of 
speculative doctrinal and metaphysical expression common to classical theology. In a way 
reminiscent of correlational theological methodologies, it is our very immersion in the 
historical particularity of Jesus that raises questions only kinds of metaphysical and 
theological reasoning can hope to adequately explicate.
452
 MacKinnon wanted to avoid an 
unfruitful subordination of christology to theology; an illness to which he saw Barth applying 
some much needed shock therapy.
453
 He also saw this wider trend being transposed into the 
more specific domain of soteriology with comparable deleterious effects. MacKinnon 
identified a symptom of this wherever the language of redemption came to dominate that of 
atonement.
454
 He asserted that: 
The tradition which has linked the concept of redemption to that of atonement, however 
revolting many of the forms it has assumed in its history, bears witness to a continuing 
awareness that any presentation of the work of Christ merits rejection as morally trivial, 
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if it does not touch the deepest contradictions of human life, those contradictions which 
writers of tragedy have not hesitated to recognize, and to recognize without the 
distorting consolation of belief in a happy ending’.
455
 
What MacKinnon seems to be attacking was trends in soteriology that could be characterised 
as either exemplaristic or ‘abstract-declarative’. That is, approaches that (broadly speaking) 
reduce the saving work of Christ to a kind of moral enlightenment and his person to an object 
of positive mimesis, or that which speaks of salvation only in terms of an objective 
transformation in the conscious will of divine or human agents, particularly where the 
ascription of guilt by the former to the latter is terminated with reference to a kind of quasi-
legal transaction.
456
 This is redemption without atonement according to MacKinnon; it is the 
cross purged of horror, confusion, ambiguity and failure, without which all talk of 
reconciliation becomes abstract and meaningless. For MacKinnon, soteriology must involve 
first and foremost an intense focus on the way in which the cross and resurrection constitute 
events in which the seemingly irreconcilable forces of justice and mercy, evil and love, 
determinism and free will are brought together at a particular, irreducible moment in time.
457
 
We see MacKinnon’s concern in the following criticism of Wisdom: 
One could wish that in this difficult, but searching essay, he had gone on to point out the extent 
to which, for instance, in the theology of the fourth Gospel, the judgment which he claims men 
seek is accomplished in the Passion of Christ; in the great scene of Ecce Homo the world is 
judged by the Son of Man condemned, and forced, in his supreme hour, to wear the robes of 
mock royalty. It is Christ’s objectively achieved atonement which, in the Christian vision, 
suffuses human actions with their truth by giving them their context in his endurance, by 
allowing them to find their firm foundation in his overcoming of the gulf between the claims of 
pity, and the claims of justice, of pity for others and justice towards others, or pity towards 
ourselves and justice towards ourselves.
458 
This is a soteriology that places an intense historical and ethical focus at the centre. It is not a 
‘conceptual’ reconciliation alone, but something achieved first and foremost within the 
holistically apprehended existence of a particular person. A sign that we are willing to 
discipline our Christology by attending to such particularity is openness on the part of the 
theologian to seeing in these events the characteristic marks of tragedy.
459
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MacKinnon’s use of the literary designation of tragedy is a controversial and perhaps 
counter-intuitive way of reasserting a historical realist dimension to Christology.
460
 It is a 
move that warrants detailed examination in its own right and I have made an attempt in the 
proceeding chapter.
461
 Reference to the tragic provided MacKinnon ways of plumbing the 
depths of the historical complexity of the personalities and events of the passion that 
language of ‘sin’ could no longer achieve. One cannot help but think that Forsyth was an 
influence here, as the following excerpt shows:  
In life’s daily affairs it may be wisdom not to take things tragically. But they have to be 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
most pervasive forms of human experience, its successivness, its fragmentariness, above all its 
ineluctable choices, fraught equally inevitably with tragic consequence.’ MacKinnon, "The 
Evangelical Imagination," 196. Janz offers an expert summary of what is at stake for MacKinnon 
here: ‘…when the cross is abstracted from the empirical history of Jesus, that is, when the tragic is not 
attended to, it becomes essentially a symbol; and then by its very nature as a symbol –even though it 
is indeed here a powerful symbol of redemption and hope –the cross becomes fundamentally the focus 
of a supreme kind of resolution. But the hope it then proclaims, if the sheer intractability of the 
empirical history of God-with us on the cross is forgotten, is no longer the hope of genuine 
reconciliation (which must remain the response precisely to utter and intractable non-resolution if we 
are speaking about genuine reconciliation in the biblical sense), but only the hope of an ultimate kind 
of holism. And the integrity of transcendence in the Paschal event, its finality of non-resolution, is 
lost. It has become a finality of resolution. Janz, God, the Mind's Desire, 177-78. 
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MacKinnon took this insight to heart; a move which gives rise to a searing burdensomeness 
in sections of his writing:  
The coming of Christ in the earliest Gospel is portrayed as tragic, and catastrophic. It is not the 
emergence on the plane of history of one who perfects its process, but rather the sudden, abrupt 
appearance of one who rejects the very assumption of its movement. Man’s [sic] tragedy is a 
religious tragedy. He has sought security at the cost of his nature. Christ removes that security 
from him, and shows him the abyss. He presents man with the Will of the Father of which he 
from all Eternity is the fulfilment. ‘There is a Calvary above which was the mother of it all’. He 
is despised, rejected, crucified. He passes ineluctably to nothingness, and therein is his Father 
glorified. His life is a question, a riddle; as Barth says – There is no human possibility of which 
he did not rid himself and therein is he recognized as the Christ.
463
  
If a kind of intense realist discipline led MacKinnon to interrogate all atonement theology by 
means of the concrete circumstances of Jesus’ mission, that is, ‘from below’, it is the domain 
of soteriology where it is possible to locate a qualified christology from ‘above’. By this I 
refer to the fact that it is in soteriology where the absolute ‘givenness’ of Christ is first 
apprehended; indeed here is the impetus by which the question of Jesus’ divinity arises.
464
 
Following Forsyth, MacKinnon held to the conviction that a theology of the incarnation is 
first and foremost not understood as beginning with reflection on the ontological status of 
Christ; the titles bestowed upon him by his disciples and the gospel writers, or the union of 
human and divine natures in a merely abstract sense.
465
 Thus when I speak of a christology 
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from ‘above’ it is not referencing any attempt by MacKinnon to take a ‘God’s eye view’;
466
 it 
is rather to give priority to the received ‘fact’ of divine reconciliation. The scandal is not, at 
least in the first instance, that God became man in some abstract sense, but that in the 
concrete reality of Jesus’ life there is a coming together of guilt and grace, mercy and justice, 
holiness and sin, the relative and absolute, that stretches language and human conceptuality 
beyond its limits. It is in being apprehended by an extraordinary act of wrenching division 
followed by reconciliation in the historical biography of Jesus that the church was driven to 
consider the divine identification with humanity and the nature of Jesus’ personhood in 
relation to the Trinity.
467
 For MacKinnon, consideration of ‘moral soteriology’ must precede 
that of christological ontology, just as much as it is also, in the end, found to be dependent on 
it. It is soteriology that marks the procedural beginning of more speculative christological 
searchings.  
To recapitulate: MacKinnon was adamant that the significance of Jesus’ life could not be 
summed up by or reduced to terms of moral exhortation and mimesis (i.e. the exemplarist 
approach), yet nevertheless it was to be understood first and foremost in moral terms.
468
 Once 
again, the Kantian inspired Christology of P.T. Forsyth provided something of a pre-cursor in 
as far as he asserted that  
…[t]he modern moralisation of religion…prescribes a new manner of inquiry on such a 
central subject as the person of Christ. It plants us anew on the standpoint of the Bible, 




Forsyth also noted that ‘[t]his rebirth of the race is not a thing yet to be done, but a thing 
already done and given into our hands…’.
470
 In this context, he also highlighted the ‘once and 
for all’ objective, revelatory and reconciling event of the cross and resurrection of Jesus that 
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we noted in MacKinnon’s approach above. The affirmation of atonement as a revealed ‘fact’ 
leads Forsyth to ask the question:  
How must we think of him who brought it to pass? As the incarnation of natural and 
arbitrary omnipotence? No, but as one who was potent for everything morally required 
by the one need of sinful Humanity, and the one demand of Holy Eternal Love.
471
 
In this instance, Forsyth claimed to be articulating a principle that he finds in Melanchthon 
and at the heart of reformation theology generally, which he thought has been further 
vindicated, or at least found an ally in, the a philosophical climate informed by Kant.
472
 
While some reformers sought a purgative rejection of the schoolmen, seeking to prioritise 
‘concrete’ biblical categories over those of abstract metaphysics, it seemed to Forsyth that 
Kant had opened up the way for both theology and philosophy to mend the rupture and re-
establish a more constructive relationship. Thus, categories of holiness, law, sin and grace; of 
conscience, guilt and forgiveness become, or rather, are returned, to the centre of Christology. 
According to Forsyth, these categories are irreducibly personal and moral.
473
   
MacKinnon was deeply influenced by this kind of sensibility.
474
 This was displayed as early 
as 1940, when arguing that  
‘[t]he records of [Jesus’] teaching and life reveal to us not a teacher of ethical principles 
commissioning followers to propagate a peculiar doctrine. Rather, we are face to face 




MacKinnon’s loyalty to the idea of the irreducibly moral nature of Christology is qualified 
and this is no better seen than in his insistence that metaphysics cannot be replaced by the 
moral categories in quite the same way that Forsyth seemed to countenance. Moore’s 
exploration of two ‘styles of theology’ is pertinent here: 
In very crude terms [one approach] attempts to give clear priority to the liberating 
authority of God in Christ; the [other] accepts the influence of Kant’s moral 
philosophy, suspects that a theology of a self-revealing God promotes heteronomy, and 
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so places humanity and its experiences as the focus of theological reflection. [Moore 
then goes on to argue that] …theological realism sits uneasily between the two. It 
appeals to authoritative traditions of realism in the Christian past as a reason for 
defending realism in the present and uses authority figures to articulate the defence, yet 
it is the authoritative experience of these figures, rather than the intrinsic authority of a 
self-revealing God, to which appeal is made.
476
  
Both Forsyth and MacKinnon seem to travel close to the realism so described, at least in 
terms of their desire to avoid reductionism and heteronomy. The priority given to soteriology 
does suggest an emphasis on ‘authoritative experience’, for instance. Yet MacKinnon’s 
insistence that the language of inter-subjectivity and morality can only go so far to explicate 
the incarnation and inter-trinitarian relations before notions such as ‘substance’ need to be 
employed, suggests to me an unwillingness to part with the ‘intrinsic authority of a self-
revealing God’, and a move that distinguishes him from Forsyth. He is very much a defender 
of the language of creedal orthodoxy.
477
   
By way of introducing this move in MacKinnon’s thought, it is necessary to raise a question 
that has so far been brushed over. This relates to the way he understands the move from a 
focus on the intense particularity of atonement in and through the passion of Jesus and 
additional claims about its universal significance. That is, how does MacKinnon understand 
the particular reconciliation effected within Jesus’ biography as coming to enact a universal 
reconciliation in a way claimed by orthodox Christianity? This is the time in which the 
theologian must come to a view regarding the relationship between the man Jesus and the 
eternal Son, the economic and immanent Trinity.
478
 But such a mode of discourse does not 
arise from the fact of the brutal death of a 1
st
 century Jew with a messianic claim alone. 
Neither does it arise from the fact that such a murder was followed by resurrection. It arises, 
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rather from the whole inseparable complex of both of these, together with a realisation that in 
them creation is being addressed by God in an act of reconciliation.    
For MacKinnon, the resurrection did not constitute a stand-alone proof of Jesus’ incarnate 
status in and of itself, as if it the revelatory ‘fact’ could be secured by the miraculous.
479
 The 
resurrection only raises the question of Jesus’ divine status in as far as it was already raised in 
conjunction with the atoning gift apprehended within his proclamation of the Kingdom and 
his death. Without the resurrection, the question of the possibility of Jesus’ unique 
relationship with God would have certainly dissolved into meaninglessness, overwhelmed by 
tragic defeat. Yet with the empty tomb came a renewal of the questions that his life had 
begun to provoke. Indeed, with the resurrection they reach a new level of criticality, in as far 
as Jesus’ raised existence effects reconciliation between irreconcilables and retrospectively 
reveals the cross to have been an integral part of this reconciliation. 
MacKinnon was fond of quoting Scott Holland’s well-known line that ‘when he rose, his life 
rose with him’, which could be taken in two senses.
480
 The first emphasises the particularity 
of the resurrection as an affirmation of Jesus’ historic ministry and a movement beyond tragic 
downfall.
481
 Secondly, it refers to the whole of Jesus’ life being revealed as containing 
universal significance. MacKinnon argues that ‘…we see Christ incarnate through his 
resurrection: and this is because in his glory his work is consummated and made 
perpetual’.
482
 It comes as no surprise that MacKinnon refuses to let talk of reconciliation 
banish that of tragedy, or the ‘universal’ override that of ‘particular’.
483
 Indeed, ‘[i]t is 
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paradoxical but true to say that it is only through Easter that we understand Good Friday, and 
only through Good Friday that the burden of Easter is made plain’.
484
  
For all of MacKinnon’s emphasis on the ‘historical particular’, however, the empiricist 
temperament is comparatively muted when it comes to the resurrection.
485
 In 1962 
MacKinnon endorsed Barth’s statement that ‘[t]he Resurrection is the non-historical relating 
of the whole historical life of Jesus to its origin in God’, and he does this while defending 
Barth’s commitment to the ‘historical Jesus’ contra Bultmann.
486
 Questions remain as to 
whether MacKinnon is entirely consistent, or whether he sees the respective cases of the 
cross and resurrection as demanding very different associations between empirical history 
and the imagination. If the only historical fact we can conceivably access is the empty tomb, 
and all theological imagination must be grounded and disciplined by such facts (as 
MacKinnon insists), it does leave open the question of the level of ‘realism’ MacKinnon is 
willing to ascribe to the resurrection.
487
        
4. Transition from Atonement Theology to Trinitarian Ontology 
 
It could be said that the resurrection opens the way to seeing in Jesus a man uniquely ‘open’ 
to the life, power and presence of God, and in so doing sets before us, according to 
MacKinnon, the ‘ontological riddle’ of his person.
488
 He would not have put it in these terms, 
however, as speaking of the unique ‘openness’ of Jesus to the Father is one of a number of 
christological idioms cited by MacKinnon as emerging from a felt need to substitute the 
homoousion with more palatable (read less overtly metaphysical) forms.
489
 For MacKinnon 
any such talk poses the question of ontology rather than replaces it. As is clear from 
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comments above, he was always uncomfortable when metaphysics was banished from 
explicit theological formulations. Indeed, he remained convinced that it would continue 
implicitly, at least when realist notions of God were being maintained. In this vein, Connor 
observes that the dynamic of cross-resurrection presented MacKinnon with a task, which was 
to set this  
…dynamic polarity in its proper relation to the dynamic ontological context of the 
movement of God to humanity and of humanity to God, that is, in the context 
determined by the interplay of the ‘inhumanization’ of the divine and the 
‘eternalization’ of the human.
490
  
MacKinnon would concede that there is a kind of epistemological circularity in all this, 
which goes hand-in-hand with any theology that holds to the scandal of revelatory 
particularity, yet it is a circularity that he wants to explicate and make credible in as far as 
such a project is possible given the apophatic reserve to which he is committed. For 
MacKinnon, any revelatory epistemology must be developed with reference to at least three 
domains: the person of Jesus and his sojourn from Galilee to Jerusalem and a back again, the 
theological interpretation of these facts, and an engagement with the spiritual life and 
suffering in which a ‘refraction of [the] mystery’ of the Cross is apprehended. For 
MacKinnon, all three are dimensions are interlinked, coming under the ‘…sign of kenosis’. 
He adds that ‘the final note is of a radical self-abandonment.’
491
 In this instance we see what 
might be called MacKinnon’s Kierkegaardian and Barthian side to the fore, in which there is 
no apprehension of God without transformative and costly personal participation; something 
which resonates with the therapeutic emphasis outlined in Chapter 1.
492
 Knowledge of a 
‘kenotic God’ revealed in Jesus requires an analogous kenosis on the part of the one who 
seeks theological illumination. In this way, the ‘object’ of knowledge determines how it is 
one may come to know it (i.e. through mimesis and participation) and this further translates 
into MacKinnon’s insistence that it is not just in the realm of epistemology where kenosis 
plays a role, but also on the level of ontology. Indeed, for MacKinnon,  
…it is clear that if the notion of Kenosis is to have a central place in Christology, that 
will only be achieved when it is seen as demanding that we extrapolate such concepts 
as limitation, vulnerability and their like into the framing of our doctrine of God.
493
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In the concept of kenosis MacKinnon finds the potential, not only for our participation in the 
event of revelation, but also for the development of an ontology that might fittingly describe 
the identity of Jesus with God.
494
 The logic seems to be that a) if the life of Jesus is 
characterised by a form of self-emptying that is not ultimately self-annihilating but 
continuous with the fullness of resurrected / eternal life and b) that Jesus is the revelation of 
God in history and identified with God in an ontologically significant way, then this pattern 
forms a reliable ‘analogy of attribution’ to God’s eternal Trinitarian character.
495
 Both the life 
of Jesus and the inner life of God can be understood by means of a common kenotic ontology 
that is shared between them. According to MacKinnon, 
Kenosis is the place where the nature of God’s love is seen… and it the locus where we 
might find some reconciliation between ‘those who insist on divine impassibility as 
necessarily involved in God’s transcendence, and those who, like the late Geoffrey 




Affirming the possibilities of kenosis as a productive notion for the holding together of long-
running Christological tensions, placed MacKinnon in tension with contemporaries such as 
Don Cupitt, Brian Davies and D.M. Baillie. Yet, Surin makes the point that participants in the 
debate were not always adequately aware of the different meanings that were being attached 
to the term. For instance, he argues that MacKinnon may avoid some of the charge of 
incoherence pertaining to other kenotic theologies in as far as they may understand kenosis to 
involve a divestment of divine attributes, rather than an act within God that enabled one, by 
means of a sophisticated notion of analogy, to claim that Jesus’ historic kenosis was an 
expression of and participation in God’s eternal nature.
497
 In seeming to hold to the latter 
view, MacKinnon shows forth the influence of figures such as Forsyth on the nature of 
kenosis and its ability express the continuity between the economic and immanent Trinity. 
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Yet, to draw on an idiom MacKinnon uses elsewhere there are various ‘moves in a game’ 
occurring here, and one must not mistake a single move for the whole game. Developing a 
prolegomena to Christology, he wrote: 
If…we allow the mystery of the Incarnation to shed its light upon the formal order of 
relations of creature to creator, and creator to creature, and if we give to that mystery 
the authority it claims, we must reverse any understanding of divine transcendence that 
sees transcendence as only safeguarded by refusal to admit any sort of self-limitation 
into the divine, any sort of self-committal in creation that would allow a genuine, if 
asymmetrical, reciprocity in relations of creation and creator. Of course God must (and 
the must is of logical necessity) remain invulnerable. One might say that his aseity can 
be mythologized in terms of an ultimate invulnerability.
498
 
Linking the Immanent and Economic Trinity via a language of kenosis gives rise to a tension 
which the paired language of ‘self-limitation’ and ‘invulnerability’ identifies. As kenotic 
language contributes to this tension, MacKinnon doubts that it can –on its own –adequately 
capture the unity of divine and  human, economic and immanent which occurred in the 
incarnation. In this he departs from Forsyth, who claimed that conceiving Jesus’ 
identification with God in the kenotic terms meant that one could achieve a credible notion of 
the unity of Christ’s personhood via a moral notion (kenosis) without recourse to traditional 
metaphysics:  
The ethical notion of the true unity as the interpenetration of persons by moral action 
must take the place of the old metaphysics of the union of natures by a tour de force. 
Unity of being need not be denied, but it will be approached and construed on those 
ethical lines which alone consist with personal relation and explain it.
499
  
Such an approach is labelled ‘functionalism’ by MacKinnon, who took a view closer to that 
of Oliver Chase Quick, which more or less insisted that a connection or identification of these 
two movements could not be substantiated without reference to a notion like ‘substance’ or 
something equivalent.
500
 That is, MacKinnon did not see personal and moral categories, 
including that of kenosis, as sufficient to articulate a credible integration of the divine and 
human personhood of Jesus.
501
 He pleads for patience as he seeks to explicate the necessity of 
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maintaining a term like ‘substance’ in twentieth century christology. The aim was not to 




…I say metaphysical tradition: for it is important to see the doctrine of substance less 
as a precisely formulable dogma than as the name of a series of explorations whose 
very nature oscillates as they develop.
503
 
The nature of this oscillation is one that gives attention to both the  
aspects of the world that are at once totally familiar and everyday, and at the same time 
highly elusive and even mysterious in the paradoxical character that they immediately 
disclose to more minute inspection.
504
 
At risk of gross over-simplification, one can observe that for Aristotle of the Categories and 
the Metaphysics, an intense focus on the concrete particular gives rise to, and cannot find 
completion without, notions such as substance, quality and accident.
505
 Indeed, MacKinnon 
seems to think that a strongly analogous dynamic to that which one finds in Aristotle is also 
at work when one focuses on the gospel writer’s reflections on the particularity of Jesus’ life 
and death.
506
 ‘Realism’ in both cases leads to modes of speech that transcend the raw sensory 
apprehension of objects, yet never fly free of this apprehension. In taking this path, however, 
he was careful to imbibe Luther’s warning that ‘[h]e who wishes to philosophize by using 
Aristotle without danger to his soul must first become thoroughly foolish in Christ’.
507
 
Additionally, it is clear that MacKinnon’s reading of Kant, Whitehead, Collingwood and 
Quine shaped his reception of the term:     
Whitehead, whom Collingwood greatly admired, remarked that in the history of 
metaphysics the modern period was marked by successive attempts to find a substitute 
for substance, the pivotal notion of the classical Aristotelian ontology. Reference was 
made above to Edward Caird’s suggestive comment that with Kant and Hegel subject 
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had usurped this role. Certainly in Kant substance emerges as one of three categories of 
relation (along with causality and reciprocity), whereby the subject is enabled to 
establish the kind of permanent background necessary for the apprehension of objective 
change. It was an indispensable condition of the possibility of objective awareness; but 
it is established as valid only as such. In other words, its significance lies in the context 
of the subject’s active experience.
508
  
According to MacKinnon, the person of Christ confronted the primitive church, as indeed he 
confronted its twentieth-century successors, with questions which call for notions that attempt 
to encapsulate the ‘…indispensable conditions of the possibility of objective awareness’. This 
is because there is in these notions ‘…the peculiar ultimacy and the peculiar 
pervasiveness…and because…the person of Christ thrusts upon our attention the question 
how one identifiable historical individual shall be at once e.g. ‘one thing’ with the Father and 
yet subordinate to that Father in that the Father is greater than he’.
509
 The ‘return of 
substance’ is not a simplistic denial of Kant’s Copernican revolution; ‘substance’ is not a 
metaphysical object, but a way of speaking about the conditions that made incarnation and 
atonement possible, namely the union of the Father and Son.
510
 Part of MacKinnon’s move 
here is a critique of what he perceived as a post-Cartesian trend:   
One finds in certain recent and indeed contemporary theological writing explicit 
reference to arguments contained in modern works both of speculative metaphysics and 
of analytical philosophy that the notion of event is more fundamental than that of 
substance, that in fact things in the sense in which living bodies, certain artefacts, 
human individuals…are to be regarded as ‘logical constructions’ out of events, the last 
being identified with momentary or short-lived occurrences…what we would in 




What MacKinnon goes on to suggest, however crudely at this point, is that the relationship of 
the notion of a ‘thing’ (a term which MacKinnon uses in close proximity to language of 
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‘substance’) to that of ‘event’ is not best understood as one in which the former emerges out 
of the latter, even if it is only in apprehension of the event that the question of substance is 
first raised.
512
 Indeed, once the whole context of an event is considered, particularly the 
actors involved and their particular place in history, MacKinnon comes to the suggestion that 
the notion of event is actually parasitic on that of ‘thing’.
513
 Emerging here is what Williams 
labels as MacKinnon’s ‘negative metaphysics’, and just as recourse to analogy becomes 
important for negative theology, so it becomes important here. This is evident when 
MacKinnon notes that 
…[a] metaphysical truth of the kind we are now speaking of does agree with 
mathematical truth in claiming universality and necessity. Like them it relates to what 
must be the case, but to what must be the case in a way significantly different from that 
in which we say of mathematical truths that they must be as they are.  Among 
candidates for the class of such truths we may include the thesis that all that happens 
belongs to a single time order, that nothing happens without falling along some causal 
line in terms of which it is explicable, that there are relatively permanent things to 
which events happen, and that truth itself consists fundamentally in the correspondence 
of a proposition and a fact.
514
  
Kenosis and ‘substance’ are strongly related for MacKinnon; a sign of a broader conviction 
that moral discourse cannot do without metaphysical reference. Rather than acting as a stand-
in for metaphysics, an intense focus in the realm of kenotic morality will produce the need for 
a language that tries to honour some of impulses that led theologians of old to invoke such 
metaphysical terms.
515
 What emerges is the tentative renewal of ‘substance’ with MacKinnon 
introducing this notion with the life of Jesus as a continuous reference point. In this way 
‘habitual routes’ of invoking ‘substance’ will not provide exact guidance as to how 
MacKinnon intends its use. Most important is a clear admission that in the past its use had 
resulted in the proliferation of the illusion that we were being ‘enabled to reach something 
more ultimate in the economy of divine self-disclosure and self-impartation than the person 
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of Jesus Christ crucified and risen’.
516
 This becomes clear when MacKinnon refers to Jesus’ 
Gethsemane anguish and speaks of:  
[Jesus’] relation to the Father, the Sonship that is his eternal substance, is now found 
transcribed into a murky, human obscurity. And through this transcription, the divine 
puts itself at the mercy of the human as if only so could the limitations of human 
existence (finitude infected by sin) be converted into an instrument of confession: as if 
there were depths of the human condition that only the divine could penetrate…It is 
creation and the work of the creator that must be reinterpreted through this experience 
of the cost and way of redemption”.
517
   
Criticisms have been made of MacKinnon’s invocation of ‘substance’.  Surin draws on 
Lindbeck to question the whole endeavour, for example. What emerges is a case against 
absolutizing a time-bound philosophical import to theology, when more contemporary 
language may be found articulate key Christological convictions with greater effectiveness.
518
 
What is being missed is the nuance MacKinnon applies to any invocation of ‘substance’ and 
also the fact that he saw it as providing the means to express a realist commitment; something 
that did not concern Lindbeck in the same way.
519
 
5. Excursus: Alter Christus? MacKinnon on Lenin     
 
Whether it be his 1953 essay in Christian Faith and Communist Faith or his 1978 postscript 
to an earlier essay Lenin and Theology, MacKinnon viewed serious engagement with 
Marxism and Leninism as a prerequisite for any Christian theology that was going to avoid a 
negative ‘culture gap’ at that point in time in the British intellectual landscape.
520
 He also 
perceived that, even in their antagonism toward Christianity, a dialogue could unearth 
resources that would help the theologian withstand the pressure to turn the claims of faith into 
subjectivist enterprise.
521
 Such an enterprise treats ‘…Christian believing…as if it could be 
scrutinized in virtually complete aversion from what is believed’, which for MacKinnon is 
tantamount to de-historicization of Christianity and the point at which theology should be 
                                                          
516
  Ibid., 247-49. 
517
 "Reflections on Donald Baillie's Treatment of the Atonement," 117. 
518
 Surin, "Some aspects of the 'grammar' of 'incarnation' and 'kenosis': reflections prompted by the 
writings of Donald MacKinnon," 102. 
519
 For a critique of Lindbeck which I suspect would gain a sympathetic hearing from MacKinnon, see 
Moore, Realism, 92-107. 
520
 D. M. MacKinnon, Christian Faith and Communist Faith: A Series of Studies by Members of the 
Anglican Communion (London: Macmillan, 1953), 229-41. Also see MacKinnon, ET, 25.  
521





 As part of this engagement with the philosophy of the Left, MacKinnon 
displayed an abiding fascination with Lenin as a historical figure and the 1917 October 
Revolution and because this seeps into his Christological writings at some prominent 
moments, there is a need to give some account of it here.
523
  
At times, MacKinnon showered Lenin with hyperbolic epithets:  
Lenin’s revolutionary genius was his extraordinary capacity for combining an 
unflinching and unyielding commitment to a particular doctrine of the concrete, 
historical actualities of human society….with a sense of possibilities that could be 
exploited in ways that might be thought to defy every rational prediction grounded on 
his fundamental analysis, provided the cadres were there trained to seize these 
possibilities and exploit them to the full.
524
  
In an essay from 1970 Lenin is labelled ‘the greatest atheist of the twentieth century’ and the 
‘greatest revolutionary of the twentieth century’.
525
 More startlingly, MacKinnon spoke of 
Lenin in quasi messianic terms. This raises the question as to whether MacKinnon fell for 
some of the claims of the propagandistic cult of personality surrounding Lenin in a way that 
suggests a lapse in judgement, and further still, a lapse in his own efforts to avoid a kind of 
historical idealism and what he saw as a lack of ‘moral seriousness’ which often plagued this 
philosophical school.   
The first point to note is that MacKinnon engaged with Lenin in a specific context. An 
environment in which debates were raging over avant-garde declarations of Christian 
‘atheism’ and secularism, revolutionary politics were in vogue on British university 
campuses, and Marxism still counted as a serious political influence for some within the 
mainstream of academia and politics. In this vein, MacKinnon’s focus was not to encourage 
fellow theologians to seek a facile ‘relevance’ rather he discerned the presence of resources 
for a constructive re-articulation of the tradition:     
…where many Christians’ understanding of their own faith is concerned, it may be that 
it is through serious engagement with the claims of Marxist-Leninism, that those 
vocationally committed to the progress of theology will find their way to a re-creation 
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of the doctrine of Christ’s person and work, and of the doctrine of God as Trinity in 
Unity, that is bound up with it, which neither seeks to ignore the reality of the very 
difficult intellectual problems that these conceptions raise, nor to admit them only to 
pretend that a greater theological wisdom would never have allowed the doctrinal 
development with which they seem inextricably bound up.
526
 
What MacKinnon expected from any prolonged reflection on the life and times of Lenin was 
not edification, but something between purgation and illumination.
527
 He acknowledged the 
perspective of an ‘…intellectually sophisticated defender of the Leninist enterprise’ and their 
insistence  
…that in so far as only through such industrialization can human living standards be 
raised, human opportunities of life and experience enlarged, provided that the work is 
set in hand self-consciously it must be regarded as the way humanity must take if it is 
to assume control of its own destiny.
528
  
‘Shocking’ and ‘horrifying’ are adjectives used to describe the costs of such a transition and a 
clear line is drawn from the Bolshevik regime to Stalin’s ‘unspeakable’ outrages against the 
humane.
529
 There is no fawning admiration here, just a degree of political realism and 
perhaps tragic fatalism in the observation that there is no way societies have managed to 
transition from agrarian feudalism to industrial modernity without amassing huge costs along 
the way. Here, MacKinnon spoke of Lenin’s  
…sombre genius to incorporate into the Marxist scheme of historical development the 
Narodnik conception of an elitist revolutionary organisation, whose members were 
schooled by an intense personal discipline, collectively imposed, to serve the cause of 
social transformation by any or every means.
530
 
He also notes in Lenin  
a radicalism at once free of scruple of any sort, yet instinct with a sort of ruthless 




Rather than make an absolute moral judgement, one can detect in MacKinnon’s work a 
grudging admiration for those visionaries who contemplated the cost of modernity and were 
willing to push ahead in spite of it, East and West alike. Perhaps it is a kind of admiration that 
Raphael saw at work in the appeal of classical tragedy, where the hero struggles against but is 
ultimately defeated by a much stronger determining agency, and ultimately it is some aspect 
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MacKinnon expressed a conviction that as a system marked by an acute historical 
consciousness, Christianity could not avoid serious engagement with one of the most striking 
epoch-shifting figures of the age. Indeed, Lenin posed a particular challenge to the 
theologian. In his worldview and approach to ethics the theologian had no place ‘at the table’. 
In State and Revolution, Lenin purportedly argued that Marxism ‘…contains no shred of 
ethics from beginning to end’ yet speaks of ‘…the simple and fundamental rules of every-day 
social life’.
533
 Furthermore, the sort of atheism espoused was not part of some dialectical 
process on the way to faith; it was not the sort of ‘atheism-lite’ that some of the fashionable 
Christian non-realists were espousing to MacKinnon’s abiding suspicion.
534
 It was a total 
claim; an intense and thoroughgoing materialism and this what made it interesting from 
MacKinnon’s vantage point. What the theologian faces is the ‘…conscious, deliberate and 
deeply convinced rejection of the reality of God as a prius of informed debate and action 
concerning the fundamentals of human life and society’.
535
  
There were a number of features of Lenin’s life and thought that fascinated MacKinnon, but 
at the forefront was the way issues of causation, freedom and morality came to the fore. 
MacKinnon observed that  
…Marxism is in a very special sense a form of historical determinism: in a very special 
sense, for the dialectical quality of historical materialism transforms the simplicity of 
the concept of historical causality with which it operates. [MacKinnon notes that within 
this view of history are figures such as] Lenin, who in himself existentially (to use a 
fashionable adverb) reconciled the claims of determinism and freedom.
536
 
In his political life Lenin did what Kant attempted to do with his philosophical system, and 
indeed, he showed forth a particular quality that Kant saw in the figure of Jesus. Here we can 
find the basis for the rather controversial analogy that MacKinnon made between Jesus and 
Lenin. Specifically, some lives are judged as raising questions for the philosopher because of 
                                                          
532
 D. D. Raphael, The Paradox of Tragedy, The Mahlon Powell lectures (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1960), 13-36. 
533
 Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of Marxism, Second edition. ed. (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1972), 3.  
534
 According to MacKinnon, ‘…to submit to interrogation by exponents of a most rigorous 
atheism…is to say farewell to the more leisurely and gentlemanly styles of apologetic, whose end, 
Whitehead once said, might be described as ‘seeking to furnish us with new reasons for continuing to 
go to church in the old way.’ MacKinnon, ET, 25. 
535
 Ibid., 12. 
536
 Ibid., 15. 
128 
 
the particular contradictions and paradoxes they hold together, as well as the degree to which 
their choices interact with events beyond their control to usher significant historical upheaval 
and cultural redefinition. According to MacKinnon, these are lives that raise the question of 
the ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ within history.
537
 Indeed, the extent to which Lenin’s life had a 
distinctive ontological ‘weight’ or posed a question analogous to that of Christ’s life, is the 
same extent to which they embodied the problem of freedom and determinism.
538
 On Lenin, 
MacKinnon noted that ‘[h]e was a rigorous objectivist, convinced that there were laws of 
historical development. Yet he was also supremely executant as well as architect of most 
drastic historical change’.
539
 Freedom and determinism are co-located, but so too is theory 
and practice which achieve a new unity …‘in his biography’; indeed, ‘…the scope of Marxist 
theory is enhanced by his actual achievement.’
540
  
At this point some question-begging parallels emerge between MacKinnon’s analysis of 
Lenin’s significance and christology. For instance, MacKinnon spoke of ‘apologists’ who 
look upon the violence and upheaval unleashed in the wake of the October Revolution and 
argue that  
…tragedy is of the very substance of human history, and that at least such a man as 
Lenin showed himself willing not to suffer blindly as the play-thing of an inevitable 
destiny, but rather to pay the price, if necessary, of the guilt incurred, that seemed 
demanded, if humankind, and in the first instance the war-weary people of 
Russia…were to be brought some way towards the promised land.
541
  
The theological overtones are explicit, and there is a definite allusion to Christ who 
‘journeyed to a far off country’, necessarily following the path set out for him in suffering 
obedience, but doing so by an act of free choice. MacKinnon took the analogy even further, 
speaking of the ‘incarnational’ nature of Marxist-Leninism and the way in which it provided 
an, admittedly tentative, parabolic insight into the nature of Christology. Thus, while 
acknowledging the ‘dark side’ of Lenin’s resolute revolutionary dedication, MacKinnon 
argued that he  
…presents the student of his life with a classical realization of the unity of theory and 
practice, a realization whose fruits abide in the present. In his life and work the Marxist 
idea of social transformation became terrifyingly incarnate, and we live in the shadow 
of the impact of that incarnation; for the weight of that incarnation lies abundantly over 
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the world of the bitter Sino-Soviet dispute. Dare we find here a parable of the 
fundamental Christian reality, the incarnation of the Word of God; the kenosis of the 
eternal Son? Certainly for myself I find in the study of Lenin’s concrete definition of 
the revolutionary idea, in his achievement, the source of a continual impulse to engage 
anew with the doctrine of the Incarnation.
542
 
Re-apprehending christology via historical figures such as Lenin may seem to be an eccentric 
and controversial move from the vantage point of 21
st
 century Britain, but it gives a rather 
stark insight into the way analogical imagination and historical criticism coalesce in 
MacKinnon’s thought, as well as highlighting again his tendency to break ranks with any 
form of reductionist empirical historicism. One may think that MacKinnon risked failing at 
his own criteria of ‘moral seriousness’ in presuming to make such an analogy, yet his 
sympathetic reading of Merleau-Ponty’s Humanism and Terror shows him to be 
conscientised to the horrors suffered by many Soviet citizens.
543
 His point is never to see 
Lenin as being a ‘second Christ’ in the same way as some over-zealous devotees saw St. 
Francis. Furthermore, given his emphasis on the tragic, nor is it to indulge in what Ramsey 
labelled as Illingworth’s ‘naïve optimism’ when the latter claimed that ‘…secular civilisation 
is…in the Christian view, nothing less than the providential correlative and counterpart of the 
incarnation.’
544
 Darwell Stone criticised Charles Gore in 1890 because he felt that the writers 
Gore had assembled to compile Lux Mundi, ‘…treated revelation as differing only in degree 
from the natural man’s knowledge of God and blurred the line between the distinctive 
inspiration of Scripture and the phenomenon of genius in the human race’. I wonder whether 
MacKinnon is vulnerable to this charge, and also, whether he would dismiss it as a philistine 
inability to engage the analogical imagination.
545
 
In the next chapter I will show that MacKinnon did attempt to break down a sacred divide 
between the text of scripture and texts of the wider literary canon; a move that shares the 
same originating impulse as the discussion of Lenin in relation to Christology. In his 
references to Lenin, MacKinnon pointed to a historical persona that renders Christian talk of 
the incarnation as not entirely foreign to the modern, secular sensibility after all. What 
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becomes apparent here is the presence of elements in MacKinnon’s thought that run 
alongside the empiricist emphasis on the ‘particular’ and moderate the rejection of idealism 
so prominent throughout his oeuvre. There is a narrative dimension to history; the 
identification of certain structures, recurrent questions and the linking of particular events 
through analogy in a way that proves illuminative for both. Again, the ‘scissors and paste’ 
approach to history is rejected and the empiricism of the poets must be embraced.    
Do MacKinnon’s reflections on Lenin and christology represent a genuinely creative 
theological enterprise, expressing a courageous vulnerability to key conversation partners 
in the wider historical milieu, or do they suggest an eccentric obsession that undermines 
aspects of MacKinnon’s christology as it is developed elsewhere? The answer is probably 
affirmative on both counts. In any case, it is almost certain that such explorations have left 
MacKinnon particularly vulnerable to the critiques by Hart and Milbank in as far as they 
harbour deep reservations about MacKinnon’s use of the tragic motif.
546
 For, in what I 
have described above, it seems that the analogical invocation of ‘incarnation’ is one 
grounded in a shared participation in the tragic dimension of history as freedom and 
determinism clash. Indeed, just as MacKinnon sought to purge evasions of the historical 
particular in others, so these figures are concerned that the same might be said of 
MacKinnon’s invocation of the tragic as a kind of structural component to history or an 
irreducible presence in Trinitarian ontology.
547
 In light of this, Hart makes explicit what 
remains implicit in MacKinnon’s project: that is, the way in which the resurrection 
completely shatters any analogy between Christ and Lenin. He argues that  
…Easter unveils the violence of history, its absolute ungodliness, its want of any 
transcendent meaning; the meaninglessness and tyranny of death is made absolutely 
clear in the Father having to raise the Son for the sake of his love. It is just here that the 
Christian narrative is seen to depart from the tragic narrative not on account of the 
latter’s “nihilism”, but on account of its comforting “optimism”. The solemnity and 
self-importance of Attic tragedy –its magnificent bathos, the protagonist’s striving after 
the sublime –touches upon a very real kind of pain, a suffering that comes in the wake 
of shattered expectations or hopes, a sense of rage before the indifference of fate or the 
inexorability of divine “justice” or malice, and a final resignation before the unalterable 
structures of the universe. But the doctrine of the resurrection opens up another, still 
deeper kind of pain: it requires of faith something even more terrible than submission 
before the violence of being and acceptance of fate, and forbids faith the consolations 
of tragic wisdom; it places all hope and all consolation upon the insane expectation that 
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what is lost will be given back, not as a heroic wisdom (death has been robbed of its 
tragic beauty) but as the gift it always was.
548
   
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I sought to examine the ways in which the therapeutic methodology identified 
in Chapter One and the key influences on MacKinnon’s intellectual formation explored in 
Chapter Two, are shown in his Christological writings. What emerged was a clear call for a 
focus on the historical particular as an outworking of a deeper commitment to realism. This 
was coupled with a nuanced conviction pertaining to the way in which exercises of 
imaginative construction can potentially enhance rather than detract from this realism. 
Applying these therapeutic tools to christology meant a relentless submission of all 
theologising to the reality of Christ’s historic existence and its irreducibly moral dimension, 
just as it meant exposure to contemporary historical realities in order to apprehend the 
meaning of this existence afresh. While this approach helped MacKinnon to avoid some of 
the excesses of mid-century non-realist theology on one hand, it also resulted in rather 
eccentric forays into christological analogy on the other. In the case of his references to 
Lenin, the therapy sought was potentially worse than the disease, although it may be easy 
from a contemporary British vantage point to react negatively to the mere invocation of Lenin 
without attending to the limited scope of the analogy intended. In the next chapter, I will 
explore the way in which MacKinnon saw literature as a therapeutic resource toward moral 
realism in ways that parallel and deepen many of the themes raised above.      
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Chapter 4: MacKinnon and the Literary Imagination  
 
1. Introduction  
 
MacKinnon once observed that 
[i]t has been very often (though not exclusively) in the medium of imaginative literature 
that the questions which refuse to be answered in terms of a facile teleology have 
persistently intruded themselves.
549
    
This chapter will focus on MacKinnon’s use of literature as a therapeutic resource in a way 
that serves his primary loyalty to moral realism. MacKinnon’s literary interests stem from his 
early realisation that Kant’s moral formalism needed to be supplemented by means of 
descriptions which brought out the irreducible complexity of particular human lives.
550
 As 
has become clear from previous chapters, this was a concern that MacKinnon had not only in 
relation to the Kantian legacy alone but also positivist utilitarianism and deductive Christian 
natural law approaches, or any style of ethical reflection that approached its task by 
establishing universal principles or overarching theories of moral obligation which were then 
to be applied casuistically.
551
 In each case the universal principle comes into relentless 
questioning under the exposure of the ‘particular’ and this pressure inevitably causes moral 
theories to collapse under the weight of their own qualifications and contradictions. The 
moral discourse struggles to escape the realm of hypothetical abstractions and the temptation 
is always to generalise and simplify concrete moral dilemmas so as to make them 
descriptively accessible, even ‘solvable’. For MacKinnon, certain kinds of literature can play 
a therapeutic role in animating and complementing a kind of historical realism that avoids 
this temptation. To the degree to which literature can help us perceive moral conflict inherent 
in historical events, it also becomes a site where the ‘problem of metaphysics’ arises.  
2. A Moral Realist Reads Literature  
 
MacKinnon acknowledged no foundational metaphysical bedrock that would secure moral 
realism, or provide it with unassailable positive content. In an agnostic tone he continually 
associated invocation of a metaphysical register with the persistence of a certain kind of 
questioning, rather than any solid answers from which we can secure subsequent concepts 
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  In this vein, MacKinnon spoke of the intersection of general and special 
metaphysics or, perhaps translated analogously to the ethical sphere, the universal moral 
imperative(s) and the demands of a concrete historical situation as discerned by a particular, 
fallible human being or a community. He argued that 
[i]f there is a metaphysica perennis, it is found more in the strange immunity to the 
acids of criticism of a programme rather than in a positive body of achievement. Where 
there is achievement it resides more in the deepened awareness of what such a 
programme involves, and of understanding of the conceptual tools we need for its 
advancement – and here of course I refer to the interplay of metaphysica generalis with 
metaphysica specialis: an interplay that we are immediately aware of in the classical 
authorities, Aristotle and Kant. Over against this we have to reckon with the Hegelian 
incorporation into the body of speculative philosophy of the cry for redemption. It is 




For MacKinnon, literature does have usefulness: it captures a ‘cry’. Literature is an avenue 
for the most pertinent expressions of the question that traditional theodicy has sought to 
answer and, compared with many of these efforts by theologians and philosophers, it has 
provided a more truthful response. It can present us with situations in which agents are 
confronted by moral demands and a means by which we might be rehabilitated from the kind 
of self-deception which clouds our moral perception and dulls the will to act. In this vein, 
when works such as Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar present extreme situations of political 
upheaval, excruciating moral compromise and tragic self-deception, they enable 
…us to see what it is that may confront us. In its action we are enabled, in fact, 
imaginatively to understand the actuality of human action; we are prevented from 
treating it as something which we can look at from a distance, as if the stuff of 
individual life were not often at stake in its accomplishment. To write in these terms is 
not to allow a kind of existential self-indulgence to inhibit action; rather it is to protect 
ourselves against the sort of self-deception to which, in our action, we may find 
ourselves exposed, and indeed from which we may suddenly seek to escape by turning 
aside from what we must do, by passing by on the other side lest, by our intervention, 




MacKinnon spoke about literature in which he identified a relentless pull toward a kind of 
moral realism and, in some cases, schooling in the prevention of the kind of self-deception 
that he associated with an ever-present tragic possibility. The tone here is sceptical, 
confessional and therapeutic: we do not know ourselves nearly as well as we might like to 
                                                          
552
 MacKinnon, ET, 106-12. This has clear parallels with Janz’s understanding of the sort of 
metaphysics that Kant’s seeks to articulate after the transcendental illusion has been confronted.   
553
 Ibid., 104. 
554
 Ibid., 186. 
134 
 
think and we are perennially tempted to shift our gaze from the complex and morally 
ambiguous particular.  
Is MacKinnon’s engagement with literature in this way justified? Is it valid? These questions 
can arise with reference to the literary critic S.L. Goldberg, who criticises philosophers who 
in their approach to literary texts assume  
…that moral philosophy is the centre…the place where truth and reason are to be 
found, and that literature is simply the application of moral ideas and feelings, 
somewhere on the periphery’.
555
   
The alternative Goldberg advocates is a position which holds that  
…literature and literary criticism form a distinctive and irreplaceable way of thinking 
about certain crucial aspects of Socrates’ question [‘how to live?’] –a way which is 
outside the scope of philosophy but complementary to it, which is no less subject to 
requirements of truth and reason, and which makes some kinds of literary judgement 
not just like moral judgements, nor just connected with them, but actual moral 
judgments in their own right’.
556
 
Goldberg makes mention of Bernard Williams, a contemporary of MacKinnon, attributing to 
him the view that ‘…all that literature and literary criticism can offer is perhaps no more than 
a kind of phenomenology’; a representation of the ways we experience ethical life that is then 
taken up into philosophical discourse.
557
 Goldberg argues that something far more 
constructive is happening in literature; that literature does its thinking in ‘…the particulars it 
imagines’ and in doing so it can ‘…do something which moral codes and moral philosophy 
cannot’, which is to draw together a notion of the human person as both a voluntary agent 
confronting, exemplifying and responding to moral imperatives, as well as the notion of the 
human person as one ‘…whose particular qualities and trajectory in time are, in quite crucial 
ways, not like others, nor by any means a matter of voluntary actions…’
558
  
I am reasonably confident that MacKinnon’s approach to the relationship between philosophy 
and literature would find a sympathetic hearing from Goldberg, who goes on to critically 
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engage with Nussbaum and MacIntyre in ways that warrant close engagement. That 
MacKinnon sometimes did use a particular literary text as an example of a moral point he 
was making on other grounds and also that he limited his attention to but a few genres of 
literature, may render him vulnerable to Goldberg’s criticism. Yet, taking a broad view of his 
overall project would suggest that for the most part he did far more than mine literature to 
provide superficial garnish to a philosophical point. Indeed, MacKinnon considered certain 
examples of literature as embodying insights that could not have been mediated by means of 
another form. One example becomes clear in White’s analysis of MacKinnon’s approach to 
the parables in which he argues that ‘…for Dodd and Jeremias the realism of the parables is 
put in the service of using human stories to illustrate the divine, whereas in MacKinnon it is 
time and again put in the service of exploring the divine’.
559
 Indeed, Dodd and Jeremias are 
taking what MacKinnon identified as a typical path for philosophers:   
…when the philosopher recalls Freud’s words [‘The poets knew it all already’], he is 
inclined by reason of his professional commitment, to suggest that the poets ‘knew it 
all’ only in the sense of a vague, intuitive perception which must yield place to 
effective articulation in terms of general concepts.’[Here,] ‘…the philosopher in the 
condescension towards the poets marks his reception of Freud’s words, is of course 




By locating MacKinnon as one who did not maintain such a posture of ‘condescension’, we 
should take him at his word when he expressed his own temptation and that of others to 
embark on the ‘…familiar enterprise of seeking to reduce the bewildering to terms other than 
itself’.
561
 For MacKinnon, literature is a much needed companion to philosophy which may 
otherwise lack sufficient tools to apprehend the texture of human experience and historical 
contingency. At the same time any serious examination of the moral dimensions of literature 
will result in forms of inarticulacy as well, which philosophy may help to clarify.
562
 The 
discussion of ‘substance’ in Christology (above) is one such example. MacKinnon’s 
invocation of terms such as ‘realism’ when considering literary texts bears this dynamic out. 
It is a notion that helps him describe the irreducible uniqueness of a character and the 
conflicting imperatives which are seen to press upon them. This is not about one form of 
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discourse failing and looking for completion in the other, but two modes of apprehending the 
moral task which enrich each other through continual interaction and which encapsulate, and 
can help tease apart, irreducible conundrums. In this way MacKinnon is forging a path that 
avoids the fate of literary imagination in the work of figures as various as Plato, Hegel 
Hobbes, Berkeley and Ryle.
563
  
The development of MacKinnon’s conviction that literature is an indispensable ally to the 
sort of therapy with which he was engaged cannot be understood without reference to George 
Steiner, Gabriel Marcel (and other expressions of existentialism) and Collingwood.
564
 He 
never offered a worked-out theological aesthetics or for that matter a hermeneutical theory 
that systematically explored literature’s relationship to philosophy and theology. Yet for all 
that, MacKinnon’s literary interests were not indiscriminate and the type of distinction 
Coleridge made between ‘imagination’ and ‘fancy’ looms large.
565
 The kind of literature 
which he considered salient to the moral theologian included those works that capture the 
complexity of a realistically portrayed scenario in a way that allow the observer to appreciate 
nuances and emotional depths of interpersonal relationships, conflicting allegiances, moral 
dilemmas and individual agency in the face of a broader historical context.
566
 An example of 
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this conviction is found in MacKinnon’s essay Tragedy and Ethics, where he agrees with the 
Labour politician and journalist R.H.S. Crossman that there is no better explication of the 
sorts of dilemmas confronting those involved in the July 1944 conspiracy to kill Hitler than 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar. Following Crossman’s suggestion, MacKinnon interweaves 
descriptions of the historical situation and Shakespeare’s drama together in a way that is seen 
to bestow on the ‘bare’ historical report a greater vividness and deeper attentiveness to the 




In SET, one finds passing references to Albert Camus, Charles Dickens, William Blake, 
Dostoevsky, George Eliot, George Orwell, Wordsworth and Sophocles. Likewise, PM 
contains references to Cézanne’s reflections on art, as well as to Conrad, Dickens, Euclid, 
Goethe, Pericles, Plutarch, and again, Shakespeare and Sophocles. Further to this, 
MacKinnon makes reference to D.H. Lawrence’s ‘…vehement polemics against falsely 
spiritual religiosity in the account of the visit to Lincoln Cathedral in The Rainbow’; a theme 
repeated in The Man who Died.
568
 He speaks of Nostromo as ‘…Joseph Conrad’s great 
political novel…not only one of the greatest novels in the English language, but a major 
contribution to the fundamental anatomy of politics’.
569
 Recalling an emphasis within the 
preceding chapter, Mackinnon speaks of the way in which Conrad’s Under Western Eyes 
‘…has given us a profound study of [the 1917 Revolution’s] ethos…one that penetrates its 
sombre depths.
570
 Elsewhere he speaks of the ‘remarkable modern novel’, William Styron’s 
Lie Down in Darkness in the midst of his technical foray into the theme of the irreversibility 
of time, and refers at some length to T.S. Eliot’s Little Gidding in his essay On the Notion of 
a Philosophy of History.
571
 Additionally, while a professor at Cambridge, MacKinnon 
contributed to a book marking the bicentenary of Coleridge’s birth, displaying an awareness 
of various contemporary controversies surrounding the poet and a willingness to make 
connections with his own philosophical interests.
572
 
Thus, like his onetime mentor A.E. Taylor, MacKinnon showed himself to be more than 
superficially engaged in the reading of ‘serious’ literature, although his actual examination of 
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texts in published works is rarely deeply exegetical. Even so, behind the passing invocations 
there is ample evidence that he engaged in reading serious literary criticism too, including 
Nicholas Brook on King Lear, Phillip Vellacott on Oedipus, Victor Ehrenberg’s monograph 
on Sophocles and Pericles,
573
 Kermode’s essays on literary criticism,
574
 and as noted above, 
Steiner and Marcel.
575
 If we add MacKinnon’s abiding concern with the theological 
interpretation of Christian scripture to this list, there is no exaggeration in the proposition that 
engagement with literary culture is an important structural component to MacKinnon’s 
project.  
When there is a move toward self-reflection on this practice, a word that appears with 
frequency is ‘imagination’. The ‘Evangelical Imagination’ (1986) and ‘Intellect and 
Imagination’ (1991) are two essays in which the cognitive status of the imagination and its 
relationship to historical realism is explored, albeit with MacKinnon’s characteristic brevity 
and open-endedness.
576
 A chief concern is the way in which the notion of the imagination 
might help us escape the ways in which forms of empiricism and idealism have failed in the 
task of adequately accounting for the moral demands of concrete historical situations.  In the 
essay Intellect and Imagination, MacKinnon, in less than 6 pages, attempts the rather titanic 
task of establishing a speculative link between concepts of the imagination in Hume and 
Kant, with the distinctive literary characteristics of St. John’s Gospel.
577
  
What MacKinnon took from Hume’s Treatise is that there are ‘habits of the imagination’ that 
are ‘permanent, irresistible and universal’ as well as those that are ‘changeable, weak and 
irregular’.
578
 The first pertains to the philosophy of causation where imaginative effort is used 
to explicate the relationship between cause and effect or effect and cause; the second is when 
people begin to deploy this practice of inference to establish the influence of spiritual forces 
as explanatory agents. Without the working of the imagination to make the inference, human 
life would become unintelligible. Yet, the capacity to make inferences can also lead us away 
from reality into a self-created world that is a projection of our own ignorance and fears 
rather than any apprehension of the real. MacKinnon sees a healthy ambivalence about the 
imagination in Hume, leading to a stipulation that the only good use of the imagination is 
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‘naturalistic’. This is a point which anticipates aspects of Kant’s use of the notion according 
to MacKinnon: 
For Kant…the imagination was the ‘understanding working blind’, its activity 
associated particularly with the second synthesis in the subjective ‘deduction of the 
categories’ (named ‘synthesis of reproduction through imagination’). Later in the 
structure of the Critique of Pure Reason imagination is treated as the effective agent of 
the schematism of the categories, whereby in fact the forms of understanding are 
transmagnified into the conditions of objective awareness, the pure category of ground 
and consequent, for instance, into that of cause and effect. The latter is vindicated in the 
‘second analogy’ as the assumption that we must bring to the manifold of our 
experience if we are able to consider an objective time-order, wherein before and after 
are not matters of our caprice or situation, but following one another with the 
inevitability of night or day.
579
    
The point to take from this is twofold. First, MacKinnon assented to a stream of argument in 
Hume and Kant holding that there is a faculty related to our apprehension of causality 
identified as the ‘imagination’ which is a crucial enabler of our apprehension of the world. 
Secondly, it is also the case that this faculty must come under the most rigorous scrutiny and 
discipline if it is to support reliable claims to knowledge. MacKinnon noted Kant’s concern 
that the ‘understanding’ risked ‘…the indulgence of sheerly undisciplined extrapolation of its 
resources to achieve no longer the conditions of objective experience, but to delineate in 
ways that would outrun any procedure of confirmation or falsification, the ultimate secrets of 
the universe’.
580
 This is an eventuality which the whole argument of the Critique of Pure 
Reason sets out to prevent. MacKinnon was of the view that Christian theologians might see 
something analogous to what Kant is describing at work in their own system of ‘projection’, 
particularly when it comes to their engagement with the gospels. While acknowledging the 
imaginative stretch that may be required to accept such an analogy, MacKinnon nonetheless 
makes reference to the supper discourses of St. John’s gospel, arguing that 
[t]he very unnoticed richness of perceptual experience with the inter-penetrating 
resources that make it what it is, are wonderfully uncovered by Kant in his quest for the 
conditions of objectivity. We are not in bondage to sense-awareness in the manner 
suggested by the uncritical empiricist, who disdains skills enabling us [to] transcend the 
immediate, and for whose conceptual activity is reduced to a mere Vorstellung-ablauf. 
So in the fourth gospel faith demands a reference point; it does not disdain ostentation 
whether by sight, hearing or touch. Yet that reference point by itself is insignificant, 
even as Kant judged sense without conceptual activity to be blind.
581
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Here, MacKinnon was developing his own trajectory within a tradition that Hedley associates 
with Kant, Coleridge and Collingwood; an ‘anti-empiricist polemic’ in which ‘…[p]erception 
of an object always involves more than sense data: it involves the imagining of properties 
which are not disclosed to the senses, or noticing, i.e. looking at or attending to, what is 
seen.’
582
 When it comes to the disciplining of the imagination in the theological realm, 
MacKinnon seems to draw upon two sources: the historical critical approach to the text and 
the work of the Holy Spirit. In the case of the former, it became clear in the preceding chapter 
that the relationship is not one way; that is, it is not just a matter of empirical historical 
methodology taming the imagination, but an interaction of greater mutuality in which 
imagination enhances historical realism, while a commitment to the empirical draws the 
imagination back from a flight to the unreal.  
After discussing the use of imagination in Milton’s and Luke’s versions of Christ’s 
temptation, MacKinnon raised a nagging question; a question which arose whenever it was 
clear that description of the event and imaginative theological apparatus were inextricably 
wedded: ‘…are we engaged with, that which is somehow factually referential?’.
583
 
MacKinnon’s answer was affirmative: ‘…we need the tools of literary study, above all the 
discipline of close reading, to enable us to reach through the apparent flight from fact to 
fantasy, back towards the coldly factual basis’.
584
 MacKinnon could see the imagination as an 
ally for realism because the notion of ‘cold factuality’ with which he worked was rather more 
expansive than that of many positivists and empiricists, as noted in previous chapters. With 
Marcel, ‘cold factuality’ is not seen as antithetical to notions of transcendence; with Barth, it 
is not antithetical to a Divine act and with Taylor and Sorley, it is not antithetical to moral 
realism. 
In as far as MacKinnon had a pneumatology, it would seem that one of the guises of the Holy 
Spirit is to act as a limit on the imaginative excess; an aspect of Divine agency which 
undermines any ‘…unchecked aspiration that will bend the deliverance of sense to 
confirmation of its own ill-disciplined fantasy’.
585
 The mythological and typological are 
essential, and when limits are placed on the imagination by philosophers, historians and the 
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Holy Spirit what we encounter is not a flight away from factuality but ‘…a standing protest 
against failure to take seriously the sheer concreteness of God’s self-incarnating.’
586
  From 
MacKinnon’s vantage point, any hard and fast distinction between historical fact and the 
interpretation of that fact becomes problematic, especially when ‘imagination’ becomes a 
word applied to the former and ‘hard knowledge’ to the latter. Perhaps we see here a mirror 
of MacKinnon’s refusal of any strict fact / value distinction in the realm of moral theory 
1. On Scripture as Literature 
There is every reason to affirm that MacKinnon held the Old and New Testaments to be 
sacred texts ‘containing all things necessary for salvation’. Yet this did not lead him to posit 
an absolute qualitative distinction between them and other forms of ‘canonical’ literature.  
MacKinnon noted ‘curious similarities’ between the book of Job and Aeschylus’ Prometheus 
Vinctus and saw Milton’s writings on the temptation of Jesus as entirely in-keeping with an 
imaginative trajectory or hermeneutic tradition that is found in St. Luke’s gospel.
587
 On 
Milton he notes that 
[h]e himself was responding to what Luke had done with the tradition before him. We 
do well to heed the fact that we are dealing with great literature, where the imagination 
of a creative artist has transcended the limitation of bare factual record, in Luke’s case 
an imagination liberated by freedom to indulge in acceptance of the miraculous as part 
of the furniture of the world in which he lived…
588
 
Christian Scripture contains literary achievements to aid realist therapy although MacKinnon 
is adamant that it is unevenly the case. Indeed, in a way that seems designed to deliberately 
(and perhaps mischievously) upset the prudishly conservative, he spoke of the Book of Acts 
as ‘…markedly inferior…in theological and spiritual perception’ compared to the Gospel 
commonly attributed to the same author’.
589
 MacKinnon’s focus is almost entirely with the 
gospels, with John seen as the pinnacle achievement of that genre because of its penetrating 
perception beyond mere ‘events’ and toward ‘actions’. It was in the narrative aspects of the 
scripture and specifically in the gospels that MacKinnon saw a means to engage in moral 
discernment in a way that was both philosophically responsive and true to the ecclesiological 
tradition which placed the person of Jesus as the revealed heart of theological epistemology. 
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In observing strong continuity between scripture and other forms of literature, MacKinnon 
found at least a modicum of a shared sensibility with liberal theologians such as Hick and 
Cupitt as well as literary critics such as Steiner. Where he departs from these figures is in the 
way he wants to pair this foundational commonality with a radical discontinuity, the source 
of which is an appreciation of Jesus as an act of salvific revelation and the insistence that, 
unlike literary fiction, an absolute commitment to realist historical referents and a dialectic of 
‘correspondence’ must be maintained. In order to explore this discontinuity more fully, one 
might be tempted to go back to the under-developed notion of the Holy Spirit evoked by 
MacKinnon, which, as noted above, he wrote about in terms of a check on the imagination; 
an agent preventing self-delusion and dissolution into groundless fantasy. Pneumatology 
remained a yawning gap in MacKinnon’s work, yet its brief appearance in discussions of 
gospel narrative represents an effort to distinguish himself from those who saw Scripture as 
merely another form of morally ‘useful’ literature.
590
 
Within the gospel genre it was the parables that most captivated MacKinnon. White observes 
that ‘…if we engage ourselves seriously with the parables, we are continually invited to tread 
strange and offensive paths of thought.’
591
 He was supervised as a student by MacKinnon and 
notes his teacher’s plain acknowledgement of parable’s ‘…perverse, offensive and even 
blasphemous’ suggestions; their ‘intense human realism’ and finally their irreducible 
complexity and the potential insights to be gained by a patient attentiveness to the minute 
details of these literary constructions.
592
 White sees MacKinnon’s approach as emerging in 
the wake of ‘…the tradition of parable interpretation inaugurated by Adolf Jülicher and 
modified and developed by authors such as Dodd and Jeremias’, and indeed MacKinnon does 
mention these three together whenever he is trying to give some representation of 
contemporary scholarship about the genre.
593
  
In MacKinnon’s oeuvre, the theme of the parabolic appears most strongly in PM although 
White overstates the case when he calls it ‘one of the central themes of the book’.
594
 His 
essay Parable and Sacrament is a good place to start, however. It is typical of his style: 
suggestive and energetically creative, with insightful comparisons and alluring intimations of 
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barely-grasped depths, yet conceptually under-developed and frustratingly open-ended.
595
 
The essay does, however, provide a good initial rationale as to why he found the parabolic 
genre such a rich vein for the moral theologian to tap. It is what MacKinnon described as the 
‘openness of texture’ of the parabolic which is its chief benefit.
596
 This ‘texture’ 
‘…subsume[s] under it… pieces of discourse as different one from another as the parables of 
the sower, the tares, the ten wise and ten foolish virgins, the marriage feast, the labourers in 
the vineyard, the talents, the lost sheep, the lost coin, the two brothers, the good Samaritan, 
the prayers of the Pharisee and tax-gatherer, the unjust steward etc.’
597
 One is invited to see 
the work of God in the manifold diversity of human lives and their daily struggles, yet more 
than offering simple moral and theological object lessons, they often obscure as much as they 
clarify and continually undermine assumptions made about God rather than securing readers 
against the assaults of doubt. The parable is attractive to MacKinnon because it invites (in the 
spirit of Chapter One) a non-prescriptive therapeutic and confessional engagement toward 
self-knowledge and moral apprehension via immersion in the particular.     
MacKinnon made two interesting connections in this essay. The first was between the 
distinctive character of the parabolic and the theological projects of Bonhoeffer and Barth. 
MacKinnon noted in Bonhoeffer a very particular kind of secularisation of theological 
sensibility under the discipline of the incarnation, and in Barth, a relentless concern for the 
factuality and concreteness of revelation.
598
 An emphasis on a qualified secularity and 
realism is what MacKinnon sees in the parables, and I will return to this point as this chapter 
unfolds. The second connection arises between the parabolic form and Eucharistic practice. 
Again, in a qualified sense, MacKinnon took the sacrament to be an enacted parable. Both 
parable and sacrament involve narrations that drive a participant toward a type of ‘historical 
realism’, yet in both alike, narratives are imaginatively presented and represented in such a 
way that the possibility of a continually renewed quest for meaning goes hand-in-hand with a 
deeply personal register of participation. There is a dynamic and disruptive dimension to both 
that undermines the inevitable forces of stagnation, sentimentality, or ideology from 
corrupting discourse about God or moral obligation. On the connection between parable and 
sacrament, MacKinnon makes the following observation:      
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In the upper room on the threshold of his betrayal, Jesus performed actions whose 
manifestly symbolic character demanded that they should be understood in ways 
comparable to that in which a highly contrived parable might be said to demand 
understanding, or more simply in ways comparable to those in which we understand or 
fail to understand…what a person is saying who for instance is deliberately rendering 
himself vulnerable in our presence by self-revelation, or what we ourselves are actually 
doing when by promise or other verbal performance we commit ourselves in the future 
or arouse in others expectations concerning our behaviour which we bind ourselves to 
fulfil with only a partial discernment of what is involved.
599
  
MacKinnon saw parable and sacrament as employing simultaneous movements of revelation 
and obfuscation; movements which allow one to be immersed in a textured account of history 
not shorn of the drama of moral agency and confessional vulnerability.
600
 MacKinnon’s 
engagement with key debates in biblical scholarship of the mid-20
th
 century (noted in Chapter 
three) paved the way for such speculations and convictions to develop. Jülicher became 
known for an argument by which he sought to pit the historical Jesus who told simple 
parables, with a simple moral message to simple people, against the Jesus of the gospel 
writer’s imaginations, particularly that of Mark, in whose gospel Jesus is seen to deliberately 
court obscurity and misunderstanding by means of the parabolic form.
601
 According to White, 
the biblical scholars Jeremias and Dodd  
…take their starting point in Jülicher but with a fundamental change of emphasis. For 
now the idea that moves into the foreground is that the parables as we encounter them 
in the Gospels are frequently obscure and difficult to understand, and hence the task of 
the New Testament critic is to restore them and recover their original setting so that we 
may be able to see them in their full simplicity.
602
  
It is clear that MacKinnon sees the work of Jeremias and Dodd as important: 
…we must reckon with the arguments advanced in such works as C.H. Dodd’s The 
Parables of the Kingdom, and Joachim Jeremias’ the Parables of Jesus, which have 
insisted on the distinction between the setting of the parable’s actual delivery by Jesus 
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As MacKinnon came under the influence of Collingwood’s views on historical method, 
however, and also the developments of redaction criticism, he moved away from Dodd’s and 
Jeremias’ focus on uncovering (what was thought to be) the simplest and most original form 
of a parable. The problem was that such efforts tended to result in reduction of the parables to 
pithy moral or theological object lessons, with exegesis tasked to remove the ‘husk’ of 
subtlety, complexity, and obscurity, with these characteristics thought to be accretions 
overlaying what was presumed to have been an original simplicity.
604
 For MacKinnon, ‘…if 
the parable counsels simplicity, it is a simplicity of which simplisme is the mortal foe.’
605
   
One might say that Dodd and Jeremias represented a particular epistemological 
presupposition about the nature of factuality which motivated their approach to the parables; 
they wanted to discipline the imagination in a way that for MacKinnon undermined their true 
literary power and their therapeutic potential. The alternative route was to see the complexity 
and obscurity of the canonical parables as the optimal form of the text, not because entering 
into speculation on original forms and asking the question of their historical context is utterly 
void –quite the opposite –but because the complexity and obscurity render them potentially 
more realistic and historically vivid, not less. On this point MacKinnon noted that  
[t]he texture of the concept of parable is open; but it is of the nature of the parabolic, 
not simply to disturb or break the stale cake of long-ago backed moral custom, by 
pointing to unnoticed possibilities of well-doing, but to hint, or more than hint, at the 
ways in which things fundamentally are. Parables are true or false; we do not mean true 
or false in the sense of correspondence, which we use in connection with a passport 
photograph or a newspaper report of an air disaster.
606
   
Here we see notions of ‘correspondence’ emerging in MacKinnon’s thought but ‘not as we 
knew it’ in the hands of the classical empiricists. I will return to this issue in the next chapter.  
For MacKinnon, it is a genre in which historical referent and imaginative construal are fused 
on many interweaving levels with the result being a purgative moral intensity. Additionally, 
MacKinnon argued that parables set us free from ‘…the illusion of supposing that the sacred 
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could be isolated or set apart from life as a whole, treated as object of special experience or 
quality of special time and place’.
607
 MacKinnon was drawn in by 
…their total freedom from any quasi-numinous quality, the kind of quality that one 
believes one finds in, for instance, great liturgical texts. Again, they are totally free, for 
the most part, from the sort of pregnant religious imagery, of the kind with which 
traditional preaching is saturated.
608
 
Similarly in PM he argues that the parables have  
an unquestioned advantage of focusing in completely concrete terms the central 
metaphysical concern –that of reaching through the familiar to its alleged transcendent 
ground, without evacuating that familiar of its own proper dignity, without treating it, 
for instance, as if alles Vergängliches ist nur ein Gleichnis.
609
 
There is a resonance here with Bonhoeffer’s later writings on ‘religionless’ Christianity; an 
outworking of an already well-established humanistic sensibility which recognised the 
potential for the purgation of a stagnant Christendom in the challenge of secularisation. It 
might, after all, force the church to a renewed appreciation of the all-to-often ignored 
disruption of the sacred/secular dualism enacted in the incarnation. Speaking of Bonheoffer, 
MacKinnon observed that his criticism of religion 
…was the criticism of a man who found that certain sorts of religious concentration, in 
consequence of their intense preoccupation with the supposedly special experiences 
that brought men before God, neglected the wide-ranging complexity of the human 
reality. In his teaching by parable, Jesus illustrated ways in which very various aspects 
of this reality could, if seen aright, convey, with devastating effect, the ways of God to 
man. [MacKinnon then adds that] …it is Barth’s prophetic utterance which helped 
make possible this sort of response to the parabolic, this sensitivity…to its profoundly 
theological, yet deeply non-religious dimensions.
610
  
Barth’s rejection of the trajectory represented by Schleiermacher and Ritschl was part of his 
insistence that ‘…we must not set frontiers to the sort of human situation or experience 
through which God may declare himself’, and with this came intense scrutiny of a generic 
notion of religion popular with liberal theology and the quest to explicate a common 
underlying element of religious experience.
611
 This point becomes explicit in an essay 
MacKinnon wrote to honour Barth on his 80
th
 birthday, in which he explicated the theme of 
‘secular diakonia’, outlining a number of contemporary economists, politicians and 
academics who by their commitment to the structural reforms of the economy or the 
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advancement of progressive social policy, show themselves to be ‘truly of the Samaritans 
school’.
612
 Here MacKinnon’s sensibility to the Marxist critique of religion was evident. Yet 
further, he seemed to point to a paradoxical dynamic at the heart of dialectical theology in 
which an unrelenting focus on particular moments of revelation, paved the way for a renewed 
expression of intellectual catholicity; a broadening or secularising of expectations as to where 
divine action might occur and in what form it may take. The Bonhofferian resonances are 
palpable and Janz’s commentary in this regard is worth quoting: 
The call to this-worldliness (Diesseitigkeit) is by no means a call to the profane over the 
sacred (as some questionable readings of Bonhoeffer’s ‘non-religious Christianity’ 
suggest), since for Bonhoeffer all of these kinds of conceptual dualities have been 
overcome in Christ. Rather it is again the same call to empirical reality, in the full and 
integrated Kantian sense that I have described above. For it is precisely in drawing 
attention to the empirically real that ‘this-worldliness’, far from closing off the promise 
of meaningful reference to the transcendent, actually reopens the way to it, since 




In this vein, the radical secularising trajectory that MacKinnon takes in his Festshrift essay 
for Barth should not be seen as a departure from the explicit Christological focus outlined in 
Chapter Three, but a deeper apprehension of it.
614
 The parabolic is more likely to engender a 
contemplative attentiveness to the concrete tasks of daily life, rather than specifically 
religious experiences. Nonetheless they do contain a sort of ‘factuality’ which includes the 
self-interpretation of Jesus and ‘…his Father’s interpretation of him’ in so far as these have 
become part of the ‘secular’ history of the incarnation.
615
 The gospels use imaginative means 
to enable us to draw ‘back toward the coldly factual’, yet MacKinnon quickly adds: ‘I say 
coldly factual; I am, of course, referring to the unique, unrepeatable presence of the 
transcendent in and to the world around us. To capture even the outskirts of that drawing near 
demands every resource of imagination that we possess.’
616
 While MacKinnon was surely 
more agonised by the implicit revelatory circularity here than Barth, there is no evidence that 
he saw any way to reduce the scandal except by abandoning both Christianity and moral 
realism in different turns.   
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There is a paradox here and it is the paradox at the heart of the parables: the greater the 
immersion in the concrete particular, the more one may be drawn to articulate an intensely 
moral notion of transcendence that destabilises and interrogates, not MacKinnon would insist, 
as a function of human projection but rather apprehension. Here we see something analogous 
in the Christian claim of the utterly unexpected possibility of transcendent love being 
discerned in the midst of a crucifixion. Imagination is the key to the recognition of 
transcendence and where transcendence is at issue tragedy is never far away from 
MacKinnon’s concern:  
For the authentically human can be lost if we fail to allow our imaginations to be 
opened by the frightening possibilities of the transcendent that presses upon us, if we 
belittle the dimension of contemplation where we are schooled to perceive tragedy 
without loss of hope.
617
 
‘To perceive tragedy without the loss of hope’ is to look upon the crucified one. And for 
Christians subsequently, there is no greater locus for such a demanding form of purgative 
contemplation than the Eucharist. If MacKinnon could be said to have a sacramental 
theology, it would have at its centre a conviction as to the way healthy Eucharistic 
participation leads to a greater immersion in the coldly factual, in the particular, the local and 
the concrete in the very same way that the parables do.
618
 There is to be no fetishisation of a 
cultic act. The real presence of Christ cannot be divorced from the sort of factuality 
exemplified by the parables and any sacramental theology must go hand in hand with an 
intense scepticism of Otto’s claim that mysterium tremendum atque fascinosum Deitatis 
should be the defining feature of quintessentially religious experience.
619
 
In this vein, MacKinnon registered his concern about the non-realist risk contained in the 
realm of the liturgical: in the past the churches have made the liturgy an end in itself, ‘by 
erecting the sacred into a place of allegedly triumphal authority over the human’, and 
presumably also over the freedom of God in a way that offended MacKinnon’s Barthian 
sensibilities.
620
 Yet the parabolic also needs the liturgical. At the very least the liturgy guards 
against a ‘scissors and paste’ approach to the text that we noted in a different context in the 
last chapter: 
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 …without liturgy, without religion, we too quickly lapse into a mood that trivialises 
parable by making what it would communicate an easy lesson, somehow complete in 




The liturgy fires the imagination, drawing out the full drama of historically embedded moral 
agency in the same way as a novel or play might allow in another context. Crudely speaking, 
it represents an idealist pole in a dialectic that leads us back to greater realism; a move in 
which one risks distortion, excess and the accusation of indulging fancy for the sake of a 
greater contemplative attentiveness. MacKinnon’s development of these connections is 
woefully underdeveloped, but it would seem that there was a tacit return to an elusive 
pneumatology and muted ecclesiology occurring here.
622
 Worship provides a context in 
which parabolic texts can serve to uncover realist history in as far as it includes a Divine act 
of self-disclosure in and through the incarnation. Yet unlike advocates of Radical Orthodoxy, 
there is no space for a confident liturgical consummation here. The incompleteness of 
parables is of their essence and the Eucharist shares this characteristic: ‘...if it is the place of 
understanding, it is also the place where misunderstandings of many sorts may assume an 
obstinate permanence in the life of the spirit’.
623
 Perhaps MacKinnon’s intimations here 
might be developed in conversation with the likes of Jean-luc Marion, even if the former 
would probably suspect the latter of indulging an unacceptable theological positivism. In this 
vein, Janz notes that Marion explores the way the Eucharist can lead Christians beyond the 
limitations of the text, with Marion noting that…  
[w]e cannot lead the biblical text as far back as that at which it nevertheless aims, 
precisely because no hermeneutic could ever bring to light anything other than its 
meaning, whereas we desire the referent in its very advent’.
624
  
If the reasons animating MacKinnon’s stress on the importance of a sacramental and 
liturgical context for reading parables remains opaque, it does reveal sensitivity to the issue 
of the continuity between the text and the unique referent it portrays. Here, MacKinnon 
acknowledged that the Word must become the determinative presence in the hermeneutical 




 The Church of God, 71. Generally speaking, MacKinnon’s invocations of ecclesiology after the 
Church of God are far more pessimistic and sceptical, focused on purging self-preoccupation and 
aggrandisement, than they are building a positive doctrine.   
623
 ET, 181. 
624
 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, Religion and Postmodernism (Chicago, University of 





 The ‘intense human realism of these little fictions’ (the parables) causes a crisis for 
conventional religiosity and rationality in an analogous way to the incarnation itself.
626
 The 
parables, like the Eucharist which played such a central role in MacKinnon’s devotional life, 
confront us with the sort of transcendent referent; something of which he found echoes in 
Kant’s agnosticism, and later, Barth’s theology, but with the former’s moral seriousness and 
the latter’s uncompromising commitment to the action of God’s self-revelation in ways that 
shattered all conventional religiosity. Parables have a role in opening the way to unexpected 
apprehensions of transcendence because, as Jesus understood,   
…one of the major functions of a fiction [is] to force us to consider matter afresh by  
presenting cases in such a way that our normal prejudices, self-deception and 




3. MacKinnon and Tragic Literature  
 
Like MacKinnon, Stanley Cavell shows interest in what Shakespearian tragedy has to teach 
the philosopher. In his essay on King Lear, Cavell writes:   
It is said by Dr Johnson, and felt by Tom Jones’s friend Partridge, that what we credit 
in a tragedy is a possibility, a recognition that if we were in such circumstances we 
would feel and act as those characters do. But I do not consider it a very live 
possibility…and if I did…I haven’t any idea what I would feel or do. – That is not what 
is meant? Then what is? That I sense the possibility that I shall feel impotent to prevent 
the object I have set my soul on and won, from breaking it; that it is possible that I shall 
trust someone who wishes me harm; that I can become murderous with jealousy and 
know chaos when my imagination has been dried and then gutted and the sense of all 
possibility has come to an end? But I know, more or less, these things now; and if I did 
not, I would not know what possibility I am to envision as presented by this play.
628 
As noted in the exploration of MacKinnon’s christology in Chapter Three, part of the way he 
articulated a protest against forms of theology to which he objected was to invoke the tragic 
motif.
629
 He embraced as a tool for his therapeutic endeavour, knowing full well the 
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controversy that it would cause.
630
 In many ways, this was just a continuation of Plato’s 
‘ancient quarrel’.
631
 Karl Jaspers made a forceful argument for the incommensurability of 
Christian theology and the category of ‘tragedy’, noting that  
Christian salvation opposes tragic knowledge. The chance of being saved destroys the 
tragic sense of being trapped without chance of escape. Therefore no genuinely 
Christian tragedy can exist.
632
  
MacKinnon surely knew that figures with whom he had read and engaged, including Barth 
and Tillich, had criticised its use. Tragedy’s association with fatalism, pessimism and the 
exultation of a heroic yet flawed individual are often seen to disqualify it as a resource for 
positive theological construction.
633
 Yet the tragic is MacKinnon’s way of identifying 
perspectives within the Christian tradition that have been underplayed.
634
 More particularly, it 
is a way of bringing to the fore the intractability of the problem of evil, the experience of 
moral conflict, and what he, in the spirit of Bonhoeffer, saw as the abject failings of the 
church in the context of modernity generally and fascism in particular.
635
 I have already 
mentioned that Steiner was developing an interest in the tragic genre at around the same time; 
invoking it as a way to give voice to the existential shock and intellectual challenge posed by 
the holocaust. Alongside Steiner, whose book The Death of Tragedy MacKinnon certainly 
read, mention is made of Williams’ book Modern Tragedy in MacKinnon’s Tragedy and 
Theology.
636
 Raphael prefigured these two and his lectures published as The Paradox of 
Tragedy (1960) attracted Mackinnon’s praise. He saw them as a watershed in the 
contemporary interchange between literary criticism and moral philosophy. To this end, they 
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warranted mention in essays entitled ‘The Euthyphro Dilemma’ and ‘Theology and Tragedy’, 
as well as in his Gifford Lectures. MacKinnon lamented that Raphael’s work 
…has suffered the neglect from British moral philosophers which is so often the lot of 
writings which attempt something at first sight (though not on deeper consideration of 
the very best contemporary work) unrelated to dominant habits of thought. While I 
differ a great deal from Professor Raphael’s book, I am deeply indebted to him for 




While he did not spell out his disagreements with Raphael here or in his Gifford Lectures, it 
seems obvious enough that his most pronounced departure is on the former’s insistence that 
the category of tragedy is entirely incommensurate with the Christian tradition. Speaking of 
the approaches of Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, Raphael argues that 
…[t]he metaphysical problem from which they fashioned their Procrustean beds for 
Tragedy, is the problem of evil –by which I mean the existence of unmerited suffering. 
I have already allowed that a villain may be a tragic hero. Nevertheless, it seems to me, 
the poignancy of tragedy comes out chiefly in the misery of innocence. All tragedy 
deals with the presentation of evil, but some of the greatest works of tragic drama are 
concerned especially with the metaphysical or theological problem of evil. If one 
already has some metaphysical theory of the world, some rational scheme into which 
all human experience is to be fitted, one approaches the problem of evil with an 




For the most part, Raphael saw the Christian tradition as routinely seeking to ‘inscribe evil 
under a prepared rubric’, whether it be in systematic theodicies emphasising an all-embracing 
divine providence or those that looked to eschatology to repair, compensate or somehow 
relativize the horrors of history. He also saw the opposition springing from his observation 
that one of the reasons for the perennial attraction to tragic art is the pleasure readers (or 
audiences) get from ‘…regarding the tragic hero as more sublime than the power he 
opposes’.
639
 Raphael presumes that there would be something potentially blasphemous about 
a person resolving to fight against the will of Providence within the Jewish and Christian 
traditions. He notes that even though Job was given space to vent his protest, he submitted to 
God’s inscrutable will in the end. Raphael also gives examples of texts from other parts of the 
Hebrew Bible which, along with Job, are seen to contain genuinely tragic themes: the lament 
Psalms and Isaiah 53. Yet in all of these, he finds reasons as to why they differ in kind to 
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anything resembling a fully-fledged tragedy. In texts expressing lament and describing the lot 
of the ‘suffering servant’, it becomes clear to Raphael that for the most part,  
As soon as the existence of unmerited evil is recognised, the religious spirit finds in it a 
heightened goodness and a means to good. The moral order of the universe is not 
dimmed, but shines with a more brilliant light than before.
640
  
It is interesting and perhaps instructive from MacKinnon’s perspective, that Raphael does not 
mention Jesus’ crucifixion at any stage. In any case, Raphael would probably see the 
resurrection as undercutting any free reign of the tragic motif in this regard. Indeed, where he 
did observe some authors trying compose ‘Christian tragedies’ or to reconcile the notion of 
tragedy to Christian theology, he also detected a failure to replicate some crucial aspect of 
classical tragedy, or a departure from orthodoxy. Milton’s Samson Agonistes, Corneille’s 
Polyeucte and two plays from Racine including Athalie and Phédre are considered. In the 
case of the first of Racine’s works, ‘A Christian standpoint allows pity for her fate but not 
admiration for her defiance of God’.
641
 In the latter work Racine ‘reaches tragic sublimity’ 
yet only renders Phèdre into a tragic figure because she is a ‘…victim at once of Greek fate 
and Jansenist predestination’.
642
 According to Raphael, Racine’s Christianity meant 
Jansenism, complete with reference to an inscrutable yet essentially a-moral divine 
providence undercutting any pity we might have for the damned or admiration for them when 
they try to escape their fate. Apparently, the capacity for such pity is essential to the tragic 
ascription and this is always 
…liable to conflict with orthodox Monotheism, in which absolute goodness and justice 
are combined with absolute power in one God. …A tragic hero may display some of 
the typically Biblical virtues –righteousness, love, and patience. But humility is not 
easily made heroic; and if the tragic hero strives against omnipotence, admiration of his 




MacKinnon picked up on the stream of Raphael’s analysis which identified the partial 
presence of tragic motifs within scripture in addition to modern dramas billed as ‘Christian 
tragedies’, yet he resisted the conclusion that Christianity and tragedy are fundamentally 
incompatible. I.A. Richards observed that the tragic mood is agnostic or Manichean and 
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MacKinnon may have some tendencies in these directions, as perhaps indicated by the 
understated role he gives to the resurrection and the Holy Spirit.
644
 Having come under the 
influence of Kant’s agnosticism, and like Steiner fuelled by a sense of the existential crisis of 
the holocaust, MacKinnon rejected any notion that evil is ever inscribable under a ‘prepared 
rubric’ and yet did so while claiming that his position remained a Christian one.
645
 The only 
rubric that is available for Christians on this issue is the person of Jesus, and for MacKinnon 
there is plenty about his demise on a roman cross befitting of a tragic ascription, just as there 
is nothing about the resurrection which could be described as a ‘prepared rubric’.
646
  
There is a great deal of debate within literary circles as to how one might categorise the 
‘tragic’,
647
 and MacKinnon took full advantage of the ambiguity. In this vein, perhaps he 
would have accused Raphael of an overly prescriptive approach if he had ever developed his 
critique further. Indeed, MacKinnon argued that     
…[i]t would be a very grave mistake to generalize about tragedy as if there were an 
‘essence’ of the tragic that we could extract and capture in a manageable formula. The 
word of Racine is very different from that of Shakespeare, and both alike from worlds 
explored by the ancient Greek tragedians. Yet if one bears in mind Plato’s searching 
criticism of tragic drama as a suitable form for the presentation and exploration of 
ultimate issues, one finds that the most important aspect of what he repudiated was the 
sense that from tragedy we continually renew our sense of the sheerly intractable in 
human life.
648
   
Although MacKinnon rejected the search for an ‘essence’ he did try to explicate ‘…the 
fundamental theme of tragic drama’ nonetheless, and here we may find some similarities with 
the extract from Cavell which I discussed earlier in this chapter. MacKinnon argued that  
…it is a commonplace of very old-fashioned moral philosophy to insist that ‘ought 
implies can’. A man has an obligation, if, and only if, he has the means of fulfilling that 
obligation, of fulfilling it without, in fact, jeopardizing himself, as he must, if he finds 
the act of fulfilment self-destructive. Tragic exploration of the human condition makes 
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MacKinnon explored this thought with reference to the Greek tragedians, and on this score 
the plays of Sophocles were a focus, including Electra, Antigone, Trachiniae and Oedipus the 
King (the last he judged to be ‘the greatest and most complex of them all’).
650
 In Trachiniae 
we confront ‘…the element of the utterly intractable in the human environment, whereby men 
and women are tricked into destructive courses by their very virtues’.
651
 When it came to 
Antigone, MacKinnon sought to supplement (what he perceived as) the Hegelian tradition of 
interpreting the ‘…tragedy as residing essentially in the conflict of ‘right with right’’; a view 
which placed the conflict between familial and civic duties at the heart of interpretation.
652
 
For MacKinnon things were more complex. It is the case that Antigone  
…explores at a very deep level conflicts of personal duty. [Yet, MacKinnon 
continues…] The exploration is in the portrayal, compelling the reader and spectator to 
recognize that not only in the circumstances of actual life does it very frequently prove 
impossible to reconcile such conflicts by recourse to a formula, but more importantly, 
when an individual makes a right choice, the motives of that choice may be muddied 
beyond his or her full, or even partial awareness. Consequently human action comes to 
seem ambiguous; or it may be that while we continue to applaud what men or women 
do, we find that in the doing of it they have revealed themselves as flawed, not only in 
the actual performance, but in the springs of their response to the situation confronting 
them –springs which we acknowledge to be at least a necessary condition of their 
acting as they did’.
653
 
In 1981 MacKinnon’s gave the Boutwood Lectures, which he named ‘Creon and Antigone’, 
focusing on the vexed issue of Cold War nuclear proliferation. Unlike his discussion of 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar in relation to the July 1944 Plot, he did not make explicit the 
way in which the tragedy was thought to illuminate British policies of nuclear armament in 
the name of deterrence. As noted above, MacKinnon saw deficiencies in Hegel’s reading, 
seeing in Antigone’s character many ‘…obsessive, potentially incestuous and morally blind 
features’, yet at the same time characterising her as ‘…markedly Creon’s superior as a human 
being’. Indeed, MacKinnon claimed that ‘…[s]he activates the very worst in him, compelling 
him to identify inextricably the welfare of his city, for which he bears executive 
responsibility, with his own image of himself, which deteriorates as their exchanges 
proceed’.
654
 I suspect that MacKinnon found something analogous to Antigone in the peace 
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movement which opposed the development of a nuclear deterrent, questioned the self-evident 
nature of its necessity and steadfastly refused the utilitarian logic whereby nuclear apocalypse 
is seriously countenanced as a justified risk in defence of a state. Intimating such a link gave 
scope for MacKinnon to acknowledge the risks of blindness, obsessiveness and utopianism 
that may accompany parts of the pacifist and peace movements, yet to find in them something 
heroic, needful and true nonetheless.  
The final Sophocles play mentioned by MacKinnon is Oedipus, and it is here where he 
considered many of the key insights of the tragic genre reach a high degree of clarity and 
maturity. In approaching the play, MacKinnon appreciated the work of literary critic Phillip 
Vallacott, and while not entering into dispute on some of his more controversial interpretive 
proposals, he nonetheless approved the way Vellacott found an analogy between the types of 
moral thinking being encouraged in the tragedy and some perennial themes of epistemology. 
Indeed, present in this play are the ‘…sorts of epistemological investigations with which 
students of some of Plato’s dialogues are very familiar, i.e. those dialogues concerned with 
the relations of knowledge and right opinion etc. (e.g. Meno, Republic V-VII and Theaetetus), 
part of whose impulse came from Plato’s reflection on the Socratic imperative ‘know 
thyself’’.
655
 Further, we may detect a literary approximation of the unresolved tension 
between realism and idealism; a possibility that is intimated when Cascardi argued that  
…Sophocles' interest in politics ultimately revolves around the tragically structured 
conflict between the force of an utterance (a law) that precedes all inner-worldly speech 
and the institutionally grounded utterances through which a legislator attempts to bring 
health and order to the polis.
656
  
As well as affirming the presence of a high degree of philosophical sophistication in the play, 
MacKinnon saw in it a crystallisation of quintessentially tragic motifs: a tendency to be blind 
to key aspects of our situation and its moral claim, scenarios in which conflicting duties and 
moral demands collide, moral actors whose virtues contribute to disaster just as much as their 
vices, and people subject to contingency and compelled to act in such ways that the 
realisation of the significance and true moral (or immoral) status of their actions are only 
possible in retrospect, if ever.
657
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Tragedy offers tools for therapeutic correction, but it is not an ultimate category for 
Christianity according to MacKinnon.
658
 Yet the question remains: what then is the 
substance of MacKinnon’s link between tragedy and theology? Here, the focus shifts from 
literary tragedy to historical tragedy, a move that is never explicitly explained or 
justified.
659
 There are two factors that need to be mentioned by way of answering this 
question. The first pertains to a purgation of abstraction and triumphalism in christology. 
The second relates to the fact that circumstances involving the tragic unravelling of lives 
and insurmountable moral conflict as well as meaningless suffering, all struck MacKinnon 
as locations where attempts by human reason to bring resolution must give way to 
inarticulacy and evocations of the transcendent.  
MacKinnon saw tragic dimensions within the life of Jesus as recorded by the gospel 
writers and additionally in subsequent tendencies for the significance of his life and death 
to become enmeshed in ambivalent or downright violent ideological projects. His essay 
Atonement and Tragedy provides some essential insights here and it was discussed in 
Chapter Three. For MacKinnon, the downfall of Jesus and also later the destruction of 
Jerusalem in 70AD, which occurred despite his best attempts to model a way to avert the 
calamity, contained elements of the tragic just mentioned. I also noted his attempt to resist 
all efforts to turn the resurrection into any sort of ‘resolution’ to the problem of the 
crucifixion. On this point MacKinnon was fond of summarising his conviction with a 
quote from the Duke of Wellington, who reportedly reacted to a gushing admirer with the 
remark that ‘…a victory is the greatest tragedy in the world, only excepting defeat’.
660
  
As well as Jesus’ journey to the cross and the very real sense in which MacKinnon insisted 
on not shying away from the language of ‘failure’ in Christology, there is also a note of the 
tragic in the way New Testament narratives have been directly implicated in human suffering. 
Given his own historical milieu, there is no surprise that the woeful history of Christian anti-
Semitism was often at the forefront of MacKinnon’s consciousness as he read and re-read the 
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Scriptures, particularly St. John and St. Matthew, as well as the Acts of the Apostles.
661
 In 
this vein, MacKinnon called his essay Evangelical Imagination a ‘…twentieth century 
footnote to Milton’s Paradise Regained’, and with this, he moved to identify the fact that 
present imaginative efforts to speak meaningfully of the crucified Christ in the train of Milton 
and the Gospel writers cannot be undertaken without a serious realisation of this effort taking 
place in ‘the age of the Holocaust’.
662
 Evidently, MacKinnon wanted for theology what 
Zygmunt Bauman sought for sociology,
663
 observing ‘…that the quest for the historical Jesus 
is complemented very properly today by that for the historical Pilate’.
664
 Christians have 
never found a way of drawing near to the ‘fact’ of Christ and the true significance of his life, 
without partaking a betrayal of all that Christ lived and died for. In this vein, Lapide asked:  
Why this wave of hatred, this scarlet thread that reaches from Golgotha to Auschwitz? 
Why this condemnation of God’s biblical people, whose ‘perfidy’ consists in remaining 
true to their faith through three millennia –the faith of Abraham, Moses, David, and last 
not least, Jesus of Nazareth, who, though not the messiah of Israel, like us, longingly 
hoped for the Messiah’s coming?
665
 
Perhaps it was such questions that caused MacKinnon to be suspicious of the way certain 
readings of the privatio boni tradition had led to a ‘papering over’ of theodicy’s challenge, 
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The second dimension of MacKinnon’s link between tragedy and theology came in the way 
he saw the former pointing toward a fissure in human language and a crisis of inarticulacy.
667
 
This is at least analogous to the inarticulacy that notions of transcendence express in the some 
streams of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, and most acutely (at least for 
MacKinnon) in the domain of Kantian infused moral philosophies and theologies. In this 
vein, MacKinnon argued that in the tragic  
…we touch the frontiers of the rational, if the rational is identified with the prudential. 
We also touch the frontiers of the rational where rationality is conceived in the 
metaphysical sense of a creative Logos, whether immanent, or transcendent, or both at 
one powerful to make all things expressive of its creative power.
668
 
Like Steiner, MacKinnon thought that the intractability of tragedy opened the way to silence. 
Steiner noted that  
…[w]herever it reaches out towards the limits of expressive form, literature comes to 
the shore of silence. There is nothing mystical in this. Only the realization that the poet 
and the philosopher, by investing language with the utmost precision and illumination 




Both Steiner and MacKinnon acknowledge the ‘shore of silence’, yet they want to continue 
probing this silence with experiments of articulation. MacKinnon did this with reference to 
Christian revelation on the one hand and the firm conviction that empiricists and moral 
philosophers cannot, in the end, avoid questions of transcendence on the other, at least if they 
are properly attentive to the way in which suffering and moral agency sometimes coalesce 
with tragic results. As noted in Chapter One, these are questions MacKinnon saw as 
intertwined with ‘the problem of metaphysics’ and he detects this thread going all the way 
back to Plato. One sign that the problem of evil and its tragic manifestation in actual lives is 
being taken seriously, is that attempts to ‘solve it’ are avoided.
670
 Like the realm of freedom 
in Kant, Mill and Berlin, one apprehends a mystery in Marcel’s sense of the term, meaning 
ideas whose admission may compel a philosopher to ‘…revise a conception of the way things are 
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to make room for their reality, or even to subordinate cherished goals of theoretical 
comprehension in order to establish their pre-eminent dignity.’671 
Attempts to trace lines between tragedy, the metaphysical task of the philosopher and notions 
of transcendence, became particularly prevalent in MacKinnon’s Gifford Lectures, where 
sections on ‘Empiricism and Transcendence’ and ‘The Transcendence of the Tragic’ appear 
in successive chapters. A strong moral focus is evident at the heart of both discussions, as 
well as a continual ‘moving to and fro’ between insights from the artist and those of the 
philosopher. What MacKinnon sought to explore here was a perceived affinity between the 
work of a moralist, informed by the empiricist’s demand for a disciplined focus on the 
concrete particular, and the portrayal of the rise and fall of particular individuals by the 
tragedians. Both can leave us torn between wanting to make realist claims to knowledge in 
terms of absolute good and evil, right and wrong, yet finding the reality of particular 
situations continually undoing our best efforts to secure these ascriptions with any neat 
resolution or finality. Both domains reach for the same frontier and approach it via different 
routes, in which we know the unavoidability of the moral enterprise and the in-built limits to 
our knowledge. In this vein, Janz observes that 
Orientation to the tragic – to the sheerly discontinuous in human life – allows us to 
project our questioning to the transcendent like no other form of discourse because it 
gives us factual, tangible examples in real empirical human experience, of the finality 




For Mackinnon, this is a move which takes us beyond the idiom permitted to those who 
favour either a naturalistic reduction of ethical concepts, or who follow an alternative route of 
finding in our ethical language before all else a sort of method whereby we ‘…comment on 
human behaviour, stylise it, seek to modify it for good or for ill, to awaken in ourselves this 
or that response to this or that situation confronting us, but who deny it any factual import’.
673
 
In tragedy, we apprehend a particular circumstance that demands a value judgement; a 
distinction between good and evil, human flourishing and dissolution that resists simple 
labelling in terms of ‘naturalistic’ or ‘constructed’, and which for MacKinnon, calls forth –
however inadequately –a realist ascription. In the Spirit of Wisdom’s Paradox and Discovery, 
the limits reached here are not pointing to a deficiency in knowledge that can be filled by 
further analysis of the situation or the invocation of God in a facile way. Like Kant, 
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MacKinnon is pointing to inbuilt and permanent limits in our capacity to understand key 
dimensions of reality as we experience it.
674
 On this point, Janz observes that  
...tragedy-as-discourse is capable of accommodating or ‘representing’ the fact that real 
suffering and evil can exist in such intrusive and discontinuous particularity, or in such 
‘ruthlessness of interrogation’, that in the end it can only be apprehended as calling 
attention to itself irresolvably, confronting us on its own terms with a kind of sui 
generis authority or finality, which is at one and the same time both undeniable and 
unspeakable. 
There is more than a loose analogy with revelatory discourse about Christ here if we admit 
with MacKinnon that a tragic ascription is appropriate for aspects of how the revelation 
played out in history. There are also resonances with the type of project that Rowan Williams 
sought to undertake in his 2013 Gifford Lectures, even though Williams adopted a much 
broader focus examining why the limitations and excesses of human linguistic practice may 
furnish a renewed and much qualified natural theology. After a sympathetic discussion of the 
work of Dominican Cornelius Ernst
675
 and Arthur Gibson,
676
 Williams outlines a project that 
resonates with, enlarges and deepens a sensibility that is evident in MacKinnon’s evocation 
of the transcendent:  
 
A defensible natural theology, then, …would be a discourse that attempted to spot 
where routine description failed to exhaust what ‘needed to be said’ (however exactly 
we spell out the content of this phrase).  This is emphatically not about spotting 
explanatory gaps in the usual sense (this would be to look only for extra descriptive 
resources that happen not to be available as yet). It is more like the recognition that a 
faithful description of the world we inhabit involves taking account of whatever 
pressures move us to respond to our environment by gesturing towards a context for the 
description we have been engaged in – not as a further explanatory level, but as a 
cluster of models and idioms and practices working quite differently from the discourse 
we have so far been operating, without which our ‘normal’ repertoire of practice would 




Williams draws on Wittgenstein’s legacy for this project, and I will leave the examination 
of MacKinnon’s relationship with this legacy until the next chapter. Before moving onto 
that, I would like to note, albeit briefly, the way Janz also provides a helpful expansion of 
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MacKinnon’s examination of the ‘transcendence of the tragic’ in conversation with 
Bonhoeffer in a way that intensifies MacKinnon’s own therapeutic sensibility.  
At the heart of Janz’s exploration is a conviction that the question ‘Who are you?’ is posed 
by ‘transcendence’, whereas ‘How?’ is the question of ‘immanence’.
678
 In this way the 
question of transcendence is not one that calls for a rational account, but the type of 
exposure to the interrogative question which is part-and-parcel of all therapeutic and 
confessional activity; a point with clear connections to the projects of Kierkegaard and 
Cavell.
679
 All this is to posit that the advent of the transcendent indicates more than just 
the irresolvable intellectual problem of ‘structural’ inarticulacy, but also a rupture at a 
most personal level. This rupture can be mitigated by genuine acknowledgment (Cavell’s 
term) of the presence of another person, our own untapped depths and the self-disclosure 
of God. Williams articulates the heart of MacKinnon’s insistence with characteristic 
insight when he notes that  
…the tragic…is not simply the order of the world that must be accepted (tragedy is not 
accident…): it is one’s own appropriation of the limits of possibility, in protest against 
a polity and a culture that lure us to sink our truthful perceptions in a collective, 






In this chapter, I have explored the literary dimension of MacKinnon’s project. 
MacKinnon claimed to be working in the ‘borderlands’ and this is a reference to his 
location ‘between’ philosophy and theology. Yet another dimension of this borderland-
dwelling vocation has been revealed in the links he made and tensions he observed 
between sacred and secular literature.  
As noted earlier, MacKinnon saw Kant as providing a therapeutic treatment for 
anthropomorphism and the positivists a remedy for the excesses of idealism. He saw 
literature as a sphere in which the purgation may continue and deepen. Positively, the 
literary sphere exemplifies for MacKinnon the perennial Kantian tension between the 
receptive and creative dimensions of reason and it can furnish the kind of realist 
commitment that MacKinnon learnt in Moore’s school. Additionally, MacKinnon 
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found resources in literature that can help us move beyond the limitations of the moral 
philosophy encouraged by Kant and the positivists alike. Indeed, as we have seen, 
certain types of literature provide a remedy against the various pitfalls of formalist and 
systematic modes of moral philosophy by evoking the irreducible particularity of 
persons and the complexity and compromise inherent within history. It is in the literary 
sphere and specifically in tragic literature where MacKinnon sought to articulate what 
he meant by moral realism, where he located the impetus for a style of humanism, and 
where he perceived a dimension of human life which reached a point of inarticulacy-
toward-mystery in a way that is analogous with classical Christian narrations of the 
significance of Jesus’ life and death. In the final chapter, I will explore the contours of 
this realism more fully, taking up threads from Chapter One and focusing on 




Chapter 5: MacKinnon, Wittgenstein and Moral Realism 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter continues the focus on MacKinnon’s moral realism. I intend to deepen an 
appreciation of this commitment by exploring why he did not whole-heartedly embrace the 
apparent resources that the later Wittgenstein provided for theologians and philosophers of 
religion in the wake of such figures as A.J. Ayer and Antony Flew.
681
 This may seem an odd 
way to proceed, but MacKinnon’s reaction to Wittgenstein was closely linked with his 
convictions regarding the continuing importance of the distinction between idealism and 
realism, and relatedly, his commitment to a form of moral realism that he feared was likely to 
be corroded by a full embrace of a Wittgensteinian trajectory. In so many ways MacKinnon’s 
project cohered with Wittgenstein’s desire to return philosophy to the discipline of the 
‘concrete particular’, yet in the end, rightly or wrongly, MacKinnon did not find in 
Wittgenstein a firm ally for the kind of catholic humanism he envisioned. I will begin with a 
brief examination Wittgensteinian ethics with the aim of providing the groundwork in order 
to better appreciate MacKinnon reactions.  
2. On Wittgenstein and Ethics  
 
The claim of Chapter 1 that MacKinnon was something of a philosophical ‘therapist’, whose 
work envisaged a kind of moral realism also resonates with claims that have been made about 
Wittgenstein.  Maurice O'Connor Drury recalls a conversation in which Wittgenstein stated 
that he considered St. Augustine’s confessions ‘to be the most serious book ever written’.
682
 
Additionally, Thompson agrees with Cavell when the latter argued that in the Investigations 
Wittgenstein drew on a form of confessional therapy analogous to that employed by 
Augustine to address the problem of ‘illusion’.
683
 In explicating this claim, Thompson points 
to Wittgenstein’s statement in §110 of the Investigations:  
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“Language (or thought) is something unique” –this proves to be a superstition (not a 
mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions.  
Thompson goes on to interpret Wittgenstein’s purpose, noting that  
…when we are in the grip of such grammatical or linguistic illusions, we think that we 
are using language meaningfully, when in fact we are not. We have disconnected words 
from their contexts –the language-games –in which they have meaning. Such misuses 
of language are not ‘mistakes’ since we have moved outside the context in which 
mistakes (of fact, say) could be identified and criticized…To break the grip of illusion, 
to come to see that one is using words without meaning, one must force oneself to look 
carefully at how one’s words are ordinarily used… [The Investigations] is confessional 
because…in talking about ordinary language…I am inevitably saying something about 
myself, about what I say. But the Investigations is also confessional because this 
struggle to find clarity goes on, ‘…despite an urge to misunderstand’ (§109).
684
 
A crucial insight into the character of the purgative activity going on here can be seen in the 
shift from the early to late works, for Wittgenstein realised that he had been captivated by 
certain illusions himself. This is particularly the case when it came to his conviction that the 
kind of analysis undertaken in the Tractatus was compatible, indeed, would contribute to, the 
realisation of ‘…a complete and general set of conditions of language, namely the correlated 
notions of logic, world, and subject.’
685
 Christenson links this to an idealised view of 
‘language as representation’, where scientific verification is seen as the commanding 
paradigm for epistemology and statements of value are seen to be ‘transcendental’, that is, 
‘non-factual’; they are related to the mystical, to that which cannot be put into words but that 
which ‘shows itself’ (6.4-6.421 and 6.522).
686
 On this point and as noted in Chapter Two, 
there seems to be more than superficial similarities between the Wittgenstein’s early 
philosophy and that of A.J. Ayer. According to Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, ethics is the 
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domain of the subject’s will; the domain addressed by psychology (6.4-6.421).
687
 
Christianson argues that: 
…Wittgenstein gives up the idea of a unified set of conditions for all instances of 
language use; he now investigates ethics as one possible perspective amongst others, a 
particular way of using and addressing language…What does not change is 
Wittgenstein’s view of ethics as the subject’s relationship with the world, as well as his 
idea that all forms of language use may have an ethical point, at least in principle’.
688
  
Indeed, while not amounting to ‘knowledge’ per se, ethics remained a core aspect of his 
Tractatus. It was not the subject of a dogmatic construction, but appeared in the midst of 
‘elucidations’, ‘clarification’, and ‘perspicuous representation of our use of language’ 
(4.112). In Wittgenstein’s lecture on ethics, he described his endeavour vaguely as ‘…the 
enquiry into what is valuable, or into what is really important…into the meaning of life, or 
into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living.’
689
 Both here, and in the 
Investigations, Wittgenstein rejected a certain style of ethical theorising; he avoids debates in 
meta-ethics and rejects any temptation to lay down a metaphysical ontology to ground 
judgements of value.
690
 In the Investigations, Wittgenstein describes his methods as not 
offering solutions to problems but rather treatments, ‘like different therapies’ (§133).  
Diamond and Peterman both see Wittgenstein’s project in its differing phases as consistently 
and irreducibly charged with ethical themes.
691
 Even if moral theory is seen to have been of 
little use, language use in communities of action and discourse has an integral ethical 
dimension. A question inevitably arises at this point for anyone under MacKinnon’s 
influence: does Wittgenstein turn out to be a realist or idealist when it comes to ethics? 
Discussing this point, Fergus Kerr notes that the idealist-realist distinction has been a 
reoccurring theme in Western philosophical history: 
Since Plato’s ‘ideas’, in the theory of Forms, are ‘real’ it has been argued, with 
brilliance and plausibility, that ancient philosophy should be described as ‘realism’. The 
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Cartesian philosophy where ideas have taken up residence in the head. That accords 
well enough with Wittgenstein’s few references to idealism, because he always links it 




These pejorative remarks about idealism have not prevented a long-standing debate as to 
whether or not Wittgenstein was, in fact, guilty of something analogous. The problem is the 
way in which Wittgenstein sought to articulate the ‘conditions of meaning’ and on this basis 
Thomas Nagel mounted what is probably the most sustained and influential accusation of 
idealism.
693
 At the heart of the ascription is a focus on the way Wittgenstein’s linguistic turn 
places primary emphasis on our knowledge being limited within ‘boundaries set by our 
human form of life’, yet as Cerbone notes this is never adequately reconciled with another 
dimension of Nagel’s analysis of Wittgenstein, which concerns the fact that the language of 
boundaries implies something lying beyond them, which might suggest something of a realist 
dimension.
694
 What is clear to a number of interpreters, particularly those who examine 
Wittgenstein on the question of the language of pain, is that this opposition to idealistic 
solipsism is more robust in Wittgenstein’s later works than Nagel suggests and it has a 
crucial ethical dimension.
695
 Wittgenstein demanded that one should not look beyond 
articulations of pain to some inner dimension, but that the concrete body of the other is to be 
given the fullest moral weight possible ‘on its own terms’. That is, Wittgenstein did not 
appear to allow for the type of sceptical luxury that might lead one to agonise over the 
‘problem of other minds’ when someone in their midst is expressing pain (§293, §295).
696
 To 
the extent that some forms of idealism lay down epistemological conditions that obfuscate the 
moral demand represented by an ‘irreducible other’, MacKinnon would surely agree. 
According to Kerr, if one looks for the heart of the distinction between realism and idealism 
as it continued to be evoked by figures such as MacKinnon, one will find the lingering 
presence of the Cartesian subject.
697
 The relation of the self to the external world is conceived 
as a self-evident problem, with idealism and realism providing competing and 
incommensurable answers as to how such a relationship might be managed. Kerr notes that  
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In terms of the older story, realists and idealists divide over the intelligibility of the 
external world. For idealists, things only have the intelligibility that we give them. 
Clearly, the dispute revolves round our understanding of the place that the subject 
occupies in the world.
698
  
Elsewhere he argues that 
The idealist has identified a profound and terrifying problem: my thoughts and feelings 
may be radically incommunicable, my inner life may be totally unsharable. But the 
assurances of the realist, while they take drama out of the predicament of 
epistemological solitude, leave the metaphysical picture of the self undisturbed.
699
  
In response to this  
Wittgenstein, and Heidegger more clearly, are out to destroy the picture of the self 
which sustains the whole dispute. [Kerr adds that Wittgenstein] …is neither realist nor 
idealist: the gap between the subject and the world is simply not admitted. It is not 
bridged, for it never existed in the first place.
700
  
In order to demonstrate the character of this realism Nagel has offered a case study. It evokes 
the possibility of ‘perpetual nine year olds’, and emphasises the intelligibility of a perspective 
and a set of truths existing beyond the capabilities of these individuals to which they could 
conceivably come to realise in time. This example involved Nagel offering something of a 
linear hierarchy of truths, with people of differing capacities having differing levels of 
apprehension of the ‘real’.
701
 Perhaps Wittgenstein proposed something similar when he 
reflected on ‘feeble-minded persons’ (§371), but conceived the relationships between persons 
of differing perspectives and capacities quite differently from Nagel’s ‘linear’ approach, at 
least according to Cerbone:
702
   
Wittgenstein's “more fruitful” way of looking at the feeble-minded interrupts this way 
of picturing things, since it invites us to think of the feeble-minded as alongside our 
way of being minded, as another, perhaps “queer,” way of being minded rather than an 
“essentially incomplete” version of our own. When Wittgenstein famously declares that 
“what has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life,” his more 
fruitful way of looking at the feeble-minded may be one form of that acceptance.
703
        
While there may be ethical gains in the assumption that foreign or unusual forms of life may 
need to be accepted in their irreducible difference, rather than being subsumed as a 
subordinate and partial perspective into a universal epistemological whole occupied by ‘us’, 
the impression may be given here that Wittgenstein’s proposal leaves the field of human 
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knowledge strewn with incommensurate subjectivities. Such a concern is certainly close to 
the heart of Nagel’s negative portrayal of Wittgenstein’s idealism. Indeed, related to this 
point, Wittgenstein has been accused of fostering moral relativism. Christenson notes that 
Wittgenstein 
…seems to accept a radically relativistic view of ethics, where there are – at least in 
principle – just as many ethical positions as there are people. This ready acceptance of 
the possibility of relativism appears to challenge the objective and imperative character 
of ethics, especially as Wittgenstein at the same time refuses to provide a shared 
foundation from which we may evaluate the value of different ethical viewpoints.
704
 
Whether it is the accusation of idealism or relativism, Kerr and Cerbone are unwilling to let 
the charge go unanswered. Incandela joins them, calling it a ‘pseudo-problem’ based on a 
misreading which turns Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ‘forms of life’ into a detached 
philosophical principle.
705
 With Wittgenstein’s rejection of the ‘private world’ of the 
Cartesian subject comes the rejection of a whole style of epistemology; one which sees the 
subject as having the capacity to take on ‘…some extra-mundane perspective from which 
observer-independent knowledge of things as they really are would become available.’
706
 
This subject gives priority to ‘things’ or alternatively ‘our conception of things’, depending 
on whether one has realist or idealist leanings, with the result that ‘…[t]he realist, just as 
much as the idealist, marginalizes ‘life’, the real thing’, ‘the given’.
707
 Kerr argues that 
Wittgenstein’s solution is to abandon what he sees as the philosophical presuppositions that 
gave rise to the problem:  
For Wittgenstein… it was not a matter of reviving the realist versus idealist controversy 
in the hope of resolving it but rather of recovering a sense of the place of the subject in 
the world which would render the controversy superfluous.
708
 
As Wittgenstein developed his position beyond his early period, the old controversy becomes 
more and more redundant. Indeed, the idealist-realist distinction becomes one of a number of 
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‘dead weights’ which Wittgenstein’s project aims to purge. Both terms are taken by 
Wittgenstein as ‘belonging to metaphysics’ –pejoratively understood.
709
 Indeed, Kerr 
observes that metaphysics is completely redefined by Wittgenstein, now related to any 
attempt to make observations regarding the shared view of ‘the way things are’, which is a 
function of shared embodiment; the basis for the possibility of coherence of language among 
speakers. This redefinition seeks to avoid a certain type of damage: 
…we damage the intelligibility of our readings of the utterances of others when our 
method of reading puts others into what we take to be broad error. We can make sense 
of differences all right, but only against the background of shared belief – this is ‘the 
method of truth in metaphysics’.
710
 
Perhaps we see more evidence here of Wittgenstein’s insistence on not jumping to see the 
one whose language we find perplexing as (necessarily) inhabiting a more restricted view 
than our own. The Wittgensteinian subject is conceived in irreducibly linguistic terms, and as 
one becomes attuned to those characteristics of language use in everyday situations, the 
greater the pressure on epistemological distinctions between an abstract subject with his or 
her private cognitive sphere and the external object with some essence beneath or beyond its 
appearance.
711
 There is rather a ‘form of life’; a subject immersed in communal linguistic 
practices (§19)
712
.  The practice of language in its holistically conceived cultural and 
communal context becomes the only reference point for determining the failure or success of 
an utterance. A commitment to this vantage point means that there is literally no sense in 
attempting to find a depth of meaning, or an unanswered philosophical riddle, in positing a 
‘gap’ between linguistic utterance and external objects.
713
 In this vein, Cavell notes that  
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[…in the Investigations Wittgenstein] says: “What we do is to bring words back to their 
everyday uses.” Presumably, then, he felt that in philosophy words were unhinged from 
their contexts; it now became a problem for him how this could have happened and 
why it happened, what there is about philosophy that makes it happen and how 
language can allow it to happen. None of the criticisms of the tradition produced by 
Moore or the Oxford philosophers or the positivists seems to him to be right, to do 
justice to the pain, the pervasiveness, even the mystery of that conflict. He could not, 
for example, be content to say that in this conflict philosophy had been playing tricks or 
spoken with lack of seriousness, because he had had the experience of producing his 
first book, and he knew that such criticisms were not true of it.
714
 
The problem being identified is a ‘representative’ view of language, whereby the gap 
between our language and the objects to which it is being applied becomes yet another proxy 
for the underlying problem of the gap between the Cartesian self and the world.
715
 What is 
needed is a recognition of the subject’s full immersion in the world, the irreducible 
‘situatedness’ which renders what is usually taken for granted explicit. The romantic tradition 
offered one means of doing this; Wittgenstein offered another.
716
 On this point Mulhall notes 
that 
…if a grammatical investigation displays what it makes sense to say about something 
(what it is for any talk about something to count as, to be, talk about that kind of thing), 
then the grammar thereby made manifest is not itself a kind of talk about that thing, and 
so cannot be saying anything false or otherwise misleading about it –any more than it 
can be saying something true.
717
 
Grammatical analysis allows a kind of immersion and a style of observation, which may give 
rise to judgements of truth and falsity, meaning or meaninglessness within particular 
communities with their particular linguistic modes of expression, but is itself neither true nor 
false. The accusation of idealism comes in the impression given that what is true can never be 
conceived apart from present or future extensions of our often faltering capacity to express 
ourselves in language. As noted above, the charge of relativism soon follows.  
Yet on the first count, Wittgenstein may reply with a counter-question regarding how we 
might possibly conceive a truth without a self-awareness of our location and limits as 
language users. Clearly, he believed there to be a way of acknowledging this fact without 
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conceding to an epistemology which saw our apprehension of reality as merely constructive 
rather than receptive. Further, Wittgenstein’s approach would sound like an affirmation of 
idealism rather than a denial if language was not ‘public’ in the way Wittgenstein believed it 
to be; that is, continually transgressing any fixed boundary between subject(s) and 
object(s).
718
 In reply to the second, his rejection of the possibility of untranslatable language 
would be relevant; a rejection that stands as long as we are interacting with a living bodily 
form that is distinctly human.
719
 While there is the possibility of language arising from 
alternative life contexts striking us as strange or incorrect, there is a confidence in the 
possibility of mutual comprehension, however fallible.
720
  
The final point to make against the idealist reading pertains to Wittgenstein’s conviction that 
concepts pertain to facts: 
It is a fact of experience that human beings alter their concepts, exchange them for 
others when they learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to 
them becomes unimportant, and vice versa.
721
 
On reading this claim, Cerbone states that  
The image Wittgenstein encourages here is a kind of ongoing engagement with the 
world, where new facts may be learned (not created, stipulated, or “imposed” by the 
mind) that sometimes push and prod us to alter how we think about the world, even at 
the basic level of our conceptual repertoire.
722
  
So, thinking back to his comments pertaining to the ‘feeble-minded’, it may be that 
something of the qualitative distinction implicit in the label needs to be retained: some grasp 
reality better than others. It may now seem that Wittgenstein is countering a potential idealist 
accusation with a realist claim, yet, once again, this would be to ignore the extent to which 
our conception of the bounds of language and its limits are inconceivable outside the 
language games that pertain to the subject’s form of life. There is no sense of Wittgenstein 
advancing or defending the sort of correspondence understanding of the subject’s 
entanglements with these facts favoured by the empiricist, but nor can these comments rule 
out the suspicion that something analogous to correspondence does come into play, perhaps 
on the margins of Wittgenstein’s thought, by which the coherence of language does evolve 
and purify itself in relation to facts. 
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Applying these insights more specifically to his ethical approach, it would seem that 
Wittgenstein’s response is two-pronged:  he seemed to reject any accusation that his approach 
destroyed the possibility of seeing qualitative differences between ethical claims, while 
insisting that this can be established by the description of language use, not a matter of 
accessing ethical claims via a ‘view from nowhere’.
723
 Even if Wittgenstein’s proposal did 
have relativistic implications, anyone who made such a claim should tread carefully, if only 
for the fact that for Wittgenstein, ‘ethical relativism’ would undoubtedly represent an attempt 
at an overarching ethical theory; something which he rejected as neither useful nor 
possible.
724
 Furthermore, it is not evident that such a claim shows forth an adequate 
appreciation of the development of Wittgenstein’s later thought particularly as it developed 
during the War years. Over this period, Wittgenstein expressed a conviction that ethics begins 
with dependence on other people and must acknowledge the moral claim that their existence 
represents.
725
 He also employed language of God, particularly in his journals, when 
addressing the need for some goal in the quest for ethical perfection, even though nothing by 
way of positive content can be given to this word beyond the language games that we have, 
together with a general sense that the way in which the limits and excess of language open a 
way to the mystical.
726
 This does not indicate a radical departure: to the extent that 
Wittgenstein participated in any sort of moral realism, it was the realism of another human 
being, our linguistic ‘embeddedness’ and the reality of our own quest for self-knowledge and 
moral improvement. 
3. On MacKinnon and Wittgenstein 
 
The inspiration for this section is Kerr’s essay Idealism and Realism: An Old Controversy 





 A crude summary of Kerr’s argument is that MacKinnon was too caught up in 
the antiquated conflict between idealism and realism in a way that caused him to turn his 
                                                          
723
 Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," 5-9. 
724
 Christensen, "Wittgenstein and Ethics." 
725
 Rupert J. Read, "Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations as a War Book," New Literary 
History, no. 3 (2010): 6-7. Cavell develops this line of thought, claiming Wittgensteinian inspiration 
for his notion of ‘acknowledgement’.   
726
 Christensen, "Wittgenstein and Ethics." 
727
 The essay title is a play on the title of MacKinnon’s 1976 essay ‘Idealism and Realism: A 
Controversy Renewed’. Kerr, "Idealism and Realism," 15-33. 
174 
 




The therapies that Wittgenstein and MacKinnon offered shared a sceptical stance toward 
realist metaphysical ontologies, associated deductive moral epistemologies and attempts to 
vindicate religion ‘rationally’. They shared an approach to the philosophical task which 
sought to enact purgative disciplines by which abstract universals were avoided and concrete 
particulars took centre stage. It is the difficulties of realism and the centrality of a kind of 
ethical intensity where the similarities become most evident. Lovibond observes that:    
Wittgenstein writes in RFM VI §23: ‘Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, 
that is the hardest thing.’ The difficulty is presumably this: we wish to purge our critical 
concepts (such as ‘truth’, ‘rationality’, ‘validity’) of the absolutist or transcendent 
connotations attaching to them in the context of a foundational epistemology; but we do 
not wish, in the process, to find ourselves abolishing those concepts altogether. What is 
difficult is to pursue the twofold aim of showing, on one hand, that it does not make 
sense to look for a source of authority external to human practice which would certify 
as true (e.g.) those propositions that we call true; while, on the other hand, resisting the 
proffered alternative to our former, metaphysically contaminated use of those concepts 
–an alternative which would consist simply in jettisoning the concepts in question and 
replacing them by others. (Thus it might be argued that we should replace ‘true’ by 
‘assertible’, and ‘rational’ by ‘in keeping with the prevailing intellectual norms’)  
[Lovibond goes on to note that]  …Wittgenstein evidently feels there is something 
paradoxical about the program indicated by the words, ‘not empiricism and yet 
realism’. The appearance of the paradox is dispelled, however when we come to 
consider that programme in its application to ethics. For in ethics, and in evaluative 
discourse generally, any move toward realism –that is, towards the view that the 
assertibility conditions of evaluative sentence are truth conditions –is ipso facto a move 




Lovibond’s engagement with Wittgenstein contains much that rings true to MacKinnon’s 
project. This is especially the case in regard to observations about the persistence of certain 
terms after their association with metaphysical excess has been addressed, and the way in 
which a commitment to the notion that ‘moral judgment is answerable to truth’ may motivate 
one to embark of a struggle toward realism and cause tensions with the empiricist legacy. 
Yet, as noted in Chapter One, if there was an underlying philosophical allegiance loyalty it 
was given to Kant and this inevitably shaped MacKinnon’s reception of Wittgenstein. 
MacKinnon understood Kant to have achieved a high level of sophistication in his account of 
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the rational subject, at one point referencing ‘…a celebrated passage in the Analytic of 
Principles as refuting what he called ‘idealism’ encountered in ‘dogmatic’ form in Berkeley, 
and in ‘problematic’ form in Descartes’.
730
 For MacKinnon, Kant showed that key insights 
from idealism and realism need not be mutually exclusive, but rather the tension must be re-
articulated; held despite the extreme difficulty this will cause the philosopher.
731
 Importantly, 
MacKinnon did not think it possible for a philosopher to escape the sort of tension that the 
idealist-realist discourse was attempting to capture, Wittgenstein included. Additionally he 
thought that some of Wittgenstein’s chief concerns, such as his ‘private language argument’, 
were not necessarily antithetical to those of Kant. In this vein, MacKinnon noted that  
…Kant certainly did not see the growth of human knowledge as a movement from the 
private to the public; for him the world of which we spoke was by that fact alone the 
public world; the categories were vindicated as indispensable conditions of 
communication, the notion of causality itself being proved as the sine qua non of the 
dating of events in a public time order. Moreover, as has been constantly insisted, the 
problem of metaphysics, of the validity of men’s [sic] attempt to orientate themselves 
in respect of the unconditional was fundamental for him; it was the status of that 
enterprise that he was concerned’.
732
 
In the same way that MacKinnon avoided a mischaracterisation of Kant as either realist or 
idealist it would seem that he avoided common simplistic and polarising interpretations of 
Wittgenstein. That is, MacKinnon did not see the early Wittgenstein as engaging in 
quintessential expressions of positivism in any simple sense, nor his later work as tending 
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toward idealism in any stereotypical way.
733
 A case for Wittgenstein-as-idealist was certainly 
made by Dummett, yet MacKinnon’s sympathetic engagements with John Wisdom probably 
counteracted any naïve acceptance of this assessment. It was Wisdom who introduced 
MacKinnon to the contrast between Moore and Wittgenstein; a discussion which convinced 
him that the latter had an insight that could not be ignored. Indeed, Wisdom helped 
MacKinnon realise the  
…the crucial importance of Wittgenstein’s contention that we are obsessed by the habit 
of supposing the meaning of a word to be an object, and in consequence are impatient 




By submitting to Wittgenstein’s purgation, MacKinnon thought that it was possible to grow 
in awareness of  
…the perilous consequences of asking questions aimed at establishing the essential 
nature, for example, of discovery concerning matters of fact, as if there were not a 
whole multitude of different procedures involved in factual investigation on different 
occasions, which we must acknowledge as valid in appropriate context, refusing to 




MacKinnon’s attitude to the early phase of Wittgenstein’s project is evident in an address 
given to the Christendom group in 1939. It indicates that MacKinnon was aware of 
differences between Wittgenstein and the logical positivists with whom his views were often 
conflated subsequently. Here, he made an extended reference to the Tractatus:  
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus… furnished the impulse of the logical 
positivist movement. But both in that work, and more definitely, in his later 
unpublished writings, there are traces of a difference in method. His work lacks the 
vigorous application of phenomenalistic attitudes. For him all philosophy is nonsense. 
Yet it may be helpful nonsense. There is really no problem there – none at all, and 
certainly nothing to get excited about. Philosophic bewilderment is a form of disease. 
Remember – ‘everything is what is and not another thing’ (to borrow from Butler an 
aphorism often quoted by Wittgensteinians). If only we understood our language, if we 
grasped its oddities, its flexibility, its looseness, there would be no philosophy. As it is, 
we don’t, and there is, and therefore philosophy must go on, or rather that heir of the 
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historic subject of philosophy, which is Wittgensteinian therapy. For to Wittgenstein 
and his disciples analysis is a form of therapy. We can say what we like. That is the 
next important fact about language, and philosophy will prevent us from forgetting it. 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy seems to me to be one of the most remarkable essays in 
nominalism that the history of philosophy discloses.
736
 
At a minimum, MacKinnon clearly discerned a vehement rejection of all Platonic vestiges 
coupled with a suspicion of deductive epistemologies in Wittgenstein’s early work.
737
 He saw 
the ‘verificationist position’ of the early Wittgenstein as ‘…the rational outcome of Kant’s 
attitude to knowledge.’
738
 That MacKinnon was cognisant of the dramatic shift which took 
place between Wittgenstein’s early and later periods is evident, not so much by a direct 
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analysis of Wittgenstein’s works, but by changes in the way MacKinnon related Wittgenstein 
to Kant in essays from the 1940s compared to those of the 1970s. When MacKinnon made 
the connection, both are seen to be engaged in a comparable metaphysical purgation: 
Any reader of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, for all the difference of inspiration, receives 
continual reminders of the Kantian distinction of the form and matter of knowledge, 
from which the critique of metaphysics inevitably springs.
739
 
MacKinnon understood the early Wittgenstein as a rather extreme manifestation of a 
trajectory launched initially by Kant, yet in his later writings, he began to identify elements of 
the two projects that were analogous:   
Kant’s refutation [of Berkley’s idealism] is interesting in itself; but in his work it is a 
necessary part of his subtle and strenuous effort to have the best of both worlds, to hold 
together a view which treated learning about the world as a finding, with one that 
regarded such learning as a constructive act. It is partly in response to this dual claim 
that the analogy between his work and that of Wittgenstein is to be found…
740
    
And yet the comparison has its limits as MacKinnon also notes that:  
If [Wittgenstein’s] similarity to Kant is seen, the differences light up the nature of the 
problems Wittgenstein sets himself. For Wittgenstein, it would be an illusion that we do 
not know things in themselves, but equally an illusion that we do (crudely, because the 
concept of “knowing something as it really is” is being used without a clear sense, apart 
from its ordinary language game).
741
  
MacKinnon viewed Wittgenstein as tending toward something like a coherentist position, one 
in which ‘…it is in the stream of life that expressions have meaning.’
742
 In this way, the later 
Wittgenstein was seen to have swung from positivist nominalism to imbibing a unique 
manifestation of a kind of idealism that was analogous to that of Kant. Yet, Kant still retained 
the distinction between our conception of a ‘thing’ and a ‘thing in-itself’ and it was 
Wittgenstein’s mission to purge this sort of talk from the philosophical canon. 
Despite these efforts the distinction continued to appear at the centre of debates among 
Wittgenstein’s interpreters. For example, in 1983 Lovibond could still offer a reading of 
Wittgenstein as developing a position which easily fitted within MacKinnon’s standard 
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definition of idealism, while Cora Diamond offered a riposte.
743
 Lovibond argued that 
‘…Wittgenstein’s view of language implicitly denies any metaphysical role to the idea of 
‘reality’; it denies that we can draw any intelligible distinction between those parts of 
assertoric discourse which do, and those which do not, genuinely describe reality’.
744
 The 
difference of perspective between Diamond and Lovibond is representative of a much wider 
fissure identified by Cerbone, who observes that:  
Of the many sources of interpretive conflict in Wittgenstein's philosophy, one of the 
most recalcitrant is surely the question of his philosophy's ultimate commitment 
to idealism. Many readers of Wittgenstein (for example G. E. M. Anscombe (1981), 
David Bloor (1996), Michael Forster (2004), Jonathan Lear (1982), Thomas Nagel 
(1986), and Bernard Williams (1981) have detected at least some affiliation with, if not 
outright endorsement of, some form of idealism, while other readers, such as Cora 
Diamond (1991), Ilham Dilman (2004), Norman Malcolm (1995), John McDowell 
(1998), Edward Minar (2007), Stephen Mulhall (2009), Barry Stroud (1984), and 




Dummett is not mentioned here, yet Kerr refers to Dummett’s 1959 review of Wittgenstein’s 
Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics, as ‘fateful’ in as far as the former portrayed the 
latter as 
 …such an extreme anti-realist, as regards mathematical statements, that [Dummett] 
speaks of [Wittgenstein’s] ‘constructivism’ and ‘full-blooded conventionalism’. In old 
fashioned terms Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is interpreted as a form of 
subjectivist idealism…Dummett’s review lends authority to a now widespread belief 




Kerr proceeded to comments made in Cupitt’s Sea of Faith to demonstrate the degree to 
which theologians imbibed what he saw to be the pernicious and inaccurate conclusions of 
Dummett’s review.
747
 That MacKinnon was a sustained critic of the kind of non-realist 
theistic revisionism developed by Cupitt may point to the fact that he did not fall into the trap 
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 Indeed, speaking of Wittgenstein’s lectures on the foundations of 
Mathematics, MacKinnon claimed that ‘…he seems to ground every sort of necessity in an 
arbitrary fiat of the subject. Yet what he is doing only begins to become clear when viewed in 
relation to language as a whole’.
749
 Signs that MacKinnon was perceptive enough to avoid 
Dummett’s misreading are also evident in an essay from 1968, where he noted the fact 
Wittgenstein ‘…learnt from Moore of the philosopher’s duty to be concerned with what is the 
case, and what we can properly say to be the case’.
750
 MacKinnon continued with the 
following qualification: 
To say this is not, of course, to suggest that such concern is absent from Wittgenstein’s  
later work; it is not, but a careless reading of, for example, some of the things he says 
concerning mathematical discovery and invention go some way to encourage such 
tendencies among lesser men.
751
  
MacKinnon did not see Wittgenstein as an idealist in the way he has sometimes been 
accused, yet under the influence of Wisdom, he still saw Wittgenstein’s later work as needing 
supplementation by figures such as Moore, in as far as the latter continued to raise the 
problem of correspondence notions of truth.
752
 MacKinnon took Wittgenstein as holding to a 
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 D. M. MacKinnon, "Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology (Book Review)," Journal 
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‘holistic’ theory of meaning, with a clear analogy to coherentist approaches to truth claims in 
mind (the two were not to be simplistically equated). To the extent that Wittgenstein was not 
a coherentist or an idealist in any simple sense, MacKinnon was open to learning from him, 
yet what concerned MacKinnon was the possibility that     
…both [holistic and coherentist theories of meaning] agree in a determination, if not to 
abandon, at least radically to depreciate concern with what is or is not the case in the 
sense in which such concern if affirmed as central by those who identify truth 
fundamentally with correspondence: this though they realize the need for the utmost 
sophistication in analysis of that correspondence.
753
  
This emphasis and insistence is something that has been noticed by Janz, and it is worth 
quoting him at length:  
MacKinnon insists that those who, like himself, want to ‘identify truth fundamentally 
with correspondence… [must] realize the need for the utmost sophistication in analysis 
of that correspondence’. He is thus, as a realist, repeatedly at pains to distance himself 
from what he calls ‘a simpliste model of correspondence’ which buys into the ‘logical 
mythology of “atomic propositions” corresponding with “atomic facts”, and the implied 
ontology of ultimate simples’. Of course, what MacKinnon is referring to here is 
precisely the straw-man version of ‘metaphysical realism’ (or more correctly, atomic 
realism) repudiated by Putnam, a realism that in his words contends that ‘the world 
consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects’, that ‘there is exactly one 
true and complete description of “the way the world is” and that ‘truth involves some 
sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs and external things and 
sets of things’. MacKinnon refers to such a simpliste construal of realism or 
correspondence as the ‘picture theory’ of truth. All of the characterizations of realism 
we have been considering so far (i.e., ‘atomic realism’, ‘metaphysical realism’, the 
‘One True Theory’ view, the ‘God’s Eye’ point of view and so on) are for MacKinnon 
versions of the ‘picture theory’, and as such they all represent a fundamental 
misconstrual of the true import of correspondence.
754
 
What then is the ‘true import’? To make any headway here we must remember that 
MacKinnon saw the ‘constructive’ and ‘imaginative’ dimensions of reason as potentially 
enhancing realism; a point made in the previous chapter’s focus on the literary imagination 
and historical analogy. MacKinnon sought a sophisticated position that avoided pitting 
coherentist and correspondence approaches against each other in any blunt opposition: both 
can forget what Janz calls the ‘anthropocentric challenge’, which is essentially a therapeutic 
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determination not to ignore the person who is attempting to philosophise, their historical 
embeddedness and their moral successes and failures.
755
  
As we have seen time after time, MacKinnon never abandoned the realist insistence that part 
of any claim to coherence must be a reference to facts independent of human cognition and 
subjectivity. Yet, he drew on examples of Newton’s Inverse Square Law and Russell’s 
comments on the ‘coherentist’ nature of pure mathematics to emphasise the necessity of 
speaking in terms of coherence as well.
756
 MacKinnon clearly noticed that Wittgenstein 
combined ‘holism’ with a correspondence approach of sorts: there is a world to which 
language must continually adapt itself even if his way of expressing this courts the idealist 
charge as it seeks to avoid perceived missteps of the empiricist. Together with him, 
MacKinnon imbibed ‘…a kind of openness to holism and coherence that any properly 
integrated correspondence theory (or realism) will have to manifest.’
757
 Yet MacKinnon, 
contra Wittgenstein and to the apparent frustration of Kerr, was determined to maintain an 
empiricist’s purposive and explicit distancing of the rational subject from objects of 
knowledge; a move that is perhaps loosely analogous to Cavell’s post-Wittgensteinian 
reassertion of scepticism.
758
 Yet, the Wittgensteinian hue remains, at least in the way 
Williams notes that MacKinnon’s notion is 
…not the correspondence of photograph to scenery or physiognomy, nor…a chemical 
formula to a specific chemical reaction in a laboratory. Is it, then, more like the 
appropriateness of a move in chess? The exhibiting of a proper and conventionalized 
but not totally determined skill in responding to what is presented? [Williams goes on 
to note that]… This sails very near the pragmatist wind, but cannot be accused of covert 
voluntarism, at least. If picture theories must go, are we left with any option but 
something like this: a realism which shows itself in the halts and paradoxes, shifts and 
self-corrections of language itself as a material and historical reality.
759
  
MacKinnon never countenanced an absolute parting with the Enlightenment tradition; aspects 
of the ‘Cartesian subject’ and a correlationst approach to truth are seen as indispensable, 
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despite the temptations they bring.
760
 Such a move is seen to allow a kind of reflexivity in the 
midst of the concrete particular, allowing one creative space to speak (contra Wittgenstein) of 
a ‘philosophy of history’, to mount ‘a study of ethical theory’ and to continue to raise the 
‘problem of metaphysics’ in the form of a set of perennial questions which demand the 
invocation of the realist / idealist tension.
 761
  
With Wittgenstein, MacKinnon held that purgation is needed to drive philosophers from 
fruitless abstractions and faux-controversies into the concrete circumstances of everyday life, 
but this immersion lead to a return to metaphysical questioning rather than silence. Most of 
all, MacKinnon refused to concede that discussion centred on realist and idealist labels had 
reached an unproductive impasse. What might seem like an impasse is actually a nest of 
permanent difficulties intrinsic to the philosophical task and unavoidable for any attempt to 
apprehend the moral complexity of the human condition. Indeed, part of MacKinnon’s 
argument, which Kerr does not mention in his Festschrift essay, is the former’s contention 
that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is seen to revive questions that gave rise to the distinction, 
despite Wittgenstein’s best efforts.
762
 This may be a case of a naïve reading of Wittgenstein 
on MacKinnon’s part, yet if we look at the debate that emerged in assessing Wittgenstein’s 
legacy it seems MacKinnon had a point.
763
  
I suggested above that at the heart of Kerr’s problem with MacKinnon is the way the latter 
maintained strong sympathies for the philosophical predilections of British empiricism as he 
sought to explicate a type of realism.
764
 Kerr learns from Wittgenstein that realists of this ilk 
just as much as idealists they opposed 
…fail to acknowledge that das Leben is ‘the given’: these Lebensformen that, in a later 
and more celebrated formula, are what has to be accepted. (PI, 226) In effect, 
Wittgenstein implies here, realists are as oblivious as idealists to ‘the real thing’, das 
Eigentlich, which, again in a much later phrase, he refers to as ‘the bustle of life’, das 
Getriebe des Lebens. (RPPII, 625). Obsession with representing reality makes the 
                                                          
760
 As we will see, this is an aspect of MacKinnon’s project that attracts criticism from Milbank. 
Milbank, "Between Purgation and Illumination," 161-96. 
761
 Williams is surely right to point out that MacKinnon’s hints at a doctrine of analogy become 
relevant at this point, and I will return to this below. Williams, "Trinity and Ontology," 76.  
762
 MacKinnon, ET, 143-45. 
763
 Insole has developed a critique of the Wittgensteinian legacy that could be read as a more 
systematic development of the sort of anxiety MacKinnon tried to express. Insole, Realist Hope, 11-
69.  
764
 Kerr, TAW, 121-41. 
184 
 
unrepresentable bustle of life seem contingent and marginal. The ‘stenographer’, in 
Bukharin’s phrase, takes the place of ‘the real subject’, i.e. social and historical man.
765
    
By Kerr’s reckoning, MacKinnon was a realist, or at least someone who ‘…conducted an 
anti-idealist campaign throughout his career.’
766
 My argument has been that MacKinnon’s 
realism entailed forms of purgation that paralleled those put forward by Wittgenstein, at least 
to the extent that he pursued a project that was weary of what Wittgenstein identified as the 
dualistic tendencies of realism and its temptation to develop –inadvertently or otherwise –a 
‘metaphysical antipathy to the body’.
767
 As I will note below, there were ways in which 
MacKinnon can be criticised for countenancing certain ‘abstractions’, yet such failures often 
derive from an otherwise admirable attempt to prioritise the historical subject, rather than 
abstract away from it. Indeed, attentiveness to the very particular character of human action 
in history is what remedies temptations toward dualism, antipathy to embodiment or flights of 
metaphysical abstraction for MacKinnon, who can write that it is 
…at the level of action that men and women engage themselves, suffer and make others 
to suffer. It is where informed choices serve carefully conceived policies of individual 
or collective conception that men and women achieve what they do achieve, break 
others and themselves are broken in pieces. It is at the level of raw human existence, 
where we make play, not with ideas but with the substance of our lives, that for good or 
ill we make our mark upon the sands of time. We cannot trivialize such achievement 
and such suffering by suggesting that, for the historian, it is nothing apart from the 
significance which he himself gives it. There is an element of creativity to be reckoned 
with in the human situation, -creativity for good and for ill…but in the background 
there lies the actual work of men [sic], and it is this that gives significance to what we 
recollect, and to our efforts as disciplined historians, to reshape the raw material of our 
recollection, more in accordance with actuality.
768
  
If it is a crime that ‘[o]ur life has traditionally been regarded as accidental and marginal to the 
great metaphysical debates about words and things, thought and reality, self and world…’,
 769
 
can MacKinnon be declared ‘not guilty’? The answer, I think, is broadly affirmative. He 
sought to perpetuate the ‘great metaphysical debate’ yet in the tradition of Butler he also 
insisted on a textured and immersive moral epistemology, and under Collingwood’s 
influence, saw a renewed focus on the category of history as a locus for the continual re-
positing of questions that justify efforts toward a revisionary metaphysics.
770
 While someone 
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like John Caputo ‘…opposes correspondentism by insisting that access to objects is always 
mediated by historically contingent concepts’, MacKinnon wanted the best of both worlds: a 
type of correspondence that was compatible with a historical immersion of a self-aware 
subject.
771
 In this vein, MacKinnon showed appreciation for Bultmann’s close reading of 
Collingwood in what was an otherwise a hostile review of the former’s Gifford Lectures. 
MacKinnon noted that  
…[f]or Collingwood, sometimes history and metaphysics were identified; and it is clear 
that one of the things which Bultmann deeply admires in Collingwood are those 
elements in his conception of history which enable him practically to identify the 
historian’s task with the achievement of existential self-knowledge. In the passages in 
his concluding lectures, in which Bultmann meditates on Collingwood’s writings, his 
readers can watch him moving on beyond anything Collingwood explicitly said to the 
point of identifying history with a peculiar kind of self-awareness, which belongs to 
and indeed shapes the sort of decisions that the responsible individual must make. 
History; self-awareness; decision; these notions gradually pass into one another…
772
  
Collingwood was seen by MacKinnon as having made ‘his own signal contribution’ to the 
trajectory of modern approaches to history represented by Hegel, Marx and Dilthey, in 
distinction from the trajectory represented by the ‘logical revolutions of Frege and 
Russell.’
773
 Yet, just as MacKinnon appreciated that Marxist approaches to history potentially 
offered provocations toward purgation which themselves needed subsequent purging toward 
greater realism, so it was with Collingwood’s proposals.
774
 Indeed, Collingwood can be cited 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
unity, or to seek at the cost of honesty, avoidance of an element of pluralism.’ MacKinnon, "Ethical 
Intuition," 101. Kerr acknowledges that alongside Dummett, Collingwood was major influence on 
MacKinnon on the ‘historicization’ of metaphysics. Kerr, "Idealism and Realism," 18. MacKinnon: ‘I 
shall never myself forget [Collingwood’s] lectures on ethics in the autumn of 1933 in the hall of 
Pembroke College; they conveyed to their hearers an unforgettable impression of the importance of 
the subject, and they were at the same time notable for the decisiveness with which the lecturer laid 
bare the texture of conflicting ethical doctrines.’ MacKinnon, BT, 169. 
771
 Hector, Theology Without Metaphysics God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition, 27. 
772
 This becomes the prolegomena to reflection on Jesus Christ as ‘the eschatological event’. 
MacKinnon, "History and Eschatology," 207.  
773
 BT, 169. This is an insight shared by Vanheeswijck who notes Collingwood’s identification with 
the ‘objective idealist’ label and the Hegelian tradition. Guido Vanheeswijck, "Robin George 
Collingwood on Eternal Philosophical Problems," Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue 
canadienne de philosophie 40, no. 3 (2001): 566. 
774
 MacKinnon: ‘I do not think any reader of Collingwood’s work would fail to see that history was 
for him the name of something more than the technical products of research. History is important 
because it is a way in which men come to terms with their human environment. Human beings are 
inescapably historical animals; this does not, of course, preclude, in his view, their tending to write 
the history of the past in the image of their own present. Collingwood is often highly relativist in his 
opinions; his pervading hostility to realism always prevents his doing justice to the elements of 
“extended memory” which there must be in history. But for all his relativism, he admits the way 
attachment to a past poses to men some of their most searching human problems. For it is by history 
186 
 
along with Kant as an influence that led MacKinnon to differentiate himself from 
Wittgenstein, yet he also resisted any depreciation of the significance of the historical event 
‘in itself’ or any excessive idealistic scepticism that he detected in these figures.  
Yet, for all this, Collingwood’s historically-informed ‘moral seriousness’ left a lasting 
impression on MacKinnon. Such a capacity to speak about history in terms of free agency, 
narrative and ultimacy was important, as was the ability to adequately factor into his 
philosophy movements of ‘absolute’ historical breakthrough, suffering, tragedy and evil in a 
way that could call on the language of ‘factuality’. In addition to Collingwood (and Kant), the 
source of MacKinnon’s resistance to Wittgenstein can also be traced to the kind of 
Christological reflections that constituted Chapter Three.
775
 In this vein, he perceived that 
history’s interrogation of us, via events like the incarnation and the holocaust, demanded 
bolder attempts to test the ‘correspondence’ of moral language to ‘the given’, even if this 
meant courting failure and the continuous fragmentation of language. MacKinnon felt this 
was required for a more explicit, more forceful, articulation of humanism beyond that which 
Wittgenstein provided for. The freedom exercised to create and to destroy moral possibilities, 
alongside a historical apprehension of non-negotiable moral limits, drove MacKinnon to 
persist beyond the point where Wittgenstein thought a boundary was reached beyond which 
further philosophical articulation was impossible.  
MacKinnon’s continued probing arises from and leads toward an uneasy combination of 
intuitionism and ‘natural law’ approaches. These ideas appear in disconnected parts of his 
corpus; they are never reconciled and this is deliberate.
776
 They are, in MacKinnon’s own 
slippery idiom, ‘moves in a game’.
777
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that men become aware of the tragic element in human life; they take stock of the way human finitude 
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4. MacKinnon’s Unsystematic Proposal for Moral Philosophy: 
Intuition and Natural Law    
 
By including chapters which feature literature and Wittgenstein as MacKinnon’s conversation 
partners, I have sought to show the way in which he desired to articulate a version of moral 
realism beyond Kantian formalism. In earlier chapters I also had cause to note MacKinnon’s 
preference for utilitarianism over emotivism when it came to articulating possible alternatives 
to Kantian moral philosophy more generally. Indeed, MacKinnon did value ultilitarianism as 
long as it was tempered by intuitionism and vice versa. Both have the potential to take 
debates about conduct away from the concrete particular in distorting ways; both can habour 
an ‘impulse to escapism’ just as they both can provide a means for greater realist 
apprehension and a more robust defence of humanistic values.
 778
 Unlike Pritchard, who built 
a theory of intuitive ethics as part of a crusade against utilitarianism, MacKinnon could see a 
great deal of good in the utilitarian impulse that needed to be maintained, particularly its 
‘realist impulse’.
779
 Even so, there was something that the utilitarian needed to hear in the 
intuitionist’s emphasis on the ‘subjective aspect’ within debates about conduct.
780
 At the 
same time, MacKinnon could be weary of the pull of subjectivism within the work of the 
intuitionists in as far as grounding for moral factuality was being sought in an increasingly a-
historical and non-empirical interiority. 
Mackie saw forms of intuitionism as the insidious intellectual compromise at the base of 
attempts to defend moral realism:   
[T]he central thesis of intuitionism is one to which any objectivist view of values is in 
the end committed: intuitionism merely makes unpalatably plain what other forms of 
objectivism wrap up…[H]owever complex the real process, it will require some input 
of this distinctive sort, whether premises or forms of argument or both. When we ask 
the awkward question, how we can be aware of this authoritative prescriptivity… ‘a 
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special form of intuition’ is a lame answer, but it is the one to which the clear-headed 
objectivist is compelled to resort.
781
  
Intuitionism was a position which for many years was dominated by debates between the 
Moore, Pritchard, Ross and their respective followers.
782
 In one of his most famous papers 
on the topic, Ross argued (quite perplexingly it must be said) ‘…that good is objective in 
the sense of being independent of being attended to and of rousing any sort of experience 
in a mind, but not independent of mind, since it belongs only to minds and to their states 
and qualities’.
783
 This leaves us with an explanation for direct (as opposed to inferential) 
judgments of good that holds something like this: ‘…if our intuition of some proposition is 
to (defensibly) justify our judgment, then intuitions must be understood as nondoxastic, 
nonfactive states.’
784
 In a paper that MacKinnon read with some sympathy, A.C. Ewing 
developed a reading of Ross that conveyed the sense of a counter-manoeuvre being 
established to challenge Stevenson and Ayer.
785
  
Warnock and A.E. Taylor variously interpreted intuitionism as a revised form of Kantian  
deontology.
786
 In an early essay from 1956 MacKinnon developed a highly qualified defence 
of intuitionism, beginning with the observation that ‘…the philosophical intuitionist is 
concerned to argue, in some way, for the view that fundamental principles of morality or of 
value are self-evident and irreducible.’
787
 He then went on to explicate what can and cannot 
be meant by ‘self-evident’ and ‘irreducible’; the first pertaining to the way we come to know 
and the second pertaining to the relation between moral principles and other principles from 
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which philosophers have often attempted to ground or explicate moral knowledge.
788
 The 
notion of irreducibility is not so much taken as an attempt to elaborate a theory of the way 
moral knowledge is derived, but simply the relation of a moral claim to other principles such 
as ‘…my concern as a human being for the welfare of my fellows’.
789
 MacKinnon saw the 
attempt of the intuitionist to continue probing the nature of such principles as important and 
he does so in a way that suggests both sympathy and resistance to the Wittgensteinian project. 
He argued that: 
What is irreducible is underived, and it was insisted that the absence of derivation must 
be epistemic as well as ontological. And it may indeed be argued that with the advent of 
modern linguistic methods, this sort of artificial to and fro between what we know and 
the way in which we know it, has been abolished; something of this sort may seem to 
have been admitted in the earlier paragraphs of this essay, where the notion of 
irreducibility was analysed in terms of the way in which we argue. Some might actually 
go as far as to suggest that such phrases as ‘we know directly’, ‘we are certain’, 
occurring in ethical contexts, simply conveyed emphasis, adding nothing in content of 
assertion, but simply advertising the speaker’s temper of adherence to what he said. Yet 
I suspect that however confused their idiom, the intuitionists were calling attention to 
something important by their anxiety to speak about the manner of our knowing as well 
as concerning the status of what we know.
790
  
Here, I perceive a move on MacKinnon’s part to place value on the intuitionists in as far as 
they kept alive an insight which he saw as important to the defence of moral realism in the 
face of Wittgenstein’s purgation and the rise of aggressive forms of non-realism from other 
quarters. As noted in Chapter Two, MacKinnon avoided committing to anything like Moore’s 
moral intuition of the good, which the latter took to be a simple, indefinable, non-natural 
property, but which can be apprehended through careful analysis of key terms.
791
 Value 
judgments must still be reasoned-through by inference, yet terms such as ‘good’ offer a 
window onto a dimension of rationality that securely links particular judgments to a truth-
tracking notion of value.
792
 MacKinnon’s appropriation of the positivists’ sceptical spirit 
made him hesitant at the invocation of such a mysterious grounding for moral judgments.  
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  Moore, Principia Ethica, 60-64. On this point, Hare observes that ‘[t]o say that it is non-natural is 
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For all this, MacKinnon saw the intuitionist as the keeper of the creative and imaginative 
potential of moral agency. This was important for the way he wanted to maintain loyalty to a 
Kantian emphasis on the incommensurability of ends with present empirical history, taken 
together with an enduring hope that the gap may be lessened or abolished, even if contested 
notions such as God and the resurrection become the only way to imagine the overcoming of 
tragic separation. MacKinnon observed that ‘…[i]f the realm of nature must be separated 
from that of ends in order that the peculiar dignity of the latter shall be established, we yet 
need sometimes to invoke the imagery of their reconciliation.’
793
 In the meantime, and as 
noted earlier, Butler and St. Paul are evoked to counter Kant’s formality, in as far as they 
refused to overlook the ‘passional side of human nature’ while still advancing the intense 
introspective self-scrutiny of the Gesinnungsethiker.
794
 Yet was there a choice to be made 
between the paths set out by Butler and St Paul over and against that of Kant? Wittgenstein is 
surely lurking behind the scenes when MacKinnon claimed that:  
[w]e cannot have it both ways. If ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, then morality is independent of 
anything we can call metaphysics, ontology, religious revelation, what you will, even 
hostile to them. Morality is that in whose light we see everything else whatever; and the 
task of the critical philosopher is to enable us to see and measure the consequences of 
this. The many-levelled model of human nature, of which Butler offers us one 
example…brings to different universes of discourse which, for all differences one from 
another, agree in a kind of empiricism, and in an admission of the authority of styles of 
self-discipline, touching intellect, evolution, and imagination, that cannot be admitted 
by Kant. They cut across his formalism, even though…those who think in such terms 
have a ‘form of life’ which beckons and commands them in ways analogous to the 
universal moral order of Kant.
795
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Even with the import of the intuitive and the existential with Butler and St. Paul, Kant is 
never discarded. Moral complexity, the subjective dimension of moral deliberation and the 
‘freedom of open possibilities’ or ‘the simple truth that men [sic] could have done otherwise’ 
are points that the intuitionist, however inadequately, tries to keep within the purview of 
moral theorising.
796
 Indeed, speaking of intuitionism was MacKinnon’s way of expressing his 
commitment to something like the irreducible dignity of persons which was sustained by his 
early reading of Maritain and bolstered by his conviction that both Kant’s denial of 
metaphysics and the purgation promised by the utilitarian were effectively moves in a wider 
programme of the ‘vindication of humanism’.
797
 The emphasis also resonates with Berlin’s 
writings on historical inevitability; refusing any tendency to declare ‘good’ ‘that which would 
have happened anyway’, and resisting any temptation to look for a realm beyond the 
historically embedded subject to secure the possibility of value judgments. 
When comparing the intuitionist’s attempts to keep a certain ‘introverted’ conception of the 
human moral consciousness alive in the midst of the empiricist extroversion of the utilitarian, 
MacKinnon did not see a battle from which one or the other must emerge as unrivalled victor, 
but ‘…an analogy between the antinomy of freedom and causality’ in Kant’s philosophy.
798
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The analogy remained undeveloped, but the approach of the utilitarian with their desire to 
bring the rigour of law-like regularity to ethics is taken to mirror something of the closed 
causal account of nature to which Kant contrasts the exercise of freedom. The intuitionist’s 
focus on the generation of a state of affairs which is always at the same time an apprehension 
mirrors the exercise of a generative causal agency of the domain of freedom. What 
intuitionism points to is a form of self-awareness and self-questioning that may be identified 
as yet another dimension of the therapeutic theme that I have attempted to apply to 
MacKinnon, who noted that ‘…sooner or later in serious discussion of ethical intuition we 




Here we come upon the positive tension which drives MacKinnon’s approach to moral 
theory: greater self-apprehension will lead us to draw on metaphors of ‘reception’ rather than 
those of ‘construction’ alone. In this vein, when exploring the ethical import of ‘apostleship’ 
in 2 Corinthians, MacKinnon noted that 
…both apostle and contemplative alike agree in their realism, in their sense of the 
appropriateness of the language of correspondence; what they try to affirm in conduct, 
to seek through self-discipline, is there to be affirmed and sought…Both alike within 
the context of such a realism take up the standpoint of a Gesinnungsethiker.
800
  
The intuitionist, who plumbs the depths of a rather extreme interiority in order embody the 
supreme struggle and dignity of moral agency, should at the same time never lose sight of 
the fact that ‘…we are men and women, and particular men and women at that’.
801
 In this 
vein, MacKinnon noted that it is 
…paradoxical to speak of bringing into being what we accept, representing what we 
create somehow as already real. Yet it is to the necessity of this paradoxical stretching 
of our language that the intuitionists are inviting our attention. In morality we are active 
and bring into being a moral universe by our actions; yet even as we do this we are con-
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strained to represent that universe as something in some sense, already there, and 
commanding us to embody its pattern in our daily dealings.
802
 
Intuitionism represents for MacKinnon what might be called the ‘qualified idealist pole’ of 
his moral philosophy, whereas he looked to the utilitarian tradition and language of 
‘contemplation’ and ‘natural law’ to invoke a ‘qualified realist pole’. To say with the 
intuitionist that an ‘…immediately discerned moral universe is its own justification, seems to 
mean, if it means anything, that by speaking such a language, we create the state of affairs to 
which it refers’.
803
 Yet, this creative capacity is hemmed in; a fact that becomes clear as 
MacKinnon mounted an exploratory argument to stave off the non-realist and supplement the 
intuitionist by showing that an empirical moral temper that takes historical immersion 
seriously will begin to encounter something like a given ‘law’. Reference to social consensus, 
contract or ‘rights’ are not enough on their own to ground what MacKinnon sees as the 
possibility of speaking about actions which serve good and evil in concrete cases.
804
 This role 
needs to be given to natural law; a law which is less like a set of unambiguous commands, 
and more like the fact that we find ourselves in a world not created by us. The posture is one 
of contemplation rather than explication or construction. Plato is an inspiration here along 
with Moore, Butler and Kant.
805
 Indeed, MacKinnon argued that     
…[w]ith Plato’s speculations (and for Whitehead, all subsequent Western philosophy is 
a ‘footnote to Plato’) we are in the presence of the work of an extraordinary, if 
unbalanced genius, who had the supreme merit of raising for his readers, in subsequent 
generations, the question of how this supposed ‘natural law’ was discovered and 
established, how indeed the vague, fleeting impressions men [sic] had of its over-
arching, wide-embracing authority, related to other precarious, yet persistent 
acknowledgements of a vantage point from which the obscure and fragmentary 
circumstances of human life might be reviewed, in the light of a vision of the origin and 
source, the sense and sanction of all. ‘We are not our own.’ If Jean Paul Sartre argues 
that men are alone in their freedom to give sense to the world, he has to reckon with 
those who claim that the idiom of discovery, finding, acceptance belongs to the 
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In the same essay, MacKinnon goes on to argue that  
…[t]he issue of a ‘natural law’ ethic, raised at a place where practical and theoretical 
perplexity meet, is that in fact of the possibility of metaphysics. To say this is not to 
retreat from the problems of international politics into abstract philosophy; it is rather to 
advertise the former as raising for us the issues of the latter. The practical man [sic] 
will, of course, be eager to stress the urgent primacy of his concerns; but the Western 




That MacKinnon can speak intriguingly of St. Paul’s apostleship as an ‘ethico-religious 
category’ operating in ways analogous to this ‘law’, speaks of the slipperiness of the notion 
MacKinnon tried to evoke.
808
 The character of, and balance between, self-assertion and 
contemplation may take on a number of different guises; one can only study an individual 
biography to see how it has played-out in a life.
809
 Yet one thing is certain: the contemplative 
will continue to probe the paradox inherent in moral life and they will, MacKinnon avers, 
encounter the problem of metaphysics sooner or later. And here we return to MacKinnon’s 
sense that it is the particular burden of the Christian moral theologian to see the incarnate 
Christ as a definitive feature of this ‘natural law’:  
…the Christian emphasis on the concrete reality of Jesus as revealer of the Father 
provides a kind of barrier against the false fashioning of God after the image of our 






This Chapter returned to some of the themes of Chapter 1. Specifically, I sought to achieve 
a positive account of the realist goal to which MacKinnon’s therapeutic method was 
driving. MacKinnon was not a thinker whose insights can be easily summarised or 
systematised: one must simply try to keep up with the various twists and turns while 
attempting to discern patterns emerging over time.  
                                                          
807
 Ibid., 193.  
808
 SET, 262. There are intimations that MacKinnon may have been influenced by Max Scheler on this 
point.  
809
 Ibid., 261. 
810
 "Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology (Book Review)," 557-58. Perhaps there are 
some links here with the task of Barthian ‘natural theology’ which Hauweras attempted to explicate in 
in his Gifford Lectures. Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church's Witness and 
Natural Theology (London: SCM Press, 2002). 
195 
 
MacKinnon was engaged in a project that mirrored Wittgenstein’s in crucial respects. Yet 
he held back from the kind of Wittgensteinian iconoclasm that sought to jettison continued 
talk of the ‘problem of metaphysics’, which for MacKinnon, could be summarised by 
invoking the perennial tussle between realism and idealism. Transferred to the moral 
sphere it meant an attempt to reflect on conditions that make for a perennial tussle between 
styles of philosophy that could be labelled ‘natural law’ and ‘utilitarian’ on the one hand 
and ‘intuitionist’ on the other. Only such a complex web of proposals could begin to 
reflect the similarly complex moral domain of historical action and event. In the end, it 
was MacKinnon’s commitment to moral realism, including his sense of what the particular 
historical moment of post-war Europe called forth from  moral philosophers, that led him  
to defend notions of correspondence, moral factuality and moral freedom, even if he 




Overall Conclusion: Considering MacKinnon’ Project in Retrospect 
 
In this thesis I have sought show that applying a ‘therapeutic’ ascription to MacKinnon’s 
project provides a way of doing justice to his attempt to marry a peculiar mix of pragmatic, 
existential, confessional and non-foundationalist tendencies with a qualified realism. The 
specific end to which the therapy drove was a form of moral realism that emerged though 
patient description and re-description. It was a Kantianism transformed via Wittgenstein, 
Moore, Collingwood and debates in modern Christology. While the method gave room for 
God’s self-revealing, it never lost a sense of accountability toward, and participation in, a 
wider humanistic project that must always open itself to continuous conversation and further 
purgation.  
In this final section, I will comment on some of the ways MacKinnon’s interests and 
sensibilities have been perpetuated, and also the way in which subsequent developments in 
British theology help to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of his approach. 
The recurrence of metaphysical reference in the context of a moral argument for the 
coherence of theism (or perhaps, a theistic argument for the coherence of a certain sort of 
morality) is one recently revived in Anglican circles by Angus Ritchie. In a project of 
ambitious scope, Ritchie examines the way metaphysical language can emerge if one 
continues to interrogate widely held commitments in support of moral objectivity, 
particularly if one does not prematurely silence questions as to how such moral capacities are 
capable of ‘tracking truth’.
811
 Ritchie examines a host of secular options for defending moral 
realism and finds the persistence of an explanatory gap relating to the potential of our moral 
capacities. This occurs in a circumstance where natural selection is seen to have provided 
explanations for ‘truth tracking’ capacities for many other domains of knowledge and Ritchie 
claims that a degree of arbitrariness enters the discussion when we fail to expect similar 
explanations from the moral domain.
812
 Echoing Moore, he argues that naturalistic 
approaches have failed (and will always fail) to deliver in the unique case of moral ‘facts’.
813
 
Axiarchism, Neoplatonism and Theism are affirmed as options for metaphysical notions that 
might yet provide the means to close the explanatory gap.  
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On this last point, some parallels might be drawn with Douglas Hedley’s work in the tradition 
of the Cambridge Platonists, which perpetuates and substantially bolsters (relative to 
MacKinnon’s attempts) a philosophical defence of the ‘imagination’ and its relation to the 
task of the metaphysician and moralist. Against critics, Hedley, like MacKinnon, seeks to 
reaffirm the ways metaphysical philosophy has been employed to aid theology’s coherence, 
its apprehension of scripture and its articulation of moral realism. Yet in the broadest sense, 
Hedley and Ritchie join the likes of Moore and Murdoch in the desire (temptation?) to secure 
moral realism in a substantive metaphysical ontology, whereas Wittgenstein and MacKinnon 
were more circumspect; their realism never went too far beyond ever deeper descriptions of 
‘nature’ and history. For all the family resemblance between these projects, MacKinnon 
remained sceptical about the quest for such metaphysical ‘grounding’, just as he held back 
from the full application of Wittgenstein’s purgation. As noted above, he sought to articulate 
a ‘negative’ revisionary metaphysics of history that emerges from the continuous struggle of 
human beings to negotiate and express freedom, imagination and dignity in a context of 
realist constraint and limitation.
814
 Even so, together with all these figures, MacKinnon was 
aware that there were ‘…very many lessons to be learnt from past failures in threading an 
authentically human path between e.g. the facile optimism that will not look on historical 




Ritchie brings theism to the table toward the end of his discussion as an aid to explanation. 
As such, he is indebted to the tradition of Sorley and Taylor in moving from a commitment to 
moral realism to theism, even if he does so after a more systematic engagement with key 
advocates of naturalistic reductionism. No such strategies are evident in MacKinnon, who 
lurched between Kantian agnosticism and attempts to apprehend the particularity of divine 
revelation in history. Even as the prospect of moral finality is mooted, it remains riven with 
unavoidable contingency, ambiguity and the prospect of tragic misapprehension. After 
reading MacKinnon’s rather tortured attempts to introduce such nuance to the fact-value 
distinction one might suspect that from his perspective, Ritchie attempts to make a rather 
fought journey to theism appear easy in a way that puts the unsuspecting traveller at risk. At 
the same time, MacKinnon would surely agree with Ritchie when the latter sought to answer 
the critic who suggested that the ‘…fact there is more than one possible thing to think’ 
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presents an insurmountable problem for the moral realist. To this challenge Ritchie replies 
that 
…it is not clear why this should be so: one could surely be an ‘outright moral realist’ 
and think that competing moral values lead to tragic choices, where agents face 
irreconcilable claims of, say loyalty and benevolence and will have some reasons for 
regret whatever choice they make. In some such cases, it may be true that one choice is 
better than another. In other cases the considerations on each side might objectively 
have equal amounts to be said for them. ‘The world’ might then be experienced as a 
‘void’ in that there would be nothing more to be said on the matter, and yet a choice of 
great moment might need to be made.
816
  
Ritchie implicitly perpetuates elements of MacKinnon’s project both on the possibility of a 
‘tragic realism’, and in tracing the connections between moral realism, metaphysics and 
theism. Yet it is Rowan Williams, together with Paul Janz and John Milbank who are the 
contemporary British theologians that have been most explicit in attempting to understand 
what MacKinnon sought to do. Each dissented from MacKinnon to a greater or lesser degree: 
Williams and Janz see the need for supplementation whereas Milbank judges at least one key 
aspect of the project as intrinsically flawed and irrecoverable.
817
 For Milbank, the ‘…Kantian 
backdrop, however much it may be seen as the setting for ‘something else’, always dominates 
the entire later performance’ and this, for him, seems to be a barrier for retrieving and 
repairing MacKinnon’s approach.
818
 The key issues include a purportedly a-historical 
substratum in MacKinnon’s project, his overwrought invocation of the tragic and, lurking 
inchoately behind all this, a lack of clarity in regard the way he understands the doctrine of 
analogy.  
Whatever MacKinnon was doing in his reference to intuition and natural law, the conclusion 
of all three figures is that supplementation in a broadly conceived Hegelian direction may 
have aided the attainment of a greater depth of historical realism and perhaps allowed greater 
conceptual linkages between the ‘intuitive’ and ‘natural law’ poles of his moral philosophy. I 
suspect that MacKinnon would have remained sceptical at any attempt to build such 
conceptual linkages for fear of falling into an idealist exercise of ‘reconciliation’ which 
would have made things too ‘neat’. Yet acknowledging points of alignment may have helped 
him to avoid criticism, including the accusation that he not only finds tragedy in history, 
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‘…but emplots history within a privileged tragic framework’.
819
 Williams’ understands the 
humanistic impulse behind the tension MacKinnon tried to hold, noting that ‘…[t]here can be 
a paralysing obsession with the tragic, but there can also be an attempt to evade the limits of 
time and particularity through an attempt to bypass or rationalize pain and death’.
820
 Milbank 
seems to think that MacKinnon came close to such paralysis; apparently he was far more 
influenced by  
…the Platonic notion of presence than with the Aristotelian version of telos, and 
therefore concentrate[d] on tragic indecision which occasions a kind of exit from the 
narrative instead of remaining in the plot and seeking resolutions.
821
 
Janz also appears to be convinced that MacKinnon’s focus on ‘the tragic’ needs to be 
transcended and that, for all the insight and uncompromising moral seriousness it generated, 
the intensity and pervasiveness of this focus points to deeper structural limitations in his 
project.
822
 As noted in Chapter One, Janz saw MacKinnon as an uncommonly perceptive 
reader of Kant and has sought to repair and supplement what he calls ‘MacKinnon’s 
conciliatory realism’ and use it as a resource in aid of his own constructive suggestion for 
theological epistemology.
823
 Yet, Janz also furnishes the discussion of idealism and realism, 
externalism and internalism with extended reference to Putnam and Nagel, and then 
supplements MacKinnon’s lack of engagement with Hegel and Heidegger via a chapter 
dedicated to Bonhoeffer’s Act and Being. He joins Williams and Milbank in supposing that 
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Mackinnon’s lack of engagement with those who more deeply and critically appreciated the 
best in Hegel resulted in blindness to some of the a-historical components to his otherwise 
historicist account of moral agency. It may have also resulted in the paucity of ecclesiology 
when it came to unpacking the peculiar ways in which a distinctively Christian moral agency 
may be structured. Kerr is probably right in contending that someone like Charles Taylor has 
provided resources to repair what MacKinnon lost with his aversion to the Hegelian legacy 




In a similar vein, Milbank complains that MacKinnon smuggled into his tragic realism ‘…an 
ahistorical assumption about the permanence of the conflict between a public sphere of 
objective, and strictly equivalent justice, and a private sphere of forgiving cancellation of 
fault.’
825
 Milbank’s identification of a lingering, subterranean ‘a-historicism’ is part of a more 
general assault on MacKinnon’s apparent captivity to the sort of liberal ‘theology of right’; an 
entanglement that results in proposals for moral anthropology and philosophy which both he 
and MacIntyre find unconvincing. In this respect, Milbank targets MacKinnon’s comparison 
of ethical decision to a creative act, which I noted in the latter’s invocation of the intuitionists 
above. Milbank argues that this act  
…is, in regard to formal freedom, ‘without grounds’. In this respect he [i.e. 
MacKinnon] is actually less realist than the Hegelian tradition which sought to remind 
us how all our values and any possibility of freedom follows from sein, from an always 
already-realized (in some real degree) goodness. On the other hand he tends to prescind 
from the real site of an ‘absolute’ human creativity, namely the erection of entire 
cultural formations which represent ‘new types’, in no essential way imitative of 
anything naturally given. Thus while MacKinnon acknowledges the importance of 
Hegel’s attention to the historical, he thinks of historical situatedness in semi-Kantian  
terms as a further categorical restriction on knowledge and behaviour, and not as the 




It would seem that there is broad agreement between Williams, Janz, Milbank and Kerr on 
the need for a Hegelian supplement of some kind. Yet I wonder whether Milbank’s particular 
criticism is too pointed. MacKinnon’s writings on the moral import of St. Paul’s notion of 
apostleship, his interactions with Marxist thought and his dogged commitment first and 
foremost to seeing Christian moral agency as grounded in the agency of the ‘historical Jesus’, 
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suggest there might be resources to mitigate the criticism, or at least indicate that MacKinnon 
was not unaware of some of the weaknesses that came with positioning oneself in Kant’s 
orbit. In any case I can imagine MacKinnon making the same critique of Milbank as he made 
of John Wisdom:  
There is too much readiness in Wisdom’s writing to impose a pattern, for instance, on 
the history of the problem of our knowledge of the external world, to find positions, for 
example, for Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, in a dialectical movement, neglecting 
the subtlety and complexity of their individual work, and of their relations one to 
another. It is as if Wisdom is not prepared to extend to individual philosophers the same 
eager attention to the concrete detail of their work, and the individuality of the 
particular case he counsels so effectively elsewhere. It is as if figures in the history of 




It is not just a qualified re-engagement with Hegel’s legacy that highlights some of 
MacKinnon’s shortcomings, but also a return to a Wittgensteinian influence in the form of 
Michael Banner’s recent work in theological ethics.
828
 For all of MacKinnon’s emphasis on 
immersion in the ‘concrete particular’ the avenues for achieving this were via the writings of 
historians, biographers and novelists. Without rejecting the ways in which these media aid the 
sort of contemplative attentiveness called for by MacKinnon, Banner’s focus on a critical 
dialogue with social anthropologists, particularly those who engage in disciplines of 
ethnography, provides a compelling case that there are yet more resources available for the 
theologian committed to a moral realism grounded in empirical observation. Banner observes 
that it is only the last decade that a serious dialogue between social anthropology and moral 
philosophy has emerged and with it new tools at the disposal of the Christian ethicist.
829
 Even 
if MacKinnon cannot not be blamed for failing to anticipate this development its emergence 
does point to opportunities for deepening a trajectory he exemplified, as well as 
retrospectively exposing shortcomings pertaining to the depth of realism that he managed to 
attain. 
Milbank acknowledges that a sympathetic reading of MacKinnon’s illuminations and blind-
spots can be aided by an appreciation of his biography. His early commitment to catholic 
humanism made him perennially aware of the temptation to slide into a type of ideological 
moral excess that may accompany revelatory positivism, while the experience of the social 
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fragmentation of the Second World War and the ‘minimal and ambiguous’ presence of the 
church throughout this period made him sceptical that either the church or state (liberal or 
Marxist) could act as trustworthy sites for reliable formation in the virtues.
830
 For MacKinnon  
It was from Kant that the theologians were enabled to see that the universalism of the 
Enlightenment was no facile optimism, but an expression of the need for the devout to 
submit their aspirations to judgement at the bar of a common humanity –lest indeed 
they failed to see the Son of Man in the least of his brethren and, failing, forfeited the 
very faith by which they claimed to live.’
831
 
Yet, for Milbank, even a sympathetic reading informed by MacKinnon’s particular context is 
not enough to salvage his project from what he perceives as an enmeshment in  
…a secular groundwork in ethics…[which attempts] to safeguard the absolute 
disinterestedness of ethics, and the purity of ethical freedom, by stressing agnosticism 




Here a real debate opens. Did MacKinnon draw on Kant to supply a ‘secular’ groundwork for 
ethics? Even if he did, is it not enough to see this as ‘one move in a game’ which can be 
supplemented by a Christ-centred ‘natural law’, especially given MacKinnon’s antipathy to 
an absolute distinction between sacred and secular? Further to this, was MacKinnon right, 
together with Hare, Janz, Insole, Michalson and Hedley to believe that just as there is a 
danger when ‘…thinkers bow deeply and uncritically at the Kantian problem, and then 
pronounce confidently the unique indispensability of their own solution’, so there is also 
danger in failing to see features of Kant’s thought that resist the binary Milbank sets up? As it 
was for many of Milbank’s ‘radical orthodox’ followers, this Kantian ‘curse’ was expunged 
by Neo-Orthodox and revived Aristotelian approaches to Christian virtue ethics, variously 
associated with Barth, MacIntyre and Hauerwas. Yet, in defending a position that has some 
resonance with MacKinnon’s project, Hedley has argued that 
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…one might say that Kant’s “critique” (N.B.) of pure theoretical reason and avowal of 
the primacy of pure practical reason have very little to do with “secularizing 
immanentism” but constitute a firmly Christian insistence on both the inferiority of 
theoretical curiosity and dogmatism and the inherent value of “good will.” Kant is 
endorsing Henry More’s principle: “All pretenders to philosophy will be ready to 
magnify Reason to the skies, and to make it the light of heaven, and the very Oracle of 
God; but they do not consider that the Oracle of God is not to be heard but in His holy 
temple –that is to say, in a good and holy man.”’
833
 
Janz joins Hedley and Michalson in critiquing Milbank’s reading of Kant in a way that is 
broadly affirming of MacKinnon’s legacy.
834
 I suspect that at the base of this dispute lie deep 
assumptions about the doctrine(s) of analogy in Aquinas, Kant and Barth. It is clear that 
MacKinnon perceived a substratum between the three; a conviction that as disparate as they 
might be these different approaches to analogy were themselves strongly analogous, whereas 
Milbank sees irreconcilable foes and the need for an absolute choice.  
I doubt that MacKinnon was anything other than acutely aware of the incommensurability at 
one level: he comments, for instance, on Pryzwara’s influence on Balthasar and the impact 
this had on the latter’s reading of Barth on this issue.
835
 One source of the sheer tension of 
MacKinnon’s project arose from the fact that he claimed a fickle allegiance to both Kant and 
Barth at various points without wishing to discount the impulse behind the notion of the 
‘analogy of being’. On the one hand, his philosophical forays imbibed Kant’s use of analogy, 
yet tempered the extremity of agnosticism with reference to Thomas, while on the other, 
MacKinnon’s christological forays were most influenced by Barth’s treatment of analogy and 
yet with Forsyth, he sought further protection against any charge of fideism by welcoming 
the influence of Kant’s analogical ‘theology’ as a way to illuminate the moral heart of this 
domain. Any further attempts to understand MacKinnon’s legacy on this point will have to 
call upon the help of scholars such as Roger White.
836
 Yet, one will look in vein in 
MacKinnon’s oeuvre for any systematic treatment of analogy and will have to be content 
with mere hints and intimations. MacKinnon’s vagueness opens the way for Milbank’s 
attack, yet subsequent voices (examined above) suggest that at least some of his intuitions 
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survived and were defended by a number of key philosophical theologians in the subsequent 
generation.       
MacKinnon’s theism is entwined with his commitment to moral realism, yet neither could be 
said to ground, vindicate or necessitate the other.
837
 Both are insistences of a realism hard 
won, with ‘facts’ not easily discerned and the whole play of our reception and free response 
ever open to the spectre of the tragic. He is especially insistent that while an emphasis on 
realism is vital for the continued tenability of Christianity, it is not an apologetic short-cut, 
indeed  
…to speak of ethical facts is to speak of what is chimerical; to create for oneself the 
illusion of a world that is somehow represented as the superior counterpart of that 
world of fact wherein statements are verified and hypotheses confirmed, is to invite 
needless trouble. We may say, of course, that the creation of such a world is only a 
moment in discourse, something to be understood in terms of what we are trying to 
bring out by means of it; we are not for a moment supposing that our idiom of finding 
suggests anything in the way of a geographical exploration of the transcendent.
838
  
The Christian is not seen to dwell within a tradition in which the content of moral beliefs 
and their application is immediately obvious (e.g. the parables), and they will always be 
one ‘set on edge’ in the presence ‘…of those who would ignore human limitation to the 
extent of giving a final and irrevocable force to the passing insights of a particular group 
in a particular age’.
839
   
The type of therapy that I have associated with MacKinnon’s borderlands theology is one 
characterised by interrogation, purgation and self-apprehension above all else. The goal of 
therapy was seen as an apprehension of realist moral limits and obligations, all in a wider 
context of avoiding any simple resolution or distortive imbalance in the relationship between 
realism and idealism. MacKinnon’s strength was to harness the purgative potential of key 
intellectual and political movements of his time, while retaining a critical distance by which 
the lens could be turned back onto the therapist at every turn. Whether it was Positivism, 
Kantianism, Marxism, Neo-Orthodoxy, or Wittgensteinian philosophy, he saw important 
therapeutic insights on offer. Each engagement was a ‘move in a game’ and each represented 
a historical moment which was related, often in barely expressible ways, to Christ; the one 
MacKinnon recognised as the ultimate pivot of history and the one who taught him to 
‘perceive tragedy without the loss of hope’.   
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